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**Session speakers: Bios, abstracts and summaries**

**Please note that only materials submitted before the relevant deadlines are included in this document.**

# Session 1

# Creating and Using the Global Evidence Base for Violence Reduction

**Chair: Peter Donnelly - University of St. Andrews, Professor of Public Health and Medicine at the School of Medicine**

Without high quality data the aim of reducing violence significantly in the next 30 years stands little chance of being achieved. This includes data on its scale, distribution, and consequences; risk and protective factors for different types of violence and their causal status; what works to prevent and respond to it and how to scale up what works; and on the costs and cost-effectiveness of effective measures. Speakers in this session will present ways to generate, disseminate, and apply evidence, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, that can help to reduce violence.

## Richard Matzopoulos

**Biography**

Richard Matzopoulos is a Specialist Scientist at the Medical Research Council's Burden of Disease Research Unit and an Honorary Research Associate at the University of Cape Town's School of Public Health and Family Medicine, and its Centre for Occupational and Environmental Health, where he co-ordinates its Violence and Injury Research programme. Richard's research centres on measuring the health and social burden of violence and injury, and evaluating interventions and policies that target upstream determinants. He is currently principal investigator on two competitive grants awarded by Canada's International Development Research Centre and the UK's Department for International Development to evaluate the impact of alcohol policy and urban upgrading on violence reduction in selected low-income communities in South Africa. He advises the Provincial Government of the Western Cape on its interpersonal violence and injury prevention and surveillance activities through its Burden of Disease Reduction Project and chairs its transversal Injury Prevention Working Group. He is one of two South African focal points for the international Violence Prevention Alliance.

**Abstract**

**The Western Cape Government's New Integrated Provincial Violence Prevention Policy Framework: Successes and Challenges**

In August 2013, the Western Cape Government adopted an Integrated Provincial Violence Prevention Policy Framework initiated by the provincial Department of Health in response to the unusually high incidence of, and health burden arising from, interpersonal violence. The Policy Framework encompasses a more comprehensive intersectoral approach to the prevention of violence than the traditional criminal justice and security-centred approach typically promoted in South Africa as the conventional wisdom.  It aims to bring coherence and clarity to the government's objectives in the field of violence prevention by way of a whole-of-government approach encompassing  all sectors. The Policy Framework attempts to balance short-term evidence-based interventions, such as reducing the availability and harmful use of alcohol, with longer term interventions that address complex social norms that support violence, and which are necessary to effect a fundamental and sustained reduction in violence in the next 30 years.  It is consonant with a "whole-of-society" approach current in the South African polity to policy formulation and implementation, and is underpinned by the public health-centred guidelines set out by the international Global Campaign for the Prevention of Violence. The Policy Framework supports evidence-based approaches for violence prevention and a review and consultation process aimed at aligning existing performance priorities and deliverables across departments.  One year after its adoption we review the uptake of this policy and reflect on some of its early successes as well as barriers to its implementation. We identify early resistance arising from its conflict with intra-departmental priorities, the impact of competing policies and directives, and we propose recommendations to support its uptake. This include the establishment of a surveillance site/observatory to provide evaluate effectiveness in local conditions, and a stronger oversight mechanism to improve adherence and perform stewardship and evaluative functions for funded interventions.

**Summary**

**The Western Cape Government's New Integrated Provincial Violence Prevention Policy Framework: Successes and Challenges**

Introduction

In the Western Cape interpersonal violence places a massive burden on the public sector healthcare system and drains resources that could provide healthcare targeting other health needs and improve quality of life. Homicide was the second leading cause of premature mortality after HIV/Aids and homicide rates were 15% higher than other provinces in 2000 1. The provincial Department of Health identified violence as one of five public health priorities in its Burden of Disease Reduction (BoD) Project initiated in 2007. The project prioritised distal risk factors, the “causes of causes”, and upstream interventions typically in sectors other than health – an approach consonant with emerging recommendations from the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health(Health, 2005).

The BoD project’s alignment with the intervention approach and recommendations of the World report on violence and health, which were endorsed by the 2003 World Health Assembly in Resolution WHA56.24, resulted in international recognition. The project was presented at consecutive WHO-hosted “Milestones Meetings” in Scotland in 2007 and Geneva in 2009 as part of the Global Campaign for Violence Prevention. In September 2011, the Western Cape Government (WCG) hosted the 5th Milestones in collaboration with the National Department of Health and the WHO under the theme "Joining forces, empowering prevention". The meeting drew almost 300 experts from more than 60 countries to discuss progress, present new evidence and explore opportunities for increased collaboration between role-players in different sectors, particularly health, social development, and criminal justice. The meeting emphasised the need for policy and programme delivery targets for violence prevention and the WCG was encouraged to put in place an integrated intersectoral policy framework to guide its violence prevention strategy according to a data-driven, evidence-based prevention approach, consistent the policies applied in the Colombian cities of Cali and Bogotá 3.

The Policy Framework, adopted in August 2013, recognises that successful implementation will require the co-operation of all role-players within government, particularly the health, criminal justice, educational and social development sectors, and also to encourage the active participation and partnership of citizens and civil society more broadly. The public health approach and the whole-of-society approach provide the theoretical basis for this convergence. The Policy Framework highlights proven and promising prevention strategies to prevent violence and reduce its impact and requires that efficiency is achieved by directing funding to programmes and initiatives that are effective and that target high-risk times, places and groups at-risk.

Review of the evidence

A selection of the risks that feature prominently in the Policy Framework delineated according to an ecological model include, at the biological level, the disproportionately high burden of violence directed at males, compared to the global ratio, especially among youths and young adults. Notwithstanding, rates of violence against females, sexual assaults in particular, are also considerably higher than global averages.

Mental health problems that increase the risk of victimisation and, in some cases, predispose individuals to violent or aggressive behaviour constitute important risks, whether they have biological roots, or develop following exposure to a wide range of risks for mental health disorders. Hyperactivity, impulsiveness, misconduct, and attention problems experienced in early childhood are important examples that may predispose youths and young adults to display violent and aggressive behaviour.

Several South African studies demonstrate high rates of exposure to violence and associated mental health problems across diverse population groups4–8. This can perpetuate a cycle of violence, alcohol abuse and mental health problems, as exposure to intimate partner violence as a child contributes to violent behaviour in adults9.

The relationship between violence, mental health and alcohol is well-documented 10 and several studies have found a link between alcohol and child abuse and intimate-partner violence across different settings. Intoxicated people are more likely to become victims of violence and in the Western Cape in 1999, 58% of homicides had elevated blood alcohol concentrations at the time of death.

Among the many socio-cultural factors, the structure, behavior and cohesiveness of the family unit is particularly influential in a child’s tendency towards aggressive or violent behavior. Risks prevalent in the Western Cape include a family having a large number of children, a mother having a child at a young age, a low level of family cohesion, single parent households, low socioeconomic status, and abusive parental behaviour including harsh physical punishment and parental conflict. Abrahams et al. found that 23.5% of men from three municipalities in the Western Cape witnessed abuse of their mothers, which was found to be associated with later use of intimate-partner, and other forms of violence in the community and at their workplace.

During adolescence , having violent friends influences the likelihood of a young person engaging in violence and increases the risk of engaging in other delinquent behaviours. Activities relating to gangs, guns, and drugs tend to drive increases in the rate of violence within neighbourhoods and the psychological imprint of these experiences expose children to a range of severe negative mental-health outcomes. A survey amongst youths in the Western Cape revealed that approximately 38% of male school children and 8% of female learners had carried a weapon in the past 6 months 12.

Major social changes and demographic shifts resulting from migration, urbanisation and industrialisation are linked with increased rates of violence among youth, and in South Africa, inequality is an important predictor of violence in communities14. There are marked differences between Cape Town’s health sub-districts in aggregate education level, the percentage of informal dwellings and access to public infrastructure such as piped water and electricity. Internal and cross-border migration have been catalysts for rapid urbanisation and dramatic expansion in the size of sub-economic and informal housing settlements on the urban periphery, areas with the highest rates of violence. Between 2001 and 2006 the Western Cape experienced 100% net migration, the highest of South Africa’s nine provinces.

The Policy Framework encourages investment in those programmes most likely to affect a fundamental and lasting change over the long-term, alongside the implementation of a limited number of “quick-fix” solutions likely to reduce violence in the short-term. Investment in programme documentation and evaluation that measures behaviour change or actual changes in injury rates were identified as important factors to drive long-term investment, ensure effectiveness and enable replication of successful programmes15. Specific evidence-based interventions that are highlighted in the Policy Framework include:

Developing safe, stable and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and caregivers;

Developing life skills in children and adolescents;

Promoting gender equality to prevent violence against women and changing cultural and social norms that support violence; and

Reducing the availability and harmful use of alcohol.

Current implementation status- immediate successes and implementation challenges

We reviewed the uptake of the Policy Framework against its key goals (engaging the whole of society, prioritising long and short-term evidence based interventions, focusing on high risk areas and consolidating monitoring and evaluation) one year after its adoption.

Engaging the whole of society

The provincial government has attempted to reconceptualise the way in which safety is perceived and managed by applying a whole-of-society approach under its Provincial Strategic Objectives and it is currently developing a provincial Crime Prevention Strategy to co-ordinate crime prevention across all three spheres of government: national, regional and local.

This strategy highlights the broad endorsement of the whole-of-society approach, but while this is an engaging theory for violence prevention, the practicalities of implementation are complex. There is a tendency to prioritise and provide service according to department silos or spheres of influence. Uptake by the police (mandated by national government) has been slow and stalled the Crime Prevention Strategy’s inception and may reflect hostility between national and provincial competencies of state silos. The relationship between the private sector security services and the public sector police is also problematic with the public sector shedding responsibility to the private sector. This leads to security inequity with poor security services accorded to those who cannot pay.

The primacy of crime as the social ill to be addressed in the provincial, rather than violence, immediately entrenches a focus on criminal justice responses, which echoes the national precedent. The National Development Plan’s chapter on Building Safer Communities describes an “holistic view of safety and security” but the implementation focus is directed almost exclusively on improving the criminal justice system

and most particularly, policing.

Prioritising evidence-based interventions

Provincially, nationally and globally the Policy Framework competes with other strategies, none of which apply a consistent interpretation of the evidence-base for violence prevention. Even the 67th World Health Assembly’s Resolution on Violence Prevention, which follows a public-health approach consistent with the Policy Framework has a disproportionate focus on the plight of women, children and girls (Ref Matzopoulos, Cornell, Myers, Bowman in press). The National Development Plan similarly ignores young men as a vulnerable group, and in describing the implementation of “strategies known to work” pays scant attention to the evidence base for interventions. The provincial Crime Prevention Strategy makes no mention of a public health or evidence-based approach to violence prevention.

Amendments to provincial alcohol regulation pose a direct challenge to the intervention strategy proposed in the Policy Framework. The Western Cape Liquor Act, which aimed to regulate sales and limit alcohol harms encountered strong resistance from the alcohol industry, which slowed its drafting and the implementation of its regulations. In February 2014 the City of Cape Town adopted a by-law to extend trading times beyond the limits that preceded the Act. Another example is the inclusion of boxing as one of the key diversion strategies for youths in high-risk communities despite no evidence as to its effectiveness for youth violence prevention, and Health Department concerns that boxing could increase traumatic brain injuries, which are associated with subsequent violent behaviour, and could increase participants’ long-term risk.

A focus on high-risk areas

The focus on high-risk areas has been bolstered by the expansion of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading interventions, which were first piloted in Cape Town to five other Western Cape municipalities. The interventions are jointly funded by the German Development Bank (KfW) and the Provincial Government’s Regional Socioeconomic Programme.

Institutionalising monitoring and evaluation

Evaluation of the alcohol and urban upgrading interventions in two low-income communities, Khayelitsha and Nyanga, is being supported by research funding from the International Development Research Centre (Canada) and the Department for International Development (UK). The research includes a process to develop indicators across five key domains that are considered to influence the incidence of violence at the community level: alcohol, infrastructure, safety and security, youth development, and socio-economic development. Outcome data is complemented by the provincial Department of Health, which is piloting rapid cross-sectional studies of non-fatal injuries 16 presenting to health facilities in high-risk areas. The Provincial Injury Mortality Surveillance System provides full coverage of all injury deaths in the province17.

Conclusions and recommendations

The strongest indication that the Policy Framework is influencing the violence prevention agenda in the province is the support for the broad intervention approach and evaluation research in selected high-risk communities.

This should inform the development of a surveillance site/observatory to provide ongoing monitoring and new evidence as to which interventions work best in local conditions.

The main deficiency is the questionable adherence to evidence-based approaches for violence prevention, either because evidence-based practice is not well understood or it is simply ignored because it impinges on competing priorities. In the last month the Provincial Government has proposed changes to its Provincial Transversal Management System and the consolidation of a Strategic Objective to Increase wellness, safety and tackle social ills. Developing a stronger oversight mechanism to improve adherence and perform stewardship and evaluative functions for a raft of wholly or partly funded approved violence prevention interventions should be one of its key priorities.

Current interventions should be critically appraised to show their strengths and to highlight critical areas that need to be improved to demonstrate “effectiveness”.

A Steering Committee should be established that includes academics with knowledge of evidence-based research and decision makers from within government.

Formative research should be undertaken to assess and shape decision makers’ understanding of what defines and constitutes evidence, how evidence is used and which other factors drive intervention responses.

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## Karen Hughes

**Biography**

Karen Hughes is a Professor in Behavioural Epidemiology at the Centre for Public Health, Liverpool John Moores University; a World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Violence Prevention. She runs an extensive research programme undertaking epidemiological studies, systematic literature reviews and evaluation studies examining issues around violence prevention, alcohol use, nightlife health and other youth risk behaviours. She oversees the development of the Violence Prevention Evidence Base and Trials Register at www.preventviolence.info, which collate information on published studies and ongoing trials of violence prevention outcome evaluations. She has also co-authored a series of policy briefings, evidence reviews and focused reports on violence prevention with the World Health Organization, including the Prevent Violence: The Evidence series. Within the UK, Karen works with the Department of Health, the Home Office and a range of other national and local partners to support violence prevention activity. She has published a wide range of peer-reviewed journal articles and has acted as an expert advisor to bodies including the World Health Organization, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and the National Institute for Health Research.

**Abstract**

**Is the Violence Prevention Evidence Base Fit to Inform a Global Violence Reduction Strategy?**

Global strategies to address violence have increasingly recognised the importance of applying a science-based approach to prevention. The need for evidence has been identified as particularly substantive in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) where over 85% of violent deaths occur.  These countries are also predicted to account for the vast majority of global population growth over the next 30 years. Thus, understanding what works to prevent violence in less developed societies and how transferrable evidence-based interventions developed in high income countries are to LMICs is fundamental in developing a global violence reduction strategy. Drawing on the rolling systematic reviews conducted to populate the prevent violence evidence base (www.preventviolence.info), a collaborative project between Liverpool John Moores University, the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, this presentation will examine the state of the global violence prevention evidence base, identifying gaps in its geographical distribution and the types of violence addressed. The evidence base contains almost 400 journal articles reporting findings from violence prevention outcome evaluation studies published between January 2007 and June 2014. The presentation will consider how it can contribute to the development of a global violence reduction strategy and how it could be strengthened to support substantial reductions in violence over the next 30 years.

# Session 2

# Building Violence Prevention Research Capacity

**Chair: Patricia Lannen - UBS Optimus Foundation, Programme Director of Child Protection**

Evidence-based violence reduction requires an adequate in-country research capacity, to generate the necessary evidence and then to apply it effectively. Speakers in this session will examine the extent to which risk factors for violence differ between cultures, how national information systems can be used to address violence more effectively, and what strategies are needed to overcome obstacles to translating evidence-based principles into policy.

## Joseph Murray

**Biography**

Dr Joseph Murray is a Wellcome Trust Research Fellow and Senior Research Associate at the Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, with affiliate positions at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, and the Postgraduate Programme in Health Sciences, Federal University of Uberlândia, Brazil. He graduated from the University of Oxford with a B.A. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, and completed an M.Phil and Ph.D. at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, where he worked as a Research Associate and then Senior Research Associate until 2010. His work centres on the development of conduct problems, crime and violence through the life course in cross-national perspective. He has investigated the childhood origins of antisocial behaviour in several large, longitudinal studies in Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, the United States, and Brazil. His current research focuses on biological, psychological and social influences on antisocial behaviour in two birth cohort studies in Brazil (the 1982 and 1993 Pelotas Birth Cohort Studies) and one in Britain (ALSPAC), funded by a Wellcome Trust Research Fellowship (2010-2015). Previous awards include a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship (2006-09), the Nigel Walker Prize (Cambridge University, 2007), and the Distinguished Young Scholar Award (American Society of Criminology, Division of Corrections and Sentencing, 2008).

**Abstract**

**Universal Risk Factors for Violence? Evidence from Low- and Middle-Income Countries**


We know least about the causes of violence where it matters most. The highest rates of serious violence are found in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, but nearly all major studies of the developmental origins of violence have taken place in a small number of high-income countries in Europe, North America, and Australasia. To reduce global violence by 50% in the next 30 years, major investment will be needed to identify causes of violence where rates are highest. Two large-scale birth cohort studies in the city of Pelotas, Brazil provide a unique opportunity to investigate the development of violence, and identify risk and protective factors in a middle-income context with a high rate of violence. Over 5,000 children in each study have been followed since their births in 1982 and 1993. Official crime records have been collected for both cohorts and their parents. Self-reported crime data was collected at age 18 in the 1993 cohort that can be directly compared with a well-matched British study (ALSPAC), including some 14,000 children born in the early 1990's in the Bristol city area. We have compared associations between health and socio-demographic risk factors in the perinatal period and violence at age 18 years between the 1993 Pelotas birth cohort and ALSPAC. Many of the same risk factors were important in both contexts; for example conduct problems were predicted in both Brazil and Britain by the following: unplanned pregnancy, maternal smoking in pregnancy, teenage mother, low maternal education, single mother, and low family income. However, several risk factor associations were significantly weaker in Brazil than in Britain and, strikingly, almost no risk factors were predictive of male youth violence in Brazil. Developmental origins of violence may vary across social context. Violence research must become truly global to produce an evidence base for effective action in every region.

**Summary**

**Universal Risk Factors for Violence? Evidence from Low- and Middle-Income Countries**


In 2010, 456 thousand people died from interpersonal violence worldwide; 86% of these deaths occurred in low and middle-income countries.1 Leading criminologists have argued for more globalised research on crime and violence.2,3 However, major research programmes continue to focus almost exclusively on high-income countries. Several dozen large-scale longitudinal studies in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand have documented the developmental course of aggression and other antisocial behaviours through the life-course, and highlighted opportunities for prevention and intervention at different developmental stages. Risk factors have been replicated and meta-analysed across these studies, showing the importance of a wide range of influences at the individual, family, peer, school and community levels.4,5 Protective factors are beginning to be identified reflecting processes of resilience for individuals exposed to high risk environments.6 However, this knowledge base, as summarized in major reviews, is not global.

The highest rates of the most serious forms of violence (homicide) are found in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1). Notably, although the United States is considered a country with a high level of violence, its homicide rate (6.5 per 100,000 people, per year) is far lower than many Latin American and African countries (average for Central Latin America = 31.4; average for Tropical Latin America = 30.6, average for Sub-Saharan Africa = 34.0;).1 To reduce violence by 50% in the next 30 years, prevention efforts will have to focus on regions with high levels of violence. A major challenge is that basic evidence on the epidemiology, causes and risk factors for violence is less developed in these settings, and the same approaches to prevention may not be effective if the specific causes of violence are not identified.



**Figure 1.** Worldwide homicide rates in 2010. Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: *Global Study on Homicide, 2011*

Given enormous cultural, social, and economic variation between low- and middle-income countries, it cannot be assumed that findings from a limited number of high-income countries are truly universal. Two examples illustrate the point. First, one of the most widely acknowledged correlates of physical aggression and violence is male gender. Innumerous studies have found that males demonstrate more physical aggression in childhood and more violence during adolescence and adulthood. But is this pattern universal? Our preliminary results based on data from the Global School-Based Student Health Survey, conducted in over 50 low- and middle-income countries, suggest not (Figure 2). We find considerable variation in sex-differences in frequent fighting (4+ fights in the previous year) in early adolescence (ages 12-15). In some countries, girls and boys actually show similar rates of frequent fighting to each other. If this most basic correlate of violence varies so much across low- and middle-income countries, what are the prospects for consistent replication of other risk factors that might be targeted in violence prevention programmes?



**Figure 2.** Odds Ratios (95% CI) for the sex-difference in frequent fighting in 59 low- and middle-income countries. Source: Global School-Based Student Health Survey

Another key finding from longitudinal studies in high-income countries is the link between persistent conduct problems in childhood and the development of more serious violence in adolescence and young adulthood.7 Again, the generalisability of this basic finding may be questioned when taking a global perspective. If this developmental model were correct, one would expect that countries with high levels of violence also have high levels of childhood conduct disorders. However, systematic reviews of the literature suggest that the prevalence of conduct and other externalising disorders vary little by geographical region.8,9 Why do some countries develop high levels of violence in adolescence and young adulthood despite normative levels of childhood disorders? Does the standard developmental model of violence need adapting across social context?

To assess the current state of knowledge about correlates and risk factors for conduct problems, crime and violence in low- and middle-income countries we have been conducting a systematic review. We have searched for studies in six different languages (English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic) and screened over 40,000 references. Studies were eligible for the review if they included at least 100 participants from a general population sample in a low- or middle-income country, and reported tests of correlates or risk factors for conduct problems, crime, or violence in children or youth (up to age 30). This extensive search revealed that about 38 longitudinal studies have been conducted on these topics in low- and middle-income countries. However, the vast majority focused on childhood conduct problems, and only a handful examined youth violence as an outcome.

**New findings from longitudinal studies in Brazil**

To advance knowledge on causes of violence in a middle-income setting with a high rate of violence, we are conducting new research in Brazil. Two birth cohorts born in 1982 and 1993 in the city of Pelotas, southern Brazil, including over 5,000 participants in each, have been repeatedly assessed since birth in interviews, questionnaires, and clinic assessments. In recent years, we have collected self-report information on violence, and criminal records for both cohorts. These provide data on violence up to age 18 for the 1993 cohort and up to age 30 for the 1982 cohort. The 1993 cohort is well-matched with a similar study in England (ALSPAC, including some 14,000 children born in the Bristol area in the early 1990’s). This provides a unique opportunity to compare the development of violent behaviour through time, and risk factors between two very different social contexts. Given the health and social disadvantages that many children in Brazil are exposed to from the start of life, we have examined the role of very early (perinatal) variables in predicting childhood conduct problems and youth violence in the Pelotas 1993 cohort, and compared findings with ALSPAC.

**Method**

In the 1993 Pelotas Birth Cohort, all births occurring in the five maternity clinics in the town of Pelotas were monitored in 1993 (99% of births in Pelotas occurred in hospital). 5,249 newborns, whose mothers lived in the urban area, were included in the cohort. ALSPAC recruited 14,541 pregnant women resident in Avon, Britain with expected dates of delivery 1st April 1991 to 31st December 1992; and, from age 7, continued to recruit children born in that area at that time until age 18. We used data on 14,762 live-born singleton or twin children.

Risk factors were measured during perinatal interviews with mothers in Pelotas and in similar questionnaire items during pregnancy and perinatal assessments with mothers in ALSPAC. The following health and social risk factors were assessed in both studies: unplanned pregnancy, mother ever smoked in pregnancy, mother used alcohol regularly in pregnancy, maternal urinary infection during pregnancy, intrauterine growth restriction, premature birth, young maternal age, low maternal education, single mother, large family, and low family income.

When children were age 11 years, childhood conduct problems were measured in both studies using the parent version of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire.

At age 18, violent and non-violent crime were assessed in a confidential self-report questionnaire. The questionnaire used in ALSPAC was first translated to Brazilian Portuguese, piloted in the local population, adjusted by bi-lingual researchers, and back-translated to English.

**Preliminary findings**

Across a range of perinatal and demographic indicators, children in the Brazilian cohort were exposed to many more risk factors than in the British cohort, emphasising the different starting points for children born in in middle- versus high-income settings, with possible repercussions for development.

Many of the same risk factors were important in both contexts; the following risk factors predicted conduct problems in both Brazil and Britain: unplanned pregnancy, maternal smoking in pregnancy, teenage mother, low maternal education, single mother, low family income, and cumulative counts of perinatal and demographic risk factors. However, we found that several associations between risk factors and antisocial outcomes were significantly weaker in Brazil than in Britain. Strikingly, almost no risk factors were predictive of male youth violence in Brazil.

One reason why perinatal factors may be less important for violence in Brazil than in Britain is the “social push” hypothesis, whereby early biological factors are less important in contexts where social influences play a strong role. For example, in Brazil, male violence in adolescence may be better explained by exposure to gangs, drug and arms trades, disordered schools, weak state infrastructure in poor communities, a culture of violence, and ineffective police and justice systems.10 To our knowledge, this is the first study to test the equivalence of risk factor associations across large, population-based cohorts between social contexts as different as Brazil and Britain.

**Conclusion**

Preliminary findings from comparison of two large Brazilian and British cohort studies demonstrate that risk factor associations can be highly dependent on the broader social context. Prevention programmes developed in high-income countries may not prove effective in other settings. Serious investment must be made in basic research on causes of violence in low- and middle-income countries where the problem of violence is greate

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## Arturo Cervantes

**Biography**

Arturo Cervantes is Carlos Peralta Chair of Public Health at the Faculty of Health Sciences, Anahuac University Mexico, from 2014 appointed General Director of Information Systems for the National Institute for Educational Evaluation (INEE).

From 2007 – 2013 he served as Technical Secretary of the National Council for Injury Prevention and General Director of the National Center for Injury Prevention, Mexican Ministry of Health. He is co-author of the Mexican National Program for Road Safety 2007 – 2012 and the National Road Safety Strategy 2011 – 2020.

He obtained his Medical degree at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and both a Masters and a Doctorate degree in public health from Harvard University. He is board certified by the National Council of Public Health in Mexico and member of the charter class of the National Board of Public Health Examiners in the United States.

Since 2009 he is member of the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Global Violence Prevention, National Academies of Science, United States. He participated in the regional expert committee for the "Global report on violence and health", World Health Organization, and from  2007 – 2013 he represented Mexico´s Ministry of Health in the Violence Prevention Alliance, Global Campaign for Violence Prevention, WHO, Geneva.

**Abstract**

**Challenges and Opportunities for Large Scale Violence Prevention Efforts in Mexico**

This paper will contribute to the overall theme of the conference “How to Reduce Violence by 50% in the next 30 years” in two ways: First; based on official mortality information from 1998 – 2012, we present an overview of the epidemiology of homicide and suicide across the country, including time trends, age and gender specific rates, and geographic distribution. Second; based on implementation challenges faced by current violence and delinquency prevention efforts at National, State and Municipal levels, key recommendations for policy-makers are described, regarding key challenges and opportunities for violence and delinquency prevention program design and implementation.

Temporal and geographic trends in officially registered violence related deaths (216,462 homicides and 77,334 suicides) that have occurred between 1998 and 2012 on Mexican territory are presented. A strong increase in homicide has occurred starting in 2007 and in absolute terms, men between 20 and 49 years form the most vulnerable group, with an average homicide rate in 2012 of over 40 per 100,000. Suicide rates have also shown a steady increase over the 15 year period, specifically among females between 12 and 39 years and males between 12 and 49 years of age. Suicide rates in girls of 12 to 15 years old have almost triplicated while for boys in the same age group, the suicide rates have nearly duplicated in the 15 year time period.

Starting in 2013, an unprecedented National Violence and Delinquency Prevention Program has been launched by the current federal government administration, targeting specific municipalities and neighborhoods with highest rates of crime and violence across the country. We discuss the program design and major components, as well as challenges faced by different sectors and levels of government in charge of implementing violence reduction strategies. We reflect about the use of scientific research for informing public policy and program design and discuss opportunities that exist in order to strengthen multi sectoral evidence-based violence prevention in Mexico.

**Summary**

**Challenges and Opportunities for Large Scale Violence Prevention Efforts in Mexico**

In 1996, the World Health Organization defined violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (as cited in Dahlberg & Krug, 2002, p. 5). Since the Forty-Ninth World Health Assembly [WHA] (1996) declared violence a major and growing global public health problem, many international efforts, such as the Global Burden of Disease study (Lozano et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2012), the World Report on Violence and Health (Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002) and the associated Global Campaign on Violence Prevention (Violence Prevention Alliance [VPA],2012), have brought evidence-based violence prevention onto the public health agenda (see also, Rutherford, Zwi, Grove, & Butchart, 2007a, 2007b).

Every year in the world, an estimated 1.34 million violent deaths occur from intentional injury, of which around 880,000 are self-inflicted (i.e., suicides) and 460,000 are other-inflicted (i.e., homicides; Lozano et al., 2012). Worldwide, both homicide and suicide rank among the leading causes of death among those aged 15–44 years. Experts agree that deaths, injuries and disabilities due to violence are expected to increase in the world, especially in low- and middle-income countries (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2014; VPA, 2012). Recent data show that Central America, together with Southern Africa, has the highest homicide rates in the world, reaching above 24 victims per 100,000 population in 2012, whereas the global, world-wide homicide rate amounted to 6.2 per 100,000; when considering the five global regions defined by the United Nations, homicides rates are highest in the Americas with 16.3 homicides per 100,000 as compared to 2.9 in Asia, 3.0 in Oceania and Europe, and 12.5 in Africa (UNODC, 2014). Conversely, suicide rates in the Americas with 7.9 per 100,000 are—together with Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean region—considerably lower as compared to Europe, South-East Asia (which includes India), and the Western Pacific region (including China and Japan), where about 14 suicides occur per 100,000 population (Värnik, 2012).

In the last decade, mortality from violence, and particularly homicide, has strongly increased in Mexico, which moved the country into the group of Latin American countries with highest rates of violence-related deaths (Gawryzewski, Sanhueza, Martinez-Piedra, Escamilla, & Marinho de Souza, 2012; UNODC, 2014). Although this increase has been amply documented and discussed in the popular as well as the academic press (Dube, Dube, & García-Ponce, 2013; González-Pérez, Vega-López, Cabrera-Pivaral, Vega-López, & Muñoz de la Torre, 2012; Hernández-Bringas & Flores-Arenales, 2011; Salama, 2013; Vilalta, 2013, 2014), the evolution over time has been studied either globally or at the level of distressed areas or states. The present study examines the overall temporal pattern of change in homicides and suicides since 1998 in Mexico, segregated by gender and age groups, and how this temporal evolution spatially distributes at the aggregate level of municipalities. Findings are discussed in relation to existing literature on the psychological and sociological impact of living and growing up in a violence-stricken neighborhood. We conclude with some implications for policy-making.

Two sources of data were combined in the present project. Both sources are made available by Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía [INEGI], n.d.). On the one hand, we downloaded population counts from the Mexican censuses in the years 2000, 2005, and 2010, separated for each of the 2,456 municipalities in the country and segregated by sex and for each year of age. These data were analyzed, separately for homicides and suicides and for each sex-age group, by means of multilevel logistic regression models (which belong to the family of hierarchical or mixed-effects generalized linear models; see Snijders & Bosker, 2012, chap.17; Wong & Mason, 1985). In view of the small numbers of suicides in the lowest age group (an average of 1.0 per 1,000,000 per year, boys and girls taken together) and some methodological issues in classifying child mortality as suicides (Crepeau-Hobson, 2010), we excluded children younger than 12 years of age from the analysis.

The accelerated increase of violence that has characterized Mexico in the last decade has been amply discussed by the national as well as the international scientific community (Krug et al., 2002; Lozano et al., 2012). In line with other studies (Gawryzewski et al., 2012; González-Pérez, Vega-López, Cabrera-Pivaral, Vega-López, & Muñoz de la Torre, 2012), we found an overall gradual decrease in the yearly homicide rates from the start of our study period in 1998 to 2007, followed by a strong increase leading to a triplication of the homicide rate in the period 2007–2012. Our differentiated approach highlighted that this overall evolution is not uniform across all sex and age groups. Indeed, the temporal evolution turned out to be fundamentally different for the younger and the older age groups as compared to the “middle” age groups. The obtained results suggest that the apparent general increase of violence in Mexico primordially strikes women between 16 and 50 years and men between 16 and 60 years of age, while for young children and women above 50, the homicide rate has remained relatively constant over the study period. (For males between 12 and 15 years, and above 60, the evolutionary trend is somewhat mixed in that the increase since 2006/2007 is smaller than in the other age groups for men). In spite of the evolution being similar for women and men in the middle age groups, homicide rates are considerably higher in men from the age of 16 onwards.

Homicide rates and their evolution also strongly differ geographically and are found to be highest in areas traditionally related to drugs traffic and organized crime (in particular the border with the United States). Moreover, our results suggest that in urban, densely populated areas homicide rates are higher than in rural, sparsely populated areas, which was also a significant factor in explaining the differences in homicide rates among Latin-American countries and cities in the study by Briceño-León, Villaveces, and

Concha-Eastman (2008). However, as pointed out by the latter authors, the degree of urbanization is likely to be entangled with other factors, including poverty and social inequality, which may be more strongly related to interpersonal violence. It would be interesting for a follow-up study to relate the homicide rates in Mexican municipalities with the well-known Gini index for income inequality (Ceriani & Verme, 2012) and other indices summarizing the municipalities’ level of social welfare.

Our suicide results largely coincide with and extend those obtained by Hernández-Bringas and Flores-Arenales (2011). A steady increase of the suicide rates, accurately described by a linear function of time over the full study period, is found in women up to 39 years and men up to 49 years of age. Among these, the alarming increase in young adolescents (both males and females, between 12 and 15 years of age) warrants immediate attention. On the other hand, our results indicate that in the older age groups, the suicide rates have remained relatively constant. A study of Shah (2012) comparing the temporal trends in suicide rates across countries found that, although suicide rates world-wide increased more in older age groups, the pattern was opposite in developing countries, particularly with high income inequality and low per capita expenditure in health care. Furthermore, in line with a general difference in gender ratio (see, Schrijvers, Bollen, & Sabbe, 2012), completed suicide was found to be more likely in males than in females (while the reverse is true for nonfatal suicide attempts), which is a gap that tends to increase further with age.

This violence epidemic entails adverse effects in a wide range of the country’s developmental parameters. First, the direct impact on physical health can be quantified not only in number of deaths, but also in terms of life years lost, which according to estimates by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation [IHME] (2013) amounts to

1.27 million yearly due to the combination of self-inflicted and other-inflicted violence. In this respect, González-Pérez, Vega-López, and Cabrera-Pivaral (2012) argued that the increase in the rate of homicidal violence, especially among young people, explains why in Mexico, contrary to a worldwide trend, life expectancy in males fails to show an increase.

Second, Krug et al. (2002) amply discussed the negative impacts of a violent context not only on physical but also on mental health. In particular, violence often leads to depressions, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders, not only in the victims and their families, but also in the perpetrators. In this respect, it is interesting to see a significant positive correlation (r = .24, p < .01)between the suicide rate in a municipality and its increase in homicide rate between 2007 and 2010; this in spite of a negative correlation between homicide and suicide in the Americas found by Bills and Li (2005) prior to the violence increase in Mexico. Moreover, in many cases these mental health problems translate to a wide range of problematic behaviors, including but not limited to drugs and alcohol abuse. In addition, the levels of stress experienced by communities in Mexico with higher levels of violence have been linked to lower academic performance among students (Magaloni, 2012). In the same vein, other studies have estimated the acute effect of exposure to local homicides on the general cognitive development of children suggesting the need for a broader recognition of the negative impact of extreme violent acts on children (even regardless of whether the violence is witnessed directly, Sharkey, 2010).

Third, there is a huge economic cost associated with violence. The World Bank (2012) estimated the costs as a consequence of violence between 8% and 15% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Mexico (depending on whether direct, indirect, and/or intangible costs are included in the assessment). In addition, the cost of violence containment spent in Mexico is currently estimated at around 6.8% of the gross domestic product (GDP), that is, around 126 billion US$ annually (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).

The federal government administration, headed by President Enrique Pena Nieto, has decided to place prevention at the center of their security strategy. In 2013 the unprecedented creation of a National Violence and Delinquency Prevention Program was announced. This National Program has the virtue of being proposed in accordance with the ecological framework and the explicit support of interventions aimed at risk and protective factors at individual, family, community and social levels. Another key aspect is that National Laws and State Norms for implementing violence prevention include in their terminology several key definitions, including the explicit mention of three levels of primary secondary and tertiary prevention which are the key concept of the public health approach. This fact is of fundamental importance and offers a great area for opportunity by acting as an enabler for financing large-scale theory driven social programs at federal, state and local levels, according to sound and constructs and program models.

The National Program has identified 100 key geographical areas through the country and is investing unprecedented financial and human resources for the sole purpose of targeted violence and delinquency prevention. However, formal and informal evaluations of the National Violence and Delinquency Prevention Program have identified the following key areas of opportunity in order to better design and implement this type of complex intervention programs.

First; those responsible for funding the implementation of violence and delinquency prevention programs need to understand that value of the scientific approach, which is currently being used in many violence prevention initiatives globally. Therefore, governmental authorities, social and public health workers, the private sector and other social actors need to be made aware of the growing epidemic, as well as of the scientific basis of violence prevention that has accumulated over the last four decades.

Second; there is a lack of measurement and evaluation, observable at all levels of the program. This implies that programs and interventions which are being funded are not strictly selected based on science. As such, many interventions lack clear goals and targets specific to violence prevention, or the use of key performance indicators at local and community levels. Evidence based public health practice calls for the establishment of rigorous measurement of the effect of interventions. Monitoring and evaluation should become commonplace and are necessary in order to demonstrate effects and only programs and interventions with proven effects should be funded. A specific minimum amount (in the range of 10% to 20% of total program budgets) is desirable to be specifically set aside for measurement and evaluation activities.

Third; in order to contribute to the control and prevention of this growing epidemic, it is advisable that valuable existing evidence derived from multidisciplinary approaches in the social sciences, regarding what interventions have shown to be most useful and effective for preventing violence, across different age groups and settings, should urgently become widespread. This is most important within the context of underdeveloped social organizations and weak institutional settings, where there is an overall lack of implementation experience at the local level. This transfers in the need for training in capacity building and in intervention implementation methodology.

Fourth, epidemiologic surveillance and geographic information systems (GIS) for intentional injuries need to be in place. This entails financial and human resources who will be in charge of measurement, must be considered in long term funding mechanisms. Careful attention must be paid to the longitudinal aspect of research design. The private sector is a key ally for this endeavor whose collaboration needs to be well grounded in state and national policies and its operations financed.

Fifth; in this juncture, the specific collaboration of Criminal Justice and Police agencies with their Public-Health, Education and Social Development counterparts, remains the biggest challenge. Laws and regulations are not enough to guarantee the multi-sectoral collaboration and articulation that is needed in order to effectively deliver comprehensive program elements. Multi sector involvement in a well-coordinated fashion represents the main challenge faced when implementing violence prevention policies. Local prevention projects should be strengthened by having in place multi sectorial project planning groups, composed of federal, state and local authorities, and including organized civil society and private sector groups. Also, state-level prevention programs need to be specifically supported with adequate long term financial, human and technical resources, in order to accompany and safeguard the management, implementation and follow up of violence prevention interventions.

In addition, the World Health Organization [WHO] (2012) recently endorsed a set of policy recommendations in order to reduce the prevalence and inverse impact of violence. These recommendations vary according to the type of violence and the sector of the population affected (e.g., child abuse, intimate partner violence, youth violence, violence against the elderly, and self-inflicted violence) and include (a) the development of primary intervention programs for young children and their care-givers aimed at fostering strong, stable, and stimulating relationships (which have been shown to be more cost-effective, Institute of Medicine, 2013), (b) programs for enhancing the cognitive, emotional, interpersonal, and social life-skills in children and adolescents, (c) the reduction of the availability and consumption of alcohol, which is considered a risk factor for all types of violent behavior, (d) a restricted accessibility to lethal means, including hand guns, blades, and poisons, and (e) an improved attention and support for victims.

Given the extent and the growth of the violence problem in Mexico during recent years, it is mandatory to translate the available scientific evidence into effective actions, like the suggestions by the WHO (2012). Therefore, Mexico must move beyond political

discourse and ensure that the finite resources available for violence prevention are used in a scientifically sound way. Evidence further indicates that, to this end, a multisectoral approach is most successful, that breaks down silos and in which the efforts of policy makers, the state health department, the educational system, the judicial system, and civil society members are orchestrated.

**Table 1**

*Mexico Population Size, Number of Homicides and Suicides, and Associated Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants for Males and Females in Each Year Between 1998 to 2012.*

**Homicides Suicides**

Males Females Males Females

Year Population Count (rate) Population Count (rate) Population Count (rate) Population Count (rate)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1998 | 47,201,666 | 11,940 (25.3) | 49,412,151 | 1,529 | (3.1) | 33,467,473 | 2,769 | (8.3) | 36,077,769 | 517 | (1.4) |
| 1999 | 47,457,624 | 10,694 (22.5) | 49,714,147 | 1,407 | (2.8) | 33,777,314 | 2,802 | (8.3) | 36,436,040 | 493 | (1.4) |
| 2000 | 47,713,583 | 9,309 (19.5) | 50,016,144 | 1,291 | (2.6) | 34,087,155 | 2,911 | (8.5) | 36,794,311 | 538 | (1.5) |
| 2001 | 48,225,500 | 8,876 (18.4) | 50,620,136 | 1,300 | (2.6) | 34,706,838 | 3,081 | (8.9) | 37,510,854 | 665 | (1.8) |
| 2002 | 48,737,418 | 8,752 (18.0) | 51,224,129 | 1,283 | (2.5) | 35,326,520 | 3,183 | (9.0) | 38,227,396 | 651 | (1.7) |
| 2003 | 49,249,335 | 8,680 (17.6) | 51,828,122 | 1,322 | (2.6) | 35,946,202 | 3,385 | (9.4) | 38,943,938 | 687 | (1.8) |
| 2004 | 49,761,253 | 8,073 (16.2) | 52,432,114 | 1,208 | (2.3) | 36,565,884 | 3,393 | (9.3) | 39,660,481 | 667 | (1.7) |
| 2005 | 50,273,170 | 8,600 (17.1) | 53,036,107 | 1,294 | (2.4) | 37,185,566 | 3,553 | (9.6) | 40,377,023 | 730 | (1.8) |
| 2006 | 51,189,582 | 9,079 (17.7) | 53,925,147 | 1,295 | (2.4) | 38,045,581 | 3,522 | (9.3) | 41,207,151 | 705 | (1.7) |
| 2007 | 52,105,994 | 7,711 (14.8) | 54,814,187 | 1,080 | (2.0) | 38,905,595 | 3,610 | (9.3) | 42,037,279 | 768 | (1.8) |
| 2008 | 53,022,407 | 12,726 (24.0) | 55,703,227 | 1,434 | (2.6) | 39,765,609 | 3,798 | (9.6) | 42,867,408 | 852 | (2.0) |
| 2009 | 53,938,819 | 17,817 (33.0) | 56,592,267 | 1,943 | (3.4) | 40,625,623 | 4,144 | (10.2) | 43,697,536 | 985 | (2.3) |
| 2010 | 54,855,231 | 23,452 (42.8) | 57,481,307 | 2,429 | (4.2) | 41,485,637 | 4,065 | (9.8) | 44,527,664 | 913 | (2.1) |
| 2011 | 55,313,437 | 24,432 (44.2) | 57,925,827 | 2,732 | (4.7) | 41,915,645 | 4,583 | (10.9) | 44,942,728 | 1,080 | (2.4) |
| 2012 | 55,771,643 | 22,118 (39.7) | 58,370,347 | 2,656 | (4.6) | 42,345,652 | 4,332 | (10.2) | 45,357,792 | 1,043 | (2.3) |

*Note.* Infants up to 11 years are excluded from the suicide data, which explains the different population sizes for homicides and suicides.

## Abigail Fagan

**Biography**

Abigail A. Fagan is an Associate Professor at the University of Florida in the Department of Sociology, Criminology & Law. Dr. Fagan's research focuses on the etiology and prevention of adolescent substance use, delinquency, and violence, with an emphasis on examining the ways in which scientific advances can be successfully translated into effective crime and delinquency prevention practices. Her etiological research has been funded by the National Institute of Justice and National Institute on Drug Abuse and focuses on the effects of family processes (e.g., parenting practices and sibling relationships), victimization experiences, and community influences on juvenile offending. Her prevention-related research includes work on the Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development initiative and the Community Youth Development Study, both of which seek to assist community agencies and practitioners in identifying effective crime prevention and health promotion interventions and implementing these strategies with fidelity. Dr. Fagan has published over 50 peer reviewed articles on these topics, presented to various community agencies, academic audiences, and policy makers, and served on the Board of Directors of the Society for Prevention Research (SPR).

**Abstract**

**Overcoming Obstacles to High Quality Implementation of Evidence-based Principles in Violence Prevention**

Achieving significant reductions in violence world-wide, the goal of this conference, will be contingent upon the adoption, implementation, and dissemination of programs, policies, and practices shown in well-conducted studies to decrease violent behaviors. Although progress must still be made in the identification of such evidence-based interventions, this presentation will focus on enhancing the use of existing violence prevention strategies. Drawing from studies of implementation science, I will discuss the importance of all stages of the implementation process, from exploration through sustainability (Fixsen, Blase, Naoom, & Wallace, 2009). To achieve local implementation success, communities must: 1) differentiate evidence-based strategies from non-evidence-based interventions and prioritize the use of the former, 2) engage in careful planning and needs assessments prior to adopting a new intervention, 3) commit to replicating the new strategy with integrity and enthusiasm, and 4) monitor the quality of implementation and engage in quality improvement as needed. Challenges in completing these steps and strategies for overcoming obstacles will be highlighted using examples from communities engaged in violence prevention and youth health promotion activities. The potential for taking these practices to scale nationally and internationally will also be discussed.

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**Summary**

**Overcoming Obstacles to High Quality Implementation**

**of Evidence-based Principles in Violence Prevention**

**Introduction**

Achieving significant reductions in violence world-wide, the goal of this conference, is contingent upon the adoption, implementation, and dissemination of programs, practices, and policies shown in well-conducted studies to decrease violent behaviors. Although progress must still be made in the identification of evidence-based interventions (EBIs), this presentation focuses on enhancing the use of existing violence prevention strategies. In particular, I will discuss the importance of and strategies for implementing EBIs with high quality. Given that implementation is a *process* ([Fixsen, Blase, Naoom, & Wallace, 2009](#_ENREF_2)), this means that care and effort must be taken from start to finish, from exploring potential EBIs to be locally implemented all the way through to sustaining these EBIs and ensuring they reach a large enough population to make a significant impact on rates of violence.

**What is implementation**?

For the purposes of this talk, implementation is the *intervening step* between the scientific discovery of an intervention that reduces violence and the decreases in violent behaviors produced by such an intervention. A bottle of medicine does not do us any good if it sits in our kitchen cupboard or bathroom medicine cabinet: it has to be used and used properly to have its intended effects. Unlike medicine, which is usually very straight-forward to use, implementation of EBIs is more complicated. It is a process that unfolds relatively slowly, taking many months and possibly years to achieve. According to the National Implementation Research Network (NIRN), implementation proceeds in six stages: exploration, installation, initial implementation, full implementation, innovation, and sustainability ([Fixsen et al., 2009](#_ENREF_2)).

Each stage involves activities that must be completed and decisions that must be made, usually by a team of individuals. Failure to fully achieve the necessary steps of one stage is likely to affect the successful completion of the necessary activities associated with the next stage.

For example, the first stage of *exploration* begins with learning about potential violence prevention interventions that might be put into practice in a local agency, school, community, state, or nation. We are fortunate to have a variety of effective violence prevention programs available for use, but just as there are many different medicines in a drug store, you must select the one that will successfully treat your particular need. You have to be a savvy consumer of violence prevention programs and think carefully about your options before you make an investment, just as you would a medicine, or a new car, house, or smart phone. Multiple EBIs are available to reduce violence and you have to choose the one that is a good *fit* for your needs. To do so, you have to become familiar with your choices. You want to investigate each program’s theoretical basis; core requirements, including staffing and organizational needs; targeted participant characteristics; costs; duration; and outcomes. You will need to compare your choices on all of these elements. You also have to know your capacity to meet the requirements of these programs: do you have the time, money, staffing, organizational framework, and leadership to make this program a success? If not, then you must select a different option. If you don’t carefully consider these issues in advance, your success in achieving high quality implementation and reducing violence will be undermined from the start.

The next stages are equally time-intensive and involve many considerations. A lot of challenges will arise, and you want to be ready for them. We’ll get back to these

challenges and planning steps in a minute….

**What is high-quality implementation?**

High quality implementation means implementing the new EBI fully, faithfully, and enthusiastically. Whatever the requirements of the program, they should be met as fully as possible in a local replication. For example, the number, frequency, and duration of sessions delivered to participants should match the *dosage* requirements specified by a program developer. All essential content is delivered and the *right* people, agencies and/or communities are participating in the program. High quality implementation also means that program implementers have received training in the EBI and are supportive of the program. Meeting these goals helps ensure that facilitators are not only knowledgable about the content, but also can communicate it skillfully, thoughtfully, and in a manner that is engaging to participants. It is also important to consider is a program’s *reach*: high quality implementation means recruiting enough participants so that the intervention is cost-efficient to operate AND it can make a substantial impact on the entire community.

It is daunting to achieve high quality implementation, and it can be done, but it’s also important to remember that implementation quality occurs on a continuum. Some parts of a program will be more difficult to deliver than others, and some implementers will be more skilled than others. It’s okay to deviant from guidelines sometimes and in certain ways, but too much “*drift*” can undermine your ability to realize substantial reductions in violence. Also, realize that if you have not fully investigated the EBI prior to implementation, and selected the one you considered to be the best fit, then your chances for high quality implementation will be reduced.

**Why is high-quality implementation important?**

Presumably, the EBI you select will have undergone rigorous testing and achieved a certain impact on rates of violence. These outcomes were achieved using particular guidelines and practices that later became manualized and passed to new generations of users. Any deviations from these guidelines means that the new product is less likely to resemble the old product. In turn, the outcomes that were originally achieved may not be realized during the replication. It is possible to make improvements to the model when adapting it to fit the local context. However, unless you are carefully monitoring implementation quality and evaluating the impact of these changes on participants, you will not know if your “new” version is more or less effective than the original model.

In fact, research has shown that deviations from implementation fidelity typically reduce anticipated changes in attitudes and behaviors. Stated another way, “higher levels of implementation lead to better outcomes” ([Durlak & DuPre, 2008](#_ENREF_1)).

**What are the barriers to high-quality implementation?**

Research also shows the high quality implementation is difficult to achieve and 100% implementation is probably never going to occur ([Durlak & DuPre, 2008](#_ENREF_1)).Why not? Because implementation is challenging and barriers to high quality implementation exist at every stage of implementation.

The most common challenges documented in the literature include:

Exploration phase:

* + Lack of awareness about “what works”
  + Lack of incentives to change practices
    - Financial challenges
    - Lack of a champion
    - Lack of “buy in” from necessary supporters

Installation phase

* + Insufficient pre-planning leading to failure to choose the “right” program
  + Did not get buy-in from all key players
  + Inadequate training

Initial/Full Implementation phases

* + Inadequate leadership
  + Program not well integrated with organizations and system(s)
  + Insufficient resources are allocated
  + Implementers are isolated and unsupported
  + Implementer turn-over
  + The quality of implementation is not monitored
    - Major adaptations are made with no consideration of their impact on the program model
    - Challenges arise that are not addressed

Sustainability phase

* + Earlier challenges have not been addressed
  + Lack of buy-in and support from leadership, staff, and the community
  + Staff and leadership turnover
  + Permanent funding stream never identified
  + No on-going system to monitor implementation and provide quality assurance was created

**What is necessary for achieving high-quality implementation?**

* Local planning and responsibility
* A detailed plan for implementation (who, where, what, when) prior to the start of programming
* Integration of the program into the agency’s normal operations
* Strong administrative support
* Skilled and supportive implementers
* On-going coaching and technical support
* Monitoring and evaluation

**What is the potential we can achieve high quality implementation of violence prevention interventions at scale?** Funding issues aside, the most challenging aspects of achieving this goal are likely to be:

* Convincing the public of the need to implement *prevention* programs to reduce violence
* Helping communities/agencies *prepare for* implementation, especially during the exploration phase. Attention must be paid to the requirements and resources associated with different EBIs to ensure that the one selected is a good *fit* with local capacity.
* Building an infrastructure to collect and analyze *meaningful data* on implementation quality, and to engage in *timely and supportive* quality improvement based on these data
* Implementing *each intervention* at scale, so that that entire communities can benefit from them. Although financial obstacles will exist, perhaps a more daunting obstacle is changing the mindset and usual practice of “small” program reach.

# Session 3

# Reducing Sexual Abuse of Children and Adolescents

**­­­­­­**

**Chair: Harriet MacMillan - McMaster University, Professor at the Department of Psychiatry, Behavioural Neurosciences and Pediatrics, Chedoke Health Chair in Child Psychiatry**

Recent large-scale epidemiological studies have shown that, contrary to what was believed until recently, rates of sexual abuse of girls – and boys – are higher in many low- and middle-income countries than in high-income countries. Speakers in this session will examine major strategies to address the issue in two different regions of the world – in Arab societies and in East Africa. They will also focus on human trafficking, a form of abuse which is particularly difficult to research.

## Maha Almuneef

**Biography**

Maha Almuneef, MD, FAAP, a child protectionist and child rights advocate, is a pediatrician and  Consultant on Pediatrics Infectious Diseases, a Fellow of the American Academy of Pediatrics , involved in national implementation of CRC Article 19.  She is the founder and Executive Director of the National Family Safety Program in Saudi Arabia,  chairman of Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect Centre at King Abdulaziz Medical City.  Her achievements transcend locality, in 2011 she was appointed as a Councillor for the International Society for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (ISPCAN), and in 2013 she was elected as the President of the Arab Professional society for Prevention of Violence Against Children (APSPVAC). Dr. Almuneef is also a consultant to the Saudi Parliament, Al-Shoura Council since 2009, and Associate Professor of Pediatrics in King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences.  She received many national and international awards for her work against child abuse and domestic violence.  She has many peer-reviewed publications in the field of pediatrics, infectious diseases, and child abuse.

**Abstract**

**Addressing Child Abuse and Neglect in Arab Societies**

In the Arab Societies, research about child maltreatment is scarce, and available research shows that CAN is common and underreported.  In the era of the Arabian spring and the current armed conflict in many Arab countries (Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Gaza ), many Arab children are living under difficult circumstances, many in refugee camps.    Different forms of child maltreatments are prevalent in different countries in the middle east and north Africa (MENA) region.  I will give a brief statistics on female genital mutilation (FGM), child labor, street children, trafficking, child marriage, and corporal punishment among different Arab countries.  I will present data on child maltreatment notably child sexual abuse from Saudi Arabia using the ISPCAN child abuse screening tool for children (ICAST-CH).  Data from the national Adverse Childhood Experience (ACE) study in Saudi Arabia will also be presented as a model for the region.

**Summary**

**Addressing Child Abuse and Neglect in Arab Societies**

**Introduction**

As a social problem, child abuse and neglect (CAN) receive much attention from the medical practitioners, social workers, researchers, and policy makers. Early marriage, polygamy, divorce, family size, poverty, and parental education are the primary risk factors for CAN. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report on violence on children, most children aged 0-14 years who have experienced violence experienced it at home, inflicted by their parents, caregivers, and other family members. Violence threatens children’s health and development and can last into adulthood. It also increases the risk of further victimization and perpetration of violence.1

In the Arab Societies, research about child maltreatment is scarce, and available research shows that CAN is common and underreported.2 Yousef, Attia, and Kamel (1998) investigated family violence among preparatory and secondary school children in Egypt and provided extensive data on the rates and some correlates of corporal punishment.3 Shalhoub-Kevorkian (1999) found that, out of 38 cases of sexually abused Palestinian girls between 2 and 19 years, the majority was between 12-19 years.4 Although child maltreatment practices in the Arabian Peninsula have been described in historical anecdotes and Islamic literature, it was not until 1990 that the first case reports from Saudi Arabia was published in medical literature.5,6 While hospitals have recognized an increasing number of child maltreatment cases, the magnitude of the problem in Saudi Arabia has been unknown due to the lack of population-based statistics. Government data regarding reports are regarded as unreliable estimates due to the widespread inattention to mandatory reporting laws and data quality.7 In addition, as official records include reports of severe cases requiring professional assistance, they are not suitable for estimating the incidence or prevalence of CAN practices. Estimation of CAN occurrence using child or parent self-report of parenting practices help define the magnitude of the problem, set priorities and comparison benchmarks, develop national prevention programs and allocate funds.8

Forms of CAN in the Arab Societies include:

**Female Genital Mutilation (FGM):**

Around the world, 125 million girls and women are getting genital mutilation which is considered as a sexual abuse and violence against women. It has been restricted in most of the countries in the world in which it occurs. In African countries, it is mostly practiced in Egypt (91%) which has the highest percentage among the Arab countries. In 50% of the Arab countries, most girls were circumcised before the age of 5 years and in rest of the countries, it occurs between the age of 5 and 14 years. Traditional circumcisers perform this procedure in most of the countries.9

**Corporal Punishment:**

In 2005-2006, according to UNICEF, 72% of children between the age of 2- 14 years experienced minor physical punishment at home in Algeria.10 In Egypt, ‘severe physical punishment’ included hitting the child with an object not on the buttocks (26%) and beating (25%); ‘moderate physical punishment’ included shaking (59%), pinching (45%) and slapping the face or head (41%).11 In 1998, a federal law was implemented against corporal punishment at school in United Arab Emirates where teachers who involve will face child abuse charges.12

**Child Labor:**

In the Arab societies, child labor is growing at an alarming rate. In MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, 15% of the children are engaged to work. Approximately 5% of the children between the age of 5-15 years work in Algeria. Fourteen percent of the children in Iran are forced to work in dangerous and unsanitary conditions.13 According to the Ministry of Health in

Egypt, there are 2 million children between the age of 6-15 years are employed who contribute up to 29% of their family budget.14

**Child marriage:**

In the Arab society, child marriage is a cultural, social, and health issues which violates girls’ human rights and involves early child bearing, low education, poor health, and generational cycle of the poverty. The minimum legal age for marriage in this society – Algeria (female 18, male 21), Egypt (female 16, male18), Iran (female 13, male 15), Iraq, Jordan and Morocco (both sexes 18), Yemen (both sexes 15), and Tunisia (both sexes 20). A significant number of girls in the MENA region still get married before the age of 18 years. In Yemen, one-third of women between the age of 20 to 24 years are married by 18 years.15

**Street children:**

According to the United Nations, there are 150 million street children worldwide and this number is rising daily. Approximately 40% of the street children between 3 and 18 years are homeless and 60% work on the streets to support their families.16 Factors influence children on the street include socio-economic condition, lack of affection, domestic violence, and prostitution.17 In Lebanon, there is no accurate report regarding street children - 70% of the street children are Syrian nationals, 6% Iraqi, 1.5% Palestinian, and 1% Egyptian. Moroccans street children aged between 6 and 25 years counted 14,000 to 16,000. Approximately, 25% of the street children in Egypt are less than 12 years old.18

**Child Trafficking:**

Children are trafficked to the Middle East for different reasons including camel jockeys, labor, and sexual exploitation (e.g. prostitution, pornography). Many Iranian children between the age of 9 to 14 years are forced to involve in sex trade in UAE, Bahrain, Pakistan, Turkey, and Europe.19

Recommendations and Conclusion: All countries in the region have ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Children (CRC), which protects children from all forms of abuse.20 Case reports, and research study might help the implementers to reduce the burden of CAN in this society. In addition, population-based CAN data are necessary to inform and guide professionals and decision makers for prevention policies and resource allocation. Data will be presented from recent national surveillance done in Saudi Arabia using ICAST and ACE instruments that highlight the prevalence of CAN in one Arab country.

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## Charlotte Watts

**Biography**

Charlotte Watts is Head of the Social and Mathematical Epidemiology Group and founding director of the Gender, Violence and Health Centre, in the Department for Global Health and Development at LSHTM. Originally trained as a mathematician, with further training in epidemiology, economics and social science methods, she has twenty years experience in international HIV and violence research, bringing a strong multi-disciplinary perspective to the complex challenge of addressing violence against women and HIV in low and middle income countries.

Charlotte has more than 130 publications in peer-reviewed journals, leads a large multi-disciplinary research team and manages a large portfolio of research grants. This includes serving as Research Director of the DFID funded STRIVE structural drivers HIV Research Programme Consortium; Chair of the Expert Working Group to Assess the Global Burden of Inter-Personal Violence; and principal investigator on three cluster randomized controlled trials to assess the impact of different models of intimate partner violence prevention in sub-Saharan Africa. Senior positions include acting as a core research team member for the WHO multi-country study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence, and senior advisor to the IMAGE micro-finance and participatory gender training intervention in rural South Africa. She has served on Expert Consultations for UNAIDS, WHO, the World Bank, UNESCO and UNICEF, and was an organizing committee member for the US Institute of Medicine, The Contagion of Violence: A workshop of the Forum on Global Violence Prevention.

## Joy Ngozi Ezeilo

**Biography**

Dr. Ezeilo is an activist and versatile legal scholar recognized as a leading authority in the field of human rights, especially on the rights of women and children. She teaches Law at the Department of Public and Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria and pioneered, since 1997,  the teaching of the Course, "Women, Children and the Law"  making her Faculty and University the first to do so in Nigeria.

She was appointed by the UN Human Rights Council as the UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children (August 1, 2008 to July 31st 2014), and served in that capacity globally; monitoring and reporting to both the Human Rights Council in Geneva as well as the UN General Assembly, New York. She was recently appointed by the UN Secretary General, December 2013 as a member of the Board of Trustees, UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking.

Joy Ezeilo is also the founding director of WomenAid Collective (WACOL), a national organization that promotes human rights of women and young people. She is a recipient of the prestigious British Chevening scholarship (1995) and a grantee of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Funds for Leadership Development (1998). She has also received several national and international awards, including being conferred with the national honour of Officer of the Order of Niger (OON) in 2006 by the then President Olusegun Obasanjo (GCFR) in recognition of her outstanding contributions in the area of nation building, legal scholarship, advocacy, civil society movement and community service.

Dr. Ezeilo is a visiting professor to several universities, especially in North America and a regent Professor, University of California, Riverside (2001). She has served in various governmental capacities, including as a Commissioner for Gender and Social Development, Enugu State, and also a member of the Governing Council, Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA). In April, 2013 she was recognized by Newsweek/Daily Beast International Magazine, USA as one of the 125 women of impact in the world for her work, especially in combating human trafficking--a modern day slavery.

**Abstract**

**Strategies to Reduce Human Trafficking and Protect the Human Rights of Vulnerable Groups**

Unarguably, trafficking knows no borders and affects millions of women, children and men worldwide culminating in egregious violations of their human rights. Although, violence and exploitation foisted by trafficking in persons is not limited to sexual but extends to forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude of the removal of organs; nevertheless, sex trafficking is a prevalent form of trafficking affecting disproportionately women and girls across the world with serious repercussions on their human rights, sexual and reproductive rights.  As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children with a mandate to "focus on the human rights aspects of the victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children" my global strategic vision has been hinged on eleven pillars of 5 Ps, 3 R's and 3 C's, which I consider crucial to ending human trafficking and protecting the human rights of victims and those vulnerable to being trafficked. My presentation will examine some of these pillars and in particular innovative human and victim centered approach that I have found and adopted as good and workable strategies, including recommendations that both public and private parties can imbibe to effectively and in a sustainable manner combat human trafficking.

**Summary**

**Strategies to Reduce Human Trafficking and Protect the Human Rights of Vulnerable Groups**

1. **Introduction: Understanding what’s human trafficking: Definition & conceptual issues, including legal and policy framework**

Human trafficking or trafficking in persons or trafficking in human beings is a form of violence, which is better addressed as a gender-based violence affecting, women, men and children. However, it disproportionately affects women and girls, especially when it comes to sex trafficking, domestic servitude and servile marriage. Trafficked victims are economically and sexually exploited, held in sexual slavery, domestic servitude and other similar abusive conditions that constitute violence and violate their human dignity.

Trafficking by its nature, characteristics and consequences is intertwined with violence chiefly directed at the female gender and shares underlying causes with violence against women, which includes unequal power relations, gender inequalities, feminization of poverty, sexual objectification and commercialization of women and ingrained sex stereotypes and gender based discrimination. Gender based violence, including trafficking is exacerbated by modern socio-economic changes including globalization, cultural and religious norms that are used to justify violence perpetrated against women

The ugly phenomenon of trafficking in persons is growing globally and one cannot therefore discuss violence reduction by 50 percent in the next three decades without specific focus on human trafficking that arguably contribute to about 50 per cent of the global phenomenon of violence, especially if one takes into account the role violence play as a cause and consequence of trafficking. The Millennium Declaration 2000 in realization of the magnitude of the problem urged States to intensify their efforts to fight trafficking in persons while the *‘Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking’* developed by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights recognized in Guideline 1 that: violations of human rights are both a cause and a consequence of human trafficking; and therefore States and intergovernmental organizations shall ensure that their interventions address the factors that increase vulnerability to trafficking, including inequality, poverty and all forms of discrimination.

A host of international, regional and national legal and policy regimes prohibit human trafficking recognizing the violence and violations it perpetuates on its victims. These instruments include but not limited to: The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC: 1989) and its Protocol on Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Pornography; the Inter - American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (1994); the Council of Europe Convention on Traffic in Human Beings (2005); the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981) and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) amongst others. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (the Trafficking Protocol) supplementing the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC: 2000) articulates the most comprehensive definition of trafficking, which covers the use of minors for commercial sexual activity even if there is no force, fraud, or coercion.

1. **A Review of Evidence: Scale of trafficking, causes and consequences**

Trafficking in persons is unfortunately thriving and evolving in today’s world. My work in the last six years (2008- 2014) as the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children has confirmed that the problem of human trafficking continues to be endemic in all parts of the world and that it is an ever evolving phenomenon. It remains one of the fastest growing criminal activities in the world, which results in serious breaches of human rights. Although, very difficult to quantify, it is hugely underestimated because of its insidious, complex and dynamic nature.

Quality data is scarce and problematic in the field of human trafficking because they often include smuggled persons, as well as illegal migrants. Another major reason is that victims, particularly adult victims trafficked for sexual exploitation, rarely report their victimization. Additional problem is that in many countries for example, there is no anti-trafficking legislation or where they exist they do not comprehensively defines what constitutes trafficking. There can be no registration of victims of a crime that does not legally exist. However, it is widely agreed that most internationally trafficked people are women and children of low socio-economic status, and the primary trafficking flows are from developing countries to more affluent countries. Internally, numbers can be even harder to obtain, and it is suggested that current numbers are greatly underestimated.

Notwithstanding the challenges of quality and reliable data to measure the scale of trafficking, statistics have shown that some 2.5 million people are at any given time recruited, entrapped, transported and exploited in a process called human trafficking or trafficking in persons. However, when you juxtapose this with the recent ILO world survey (2012) that shows that 20.9 million people that are in forced labour situation one is bound to shudder and conclude without much hesitation that the problem is far more than we know or care to acknowledge.

Increasingly, the use of ICT particularly the internet to recruit victims is making it more sophisticated and difficult to detect. The root causes of violence against women are similar to the root causes of trafficking in persons, especially women and children. It has been recognized that the relationship between poverty, gender inequalities and violence is a mutually reinforcing one. The common denominator for trafficked persons is the violence experienced which may be physical, sexual, emotional and psychological, including extreme economic and material deprivation.

There is a long standing failure to protect women from gender based violence. We must therefore address economic, social and cultural issues particularly gender inequalities that causes gender based-violence and make women and girls vulnerable in order to effectively combat trafficking. For any intervention addressing human trafficking to be effective it must be based on human rights and victim centered approach.

1. **Preventing and Combating trafficking in persons-global strategies of 5 Ps, 3 R’s and 3 C’s**

Prior to the adoption of the Trafficking Protocol in 2000, the Beijing Declaration succinctly captured in Paragraph 122 the fact that trafficking is a form of violence. Undoubtedly, efforts to combat trafficking in persons will not be effective unless they are centered on universal respect for the human rights of all individuals, particularly trafficked persons and persons at risk of being trafficked. Victims of trafficking suffer grave violations of their fundamental rights; therefore it is crucial that any response to trafficking be constructed around the common goal of remedying such violations. Effective and sustainable fight against trafficking needs to be hinged on eleven pillars namely: the 5Ps (protection, prosecution, prevention, punishment, promotion of international cooperation), three victim-centered Rs (redress, rehabilitation and reintegration) and three Cs (capacity, coordination and cooperation), guided by international human rights law and standards.

There is a linkage, which I want to bring to the fore between achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and tackling the root causes of trafficking. By addressing different aspects of poverty, the MDGs are intrinsically linked to the factors increasing vulnerability of people to trafficking. In analyzing the MDGs, it is important to note that MDGs, by the fact of helping to reduce vulnerability of people to trafficking, constitute an important contribution to the prevention of trafficking. Several authors report that the majority of prevention policies adopted to combat trafficking are mainly focused in increasing public awareness and education and consider that vulnerability “emerges as the missing link in formulating well-developed policies and practices” A focus on vulnerability will in fact enhance the human rights component of an anti-trafficking policy.**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

1. **Conclusion and recommendations**

The long-term effects of human trafficking on victims are devastating; impacting not only on the individual victim but also on their family and the society at large. The severe trauma, shame and humiliation experienced by victims often prevent them from seeking treatment and support. Despite the severity of the problem, there exist capacity gaps on the part of key groups to respond effectively to trafficking and gender based violence particularly to identify, prevent and protect victims while bringing perpetrators to account.

Trafficking in persons especially of women and children just like violence against women results in cumulative breaches of human rights, and this correlation needs to be recognized in any intervention effort. I believe that the real challenge is not just in adopting strategies that will effectively lead to catching the perpetrators and punishing them. Rather, it is preferable to put in place strategies that will focus equally on the victim by recognizing and redressing the violations suffered, empowering the victim to speak out without being doubly victimized, jeopardized or stigmatized, while at the same time targeting the root causes of human trafficking. The strategies must be people‑centred and gender sensitive, bearing in mind that human trafficking is about persons whose basic right to live free particularly from fear and want is under constant threat. We must recognize the dignity of the victims and their right to survival and development, including living a life free of violence.

I proffer below the **5 A’s** recommendations as part of the global strategy to reduce violence associated with human trafficking or trafficking in persons by 50 % in the next 30 years.

1. **Awareness raising and capacity building:** I strongly encourage public enlightenment and trainings for particularly vulnerable groups and also for professionals working in the field of anti-trafficking on the mechanisms of internal/domestic recruitment for trafficking, forms, manifestations, trends and consequences. Enhanced public awareness and knowledge would lead to better identification of victims and necessary referrals that would assist in their recovery and redress. It’s also important to address and discourage demand that fosters exploitation as part of prevention paradigm. More efforts are needed with regard to prevention which remains a weak link. Awareness raising and empowerment through the realization of socio- economic as well as civil and political rights could save many from falling in the traps of traffickers. The media has a role to play, so also are businesses to prevent trafficking in their supply chains.
2. **Assistance to trafficked persons and those vulnerable migrants**, especially irregular migrants vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Protection, support and assistance to victims, including access to information, shelter, medical, counselling and legal services will help in the recovery and reintegration of victims of trafficking in persons. Also, employment opportunities, provision of vocational education and training, including compensation will reduce the risk of re-trafficking and re-victimization and the cycle of violence. Partnership with CSOs/NGOs is crucial to ensure adequate, confidential and gender sensitive support services.
3. **Action towards MDGs implementation to tackle some of the root causes of trafficking and irregular migration**

The MDGs are essential to tackling root causes of trafficking and action should be geared towards: poverty reduction; increasing access to education; and achieving gender equality. Goal 3 is especially important regarding the issue of trafficking since majority of victims of trafficking are women, mainly for sexual exploitation. Secondly because this goal concerns developing countries as much as developed countries.

It’s also important to address and discourage demand that fosters exploitation as part of prevention paradigm. Indeed, addressing the root causes that make people vulnerable to traffickers is necessary in order to fully suppress this practice. Consequently, an integration into the post 2015 MDGs agenda is of paramount importance.

1. **Alliances- Public and Private Partnerships:** Cooperation is imperative in order to prevent and combat human trafficking. Prevention of trafficking in persons requires concerted efforts by all stakeholders, including source, transit and destination countries. The Trafficking Protocol clearly recognizes the role of bilateral or multilateral cooperation in alleviating factors that make persons vulnerable to trafficking.
2. **Accountability: Promoting States accountability** to ratify and implement international instruments relevant in the field of human trafficking and migration. In addition, States must enact appropriate national legislation to criminalize all forms of trafficking and to protect vulnerable persons from violence fostered by trafficking in human beings; including to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of trafficking in persons whether perpetrated by state actors or by private persons or business. Furthermore, national plans should be developed with full participation of all stakeholders and mechanisms put in place for monitoring anti-trafficking actions.

# Session 4

# Reducing Violence in Public Space

**Chair: Mark Bellis - Liverpool John Moores University - Centre for Public Health, Director of Policy, Research and Development**

Streets, squares and meeting places that are free from the threat of violence are an important precondition for civil society. Strategies to reduce violence in public space, often committed by gangs and associated with illegal markets, are therefore a pivotal component of broader violence reduction. The speakers in this session show what we know about effective approaches to reduce violence in public space. They also present research-based ideas about innovative ways for violence reduction in communities and making the best use of new technologies for violence reduction.

## Robert Muggah

**Biography**

Dr. Robert Muggah is the Research Director of the Igarapé Institute, a Research Director of the SecDev Foundation, and teaches at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. He is also a fellow at the University of Oxford, the University of San Diego and the Graduate Institute Switzerland. He is the co-founder and executive editor of Stability Journal. Dr. Muggah serves as a senior adviser to the Inter-American Development Bank, various UN agencies, and the World Bank. He is also partnered wtih Google Ideas on issues related to fragility, conflict and violence and ways new technology can help. Dr. Muggah received his DPhil at Oxford University and his MPhil at the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex.

From Brazil Robert directs several projects on violence prevention, citizen security, stability operations, and development in the Americas and Africa. He currently oversees the Humanitarian Action in Situations Other than War (HASOW) project, the States of Fragility project and the Urban Resilience project. He routinely advises governments, international organizations and civil society groups on security and development. For example, in 2012 and 2013 he was an adviser to the High Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda and the Global Commission on Drug Policy. In 2013, he was named one of the top 100 most influential people in the world on armed violence reduction by a UK-based organization and in 2014 he was awarded a digital age grant by Google.

Previously, Dr. Muggah was research director at the Small Arms Survey (2000-2011), a lecturer at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies and an adviser to a number of multilateral and bilateral organizations on issues of arms control, security sector reform, humanitarian issues, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. He has led research and evaluations in over 30 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, South Asia and the South Pacific on related themes. His recent policy outputs includes chapters for forthcoming flagship reports of the Inter-American Development Bank, UNDP, World Bank.

Dr. Muggah's work is published in dozens of academic and policy journals. Most recently, he is the editor of Stability Operations, Security and Development (New York: Routledge, 2013) and co-editor of the Global Burden of Armed Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 and 2008). He is also the author of Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (New York: Routledge, 2009), Relocation Failures in Sri Lanka: A Short History of Internal Displacement (London: Zed Books, 2008), and No Refuge: The Crisis of Refugee Militarization in Africa (London: Zed Books 2006) and contributed more than 14 chapters to the Small Arms Survey (Cambridge University Press) since 2001. He is a regular contributor to the Atlantic, BBC, CBC, Guardian, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and o Globo.

Dr. Muggah has published over one hundred articles in peer-review journals including International Peacekeeping, Security Dialogue, Contemporary Security Policy, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Conflict, Security and Development, The Journal of Refugee Studies, The Journal of Disasters, Forced Migration Review, and many others. In addition to featuring in international media and writing opeds for the NYT, LAT, Guardian, Huffington Post, Atlantic and others, Dr. Muggah has also been involved in co-writing and advising documentary films on violence, drug policy and development. Most recently, he has been designing new interactive online visualization tools of the global arms trade, as well as android applications to enhance police accountability from Rio de Janeiro to Nairobi and Cape Town.

**Abstract**

**Fragile Cities: Confronting the Changing Landscapes Violence**

The twenty first century will be urban. By 2030, more than 3 in 5 people will live in cities and slums. It is not just size or density of cities and their periphery, but the pace of urbanization that will define global trajectories of violence. There are at least five major risks that will influence patterns of organized and interpersonal violence over the next 30 years. These include the changing geography, topography, demography, ecology and technology of violence. If violence is to be halved in the coming decades, the dimensions of the urban dilemma need to be acknowledged. Attention needs to be refocused specifically on those cities and settlements generating disproportionate levels of violence, building-in resilience to our cities, and harnessing technological innovation to improve safety and security.

**Summary**

**Fragile Cities: Confronting the Changing Landscapes Violence**

**Introduction**

There are signs that organized violence around the world is worsening. Countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe are wracked by conflict, crime, terrorism or some combination of all three. The empirical record, however, suggests that the situation is not as grim as many believe. The frequency of conflict between and within countries has actually declined over the last 50 years. Fewer people are dying in wars than in the past.

But take a closer look and you can see that the landscapes of organized violence are also changing. It is not so much nation states that are gripped by warfare, crime and terror, but our cities: violence is migrating to the metropole.  This is to be expected. After all, most people today live in cities, and not the countryside. Our political and economic affairs are increasingly governed by cities and mayors.

Most commentators laud the arrival of the city and see in it, revolutionary promise. They see in this urban turn, a chance to revitalize creativity, innovation and jump-start prosperity. Yet for every city that has “arrived” there are others that have “fallen behind”. There are some cities that have literally dropped off the grid. We could call these “fragile cities” and they present a challenge to their residents, their countries and the world.

Cities – especially fragile cities – will increasingly define the landscape of stability and development. The talk will consider five major trends that will define the role and place of fragile cities. I will also highlight several ways to think about preventing and diminishing violence in these urban centers, and reducing the global toll of violence over the next 30 years.

**Five mega risks**

***Geography***

The geography of violence is changing before our very eyes. The frequency and intensity of war has declined over the past fifty years, notwithstanding a recent surge. The decline of war also coincides with significant reductions of homicidal violence, especially in industrialized countries over the past few centuries. These two facts are probably among the most extraordinary, if unheralded, successes of human history.

But over the past few decades there has been a marked shift in the locus of organized and interpersonal violence – with some parts of the world more affected than others. There are 10 times more people dying outside war zones than in them. This is a consequence of diminished conflicts. To put a number on this – roughly 55,000 people die in the world´s +/-30 conflicts each year. This compares to around 525,000 people who die violently in other countries. Yet violence is still stubbornly high in the Americas, Africa and the Middle East – several times the global average. Of the top 50 most dangerous cities, about 47 of them are in Latin America and the Caribbean. And things get worse when you consider their cities.

***Topography***

If violence is concentrating geographically, it is also being reconfigured to the planet´s new topography. The physical map of the world is transforming: there has been a massive shift in population to cities, especially since the second half of the twentieth century. Latin America is 80% urban, followed by Europe at 75%, the Middle East at 60% and then Africa at 37% and Asia at 30%

The dominance of the city is probably one of the most stunning sociological developments of the past 50 years. To put the pace and scale of urbanization in perspective, consider that in the 1800s, just 1 in 30 people lived in cities. Today 1 in 2 people live in cities. And over the next 15 years this ratio will rise to 3 in 5. The expansion of cities is neither even nor equitable. By 2030, about half of the 5 billion city dwellers will be living in slum

And it is important to stress that it is not necessarily the size of cities that matters. After all, with 33 million people, Tokyo is the largest and some might even say safest city in the world. Rather, it is the density and speed of population growth that predicts violence. What we are seeing is “turbo-urbanization” in some parts of the world, and it is this that is giving rise to fragile cities. Dhaka, Karachi, Kinchasa and Lagos are today about 40 times larger today than they were in 1950. We call these “primate cities”.

***Demography***

Alongside shifts in geography and topography, are major transformations in demography. In most parts of the developing world, we have seen the rise of the so-called youth bulge. This is due to improvements in reducing child mortality coupled with the continuation of high fertility rates. The youth bulge is something we need to watch. What it means is that the share of the population in the 15 to 29 age bracket is much higher in poor countries than in rich ones.

In the world´s fifty or so fragile countries, about 75% of the population is under 30. The expansion of the bulge is likely to persist for generations. It is not going to disappear. Most of these young people – owing to the search for opportunity, leisure, or in their flight from violence – congregate in cities, usually slums. Being young, poor, unemployed and male is a risk factor for violence and can shave off between 5 and 25 years of your life expectancy in fragile cities.

***Ecology***

And the growth of the city is congregating on the coast. Urban expansion in coastal areas – the littoral – is occurring at breakneck speed. This means that we are seeing the convergence of a massive concentration of people in a relatively small and confined geographic area. And what does this result in? Well, land consumption is at least twice as fast as population growth – and this means urban sprawl.

Making matters worse, coasts are precisely those areas most vulnerable to climate change, especially rising sea levels. Take a look at this satellite map and see how populations are bunched up on the littoral. More than half of the world´s megacities are located in coastal areas. The cumulative effects of massive unplanned urbanization, climate events and coast location are a powder-keg.

***Technology***

Cities, as we all know, are also hubs of innovation, industry and connectivity. And it is not just the wealthy that are benefiting from the digital revolution and open empowerment. Flying over slums you see a forest of satellite dishes, cables and towers. It can be in Rio or Mogadishu – it’s the same everywhere. There are also new challenges raised by the spread of smart phones and wi-fi.

In addition to refocusing on cities as the future site of warfare, the US army has also made cyber the fifth domain of its battle-space (along with land, sea, air, space). We have also seen the remarkable (and unpredictable) power of digital protest, mostly in cities around the world. The opportunity for people to get connected has implications for global, but also local collective action. And this action is most intensely realized in cities.

***Changing course***

Since urban growth is inevitable, reductions in urban violence depend on being able to manage the global commons. However, we confront a pivot point – where some cities will thrive and drive global growth and others will fail and threaten stability. We cannot disregard this challenge, focusing only on the promise of our global cities in the north.

First, we have to acknowledge these trends in urbanization and start a conversation among cities in the North and South about how to respond. A good diagnosis is the first step to defining effective interventions. We need to diagnose urban risks, and then build solutions to make them safer and more resilient. We could then start twinning our successful cities with our fragile ones, kick-starting a process of learning and collaboration between them.

Second, we must recognize the new geography of violence, and develop solutions accordingly. Wars are a major problem, and they need much more attention and assistance than they are currently receiving. But we also have epidemics of everyday violence – defined as more than 10 murders per 100,000 – in our big cities. If we want to half lethal violence around the world – then focus on cities.  Just a 25% reduction of lethal violence in Recife, Rio and Sao Paulo – could potentially halve Brazil´s national homicide rate.

Third, we need to respond to the new topography of cities and make them safer and more livable for all. Cities are growing at breakneck speed - exceeding local carrying capacity. If we are going to prevent tomorrow´s violence, we need to build in safety from the start – open parks, street lighting, and service delivery. We need to anticipate the sprawl, rather than fight it. This means also creating new urban poles to manage growth.

Fourth, we need to get to grips with the demography of cities. Young men do more of the killing. They are also the most likely to be killed. This has been the case for hundreds if not thousands of years. We need to find ways, as many cities are doing, of breaking this cycle. Recreation, school, employment, these are all critical and proven protective factors.

Fifth, the ecological trajectories of urban growth are perhaps the most chilling. People are on the move, and coasts are where most people have traditionally sought refuge. But now they are extra vulnerable. Obviously climate change is real. This does not mean we should not fight to minimize human impact through all means available. But it does mean that we need to plan ways to reduce vulnerability and build in safe-guards.

Sixth, and perhaps most promising, is technology. We are seeing exponential growth in technological innovations. There are opportunities to create new forms of solidarity in cities, creating networks of protection, mapping crime, and other forms of digital empowerment. While there are major risks, there are huge opportunities and we need to find ways to unleash and harness this innovation, especially in fragile cities.

The 21st century is an urban one, and how we prepare for these trends will determine future trajectories of violence.

**Alys Willman**

**Biography**

Alys Willman, PhD,  is a Social Development Specialist for the Social Cohesion and Violence Prevention Team at the World Bank. She leads analytical work and project support on  violence prevention and trauma.  She is the co-author of Violence in the City (2010), and Societal Dynamics and Fragility (2013), and has authored numerous articles and reports on violence and illicit economies. Prior to joining the World Bank she worked with NGOs in five Latin American countries, and taught at The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs. She is also a volunteer sexual assault counselor at the DC Rape Crisis Center.

**Abstract**

**Community-based Strategies to Reduce Youth Violence**

The growing population of youth in developing countries is often seen as a threat to stability, and indeed, youth have often been protagonists in social and political unrest. Youth violence has often been considered a result of unemployment or idleness, leading to blanket responses providing (mostly temporary) employment for youth. These programs have often limited success because they do not address the complex driving factors for youth violence or the intergenerational tensions that reinforce stigma against youth.

My talk will give an overview of what the World Bank has learned through our growing investment in youth-oriented projects, especially those with a violence prevention focus. I will describe how the Bank's general approach to youth is evolving from a focus on (mostly temporary) employment toward more integrated interventions that address the various drivers of youth exclusion and violence, as well as intergenerational tensions that reinforce stigma against youth. While evidence on impact is still scarce, there are indications of some promising practices, especially when targeted activities are combined with interventions to address underlying structural factors.

## Amy Nivette

**Biography**

Dr. Nivette is a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow in Sociology at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Dr. Nivette earned her Mphil and Ph.D. from the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge in 2012. Her research interests broadly concern the cross-national and cross-cultural study of violence, particularly in relation to the legitimacy of political and social institutions. Currently, she is working on projects concerning sex differences in physical aggression among adolescents; legitimacy and informal social control in Accra, Ghana; cross-national patterns of political assassinations; and support for vigilante homicide in Latin America. She has published on the topics of legitimacy, aggression, and homicide in international journals such as Aggressive Behavior, Homicide Studies, British Journal of Criminology, and Theoretical Criminology. Dr. Nivette is also an Associate Member of the Violence Research Centre at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge.

**Abstract**

**Lessons From a Comparative Analysis of Successful Reductions of Public Violence Across Cities**

Most macro-level studies examining homicide declines focus primarily on national-level trends and explanations. This approach overlooks sub-national differences in lethal violence reductions across cities. Some cities are more successful in reducing lethal violence than others. For example, the murder rate in New York City fell from 30.7 offenses per 100,000 in 1990 to 5.1 in 2012, whereas the murder rate in Chicago declined more slowly from the same level to 18.5 in the same time period. On a more dramatic scale, the murder rate in Medellín, Colombia declined from 232.4 deaths per 100,000 in 1990 to 38 in 2013, whilst the murder rate in Cali increased across the same time period (from 66 in 1990 to 84.67 in 2013). What might have caused lethal violence to decline in New York City and Medellín, but not (or to a lesser extent) in Chicago and Cali? In particular, what violence-reduction strategies and policies did these "success stories" implement that may have contributed to these declines? This paper uses a matched-city comparative design to examine the effects of city-level public policies on lethal violence across six countries. Specifically, this paper focuses on the effects of public policies designed to reduce crime, such as drugs, policing, imprisonment, and organized crime policies.

# Session 5

# Promoting Good Governance and Civil Society

**Chair: Baroness Vivien Stern - Co-Chair, Know Violence**

Societies with high levels of individual violence are often characterized by situations with a poor functioning of the state, a lacking civil society, and no effective rule of law. Speakers in this session examine how the functioning of state institutions can be strengthened, what practical steps can be taken to promote the rule of law, and how citizen's active support for violence prevention can be promoted.

## James Putzel

**Biography**

James Putzel (BA, MA McGill, DPhil Oxford) is Professor of Development Studies at the Department of International Development  at the London School of Economics. Between 2000 and 2011 he was Director of the Crisis States Research Centre at the LSE. Professor Putzel is well-known for his work on agrarian reform including his book A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, as well as his research on social capital, democratisation and the political economy of development in Southeast Asia. His recent research has focused on politics, governance and economic development in crisis states including comparative research in Asia and Africa. He has undertaken research in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Senegal. He is co-author of Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States (2012) and lead author of the OECD book, Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding (2010). Putzel was a founding member of the Fragile States Council of the World Economic Forum and sits on the advisory board of the Journal of Peasant Studies and the editorial board of the Philippine Political Science Journal. He is member of the International Advisory Board of the China International Development Research Network.

**Abstract**

**Why Liberals are Poor Peace-Makers: Discarding Orthodoxies to Reduce Violence in Developing Countries**

This paper suggests that the reduction of levels of violent conflict in lower and middle income countries requires a serious rethinking of both the role of the state in consolidating and maintaining peace and the model of a state capable of doing so. The paper draws on research undertaken by the Crisis States Research Centre at the LSE between 2000 and 2012. The first section emphasises that the most important drivers of violence in the developing world today are the asymmetric military interventions unleashed by the world’s great powers to effect regime change. The most intractable cases of persistent violent conflict in the developing world today have been precipitated by external military interventions often in the name of civilian protection and democracy promotion. The following sections argue that the establishment of inclusive political settlements and state organisations based upon them should take precedence over the promotion of formal democratic systems, poverty reduction, efficient service delivery, or prudent macroeconomic management in the wake of violent conflicts. In this sense the paper suggests that organisations like the WHO need to pay much more attention to how their activities in post-war situations affect the consolidation of state organisations, even if this means tolerating greater levels of inefficiency and slower developmental progress.

­­­­­­­**Summary**

**Introduction**

If the “international community” is serious about reducing levels of violent conflict in lower and middle income countries, this will require a serious rethinking of both the role of the state in consolidating and maintaining peace and the model of a state capable of doing so. This paper draws on research undertaken by the Crisis States Research Centre at the LSE between 2000 and 2012. The first section emphasises that one of the most important drivers of violence in the developing world are the asymmetric military interventions unleashed by the world’s great powers to effect regime change. The following sections suggest that the establishment of inclusive political settlements and state organisations based upon them should take precedence over the promotion of formal democratic systems, poverty reduction, efficient service delivery or prudent macroeconomic management in the wake of violent conflicts.

**External Military Interventions Seldom Lead to Peace**

Looking at the state of the world in late 2014, among the most intractable and intense sites of violent conflict are those territories where regime change was affected through external military intervention and aid: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria and the regions surrounding. Aside from Afghanistan where the USSR was “invited” to intervene by state authorities, these external interventions were justified in the name of ending state oppression and promoting security. There are clear reasons why external military intervention is unlikely to lead to stable or peaceful outcomes. The most important is that the ability to consolidate and maintain a state capable of managing conflict peacefully is born in the struggles and efforts of social forces to organise themselves for regime change. This requires building organisations and alliances with the capacity, discipline and legitimacy to mobilise people and raise material resources to confront a sitting regime. It almost always requires difficult processes of bargaining among non-state elites who control economic resources and the loyalty of local populations to rally to a common strategy for regime change, or, alternatively, unseating such elites as a condition to acquire the resources and popular support capable of establishing an alternative state. When external military force and assistance is required to unseat an existing state regime, the short-cut to regime change usually produces lasting insecurity.[[2]](#footnote-2)

In Iraq and Libya, the level of insecurity faced by the majority of the population in the wake of external military intervention is far worse than it was in the decades preceding external military intervention.[[3]](#footnote-3) Developmentally, both societies have suffered severe setbacks and the prospects for evolving a more democratic political system are arguably much more distant than before external military intervention. [[4]](#footnote-4) This is not just a question of hindsight, since there was ample evidence that such interventions would unleash extreme violence. [[5]](#footnote-5) In Libya, Gaddafi himself warned that the destruction of his regime would see the rise of internecine violence by armed groups and have repercussions throughout the region.[[6]](#footnote-6) The regimes in both countries emerged and were consolidated over time on the basis of elite bargains and managed conflict within their territories, often through repressive means, in ways that allowed general peace for decades. There were reformist forces emerging in both countries, but they were very far from coherent organisations with alternative plans for the state, let alone the ability, or necessarily even the inclination, to establish Western forms of democratic government.[[7]](#footnote-7) The most likely source of change was emerging from within the regimes themselves, but of course change would have been a slow process. However, tearing down the organisations of the state through external military intervention has subjected the population as a whole in these countries to higher levels of continuing violence and insecurity than experienced before intervention.

Today, Syria is in much the same position. The Arab Spring encouraged popular protests against the Assad regime, but the resources of support – the political settlement - behind the regime meant that the protesters were in no position to mount a challenge to take state power. In fact, it is highly likely that it was the precipitous declaration of support for the opposition as an *alternative* to the regime, made by the UK and other Western governments, which gave the green light to Qatar and other states in the region to arm the opposition, thus transforming domestic protests into a full-blown civil war.[[8]](#footnote-8) The advance of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as the most organised alternative force in both countries, is a direct consequence of these external interventions.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Even in Afghanistan, where the spiral of violent conflict experienced in the country today has deep historical roots, which were aggravated by Soviet military intervention in December 1979 to shore up a regime it had helped to take power, Western military intervention can be held responsible for the current level of violence. The origins of the Taliban can be traced to the support that the US and Western allies gave to jihadists in the fight against the USSR. Afghanistan’s most propitious chance for state consolidation was under the nationalist regime of Najibullah, but the US and its allies continued to support the jihadists with fateful consequences in the subsequent rise of the Taliban to a position where it could control the state.[[10]](#footnote-10) The strategy pursued by the west to exclude the Taliban from a post-invasion regime has proven ill-fated. No future peace is possible without a negotiated settlement of some sort with the Talliban, making the decade and a half of futile attempts by the West to build a liberal democratic regime in the country a costly error in terms of both resources spent and lives, particularly Afghan lives, lost.

**Understanding the Politics of Peace: the importance of elite bargains and inclusive political settlements**

A deeper understanding of what drives a society into large-scaled episodes of violent conflict is necessary to understanding the politics of peace. Western donors have persisted in defining state fragility, or states that are vulnerable to large-scale violence, in terms of persistent poverty, corruption and the absence of democracy.[[11]](#footnote-11) However, over half the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have avoided large-scale civil war despite being ridden by poverty and inequality, not to mention governed by less than democratic regimes and surrounded in many cases by violent conflict. We have suggested that state fragility, or vulnerability to large-scale violence, is best indicated by four factors: the absence of legitimate state control over security, the absence of a fiscal system that ensures state control of taxation and spending that is inclusive across identity groups, the failure of state organisations to ensure a presence throughout significant parts of its territory and the failure to establish a hegemonic position for state institutions, or rules, within a country.

Looked at in this way, what becomes important to reducing violence over time is not necessarily the elimination of poverty, but rather the need to ensure that poverty, and of course developmental progress, is shared across identity groups, be these defined by region, ethnicity or religion.[[12]](#footnote-12) The political settlement on which the state is based needs to establish state rules that take precedence over the rules of tribes, clans, language groups or religious organisations, which are recognised and relied upon throughout the state’s territory. It needs to establish security forces that are strong enough to withstand challenges from non-state armed groups, but do not exercise repressive power against the population to maintain the regime’s power. It needs to ensure a presence of the state in significant areas of the country (that is, areas of major settlement or where resources are generated) and it needs to eliminate rival sources of taxation and ensure that state spending does not reinforce inequalities based on identity.

What becomes crucial to reducing violence is less an issue of establishing formal democracy than one of ensuring the political settlement is based on elite bargains that are inclusive of all the state’s communities. In such a system conflict is usually defined in “divisible terms”, as Albert Hirschman famously noted, where conflicting interests can arrive at negotiated solutions, rather than in “indivisible terms”, or zero-sum equations, where winners take all.[[13]](#footnote-13) Malaysia is a highly unequal society, but its state is based on a set of elite bargains that has ensured the inclusion of all ethnic groups. While class conflicts persist, they are seldom expressed through the resort to violence (unless politicians turn to the mobilisation of their supporters on the grounds of ethnicity or religion). Because the political settlements established in Tanzania and Zambia after independence incorporated the elites of all communities, these states were able to maintain relatively peaceful conflict over resources and the distribution of wealth for decades.

We know that the rush towards establishing formal democracy after war can often provoke extreme violence.[[14]](#footnote-14) This is so because non-state elites often mobilise support on the grounds of identity politics and anchor their actions and claims to legitimacy in non-state rules derived from traditional authority, ethnic origins or particular religions. They often control non-state armed organisations, which the central state is unable to disarm or defeat. In a country like the Democratic Republic of Congo, elections were never going to ensure peace in the east, because major elites (often with their own armed groups) did not agree on who was a legitimate citizen of the state, and minority groups could never win a majority in the region. Here conflict has been defined in “indivisible terms”. Much more important than elections, would be the establishment of a political settlement that was inclusive of all the major elites, through forms of “power sharing”, or other, less than democratic arrangements.

In most countries emerging out of intense violent conflict, violence is more likely to be reduced by ensuring such inclusive political settlements than formally establishing democratic rules. Poverty is unlikely to be reduced, let alone eliminated, for decades, but steps can be taken to ensure that it is distributed equitably. Ending repression of particular identity groups in society by state security forces remains much more important than guaranteeing equal rights, not least because a fully rights-based regime takes time to establish and is only possible in conditions where people can peacefully organise and fight for their rights. Full-blown democracy in a country like Rwanda, for instance, so soon after the genocide committed by the majority ethnic group against the minority, would open the door to the sort of hate driven politics that led to genocide.

**The Centrality of the State and Tolerance of Illiberal Economics**

The importance of consolidating the state as a means to reduce violence after war cannot be overestimated. Very often foreign donors, in their rush to ensure that resources are spent on health care or education at the community level, bypass embryonic, poorly functioning or graft ridden state systems. But this can fundamentally undermine or pre-empt state consolidation by creating what Ashraf Ghani and his colleagues labelled a “dual public authority”.[[15]](#footnote-15) When resources are channeled outside of state systems, this can create rival systems of patronage and alternative sources of power. While this can sometimes be constructive in a well-consolidated state, it can be deadly where state-building is still on the agenda.

Liberal prescriptions for economic governance can also exacerbate the sources of violence. For instance, IMF insistence on reducing government deficits in Guinea Bissau, meant that the salaries of soldiers and police were not paid, directly contributing to the outbreak of violence in the country.[[16]](#footnote-16) Imposing fiduciary rules on the allocation of government contracts can lead to the exclusion of important elites from economic opportunities thus giving them less of a stake in the state. In a poverty-stricken country emerging out of war, establishing basic economic activity through the promotion of agricultural and manufacturing activities can remain much more important for a long period of time than ensuring that those activities meet the rules of efficiency. It is often more important for considerable periods of time that elites and non-elites have access to sources of wealth generation and income, than that the economy function efficiently, even if that means developmental progress is delayed. Such progress will be delayed in much more fundamental terms if a country falls back into violence. The same can be said of the rush to privatise moribund state assets after war, where the state has neither the capacity nor necessarily the inclination to ensure that those assets are fairly accessible to domestic economic elites.[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Conclusion**

The politics of reducing violence necessitate a move away from received wisdoms about the promotion of democracy, economic liberalism and efficiency. The surest way to reduce violence in poor and middle income countries is to avoid, except in cases of genocide, external military interventions as a means of regime change. Destroying the organisations and institutions of a state, even a repressive state, through foreign military intervention is the surest way to create the conditions for long-lasting violence. Foreign actors cannot build inclusive political settlements, but they can recognise the need to both promote and not undermine the forging of such settlements in the countries that they are assisting. To do so may require breaking from long-held tenets about the efficient delivery of services, the promotion of democratic forms of participation, the respect of fiduciary rules in the allocation of contracts or the promotion of efficient macroeconomic management. Before urging “security sector reform”, international agencies should ensure that security sectors can be established with a unified chain of command and their forces paid salaries capable of supporting themselves and their families. The delivery of health care to communities needs to be done by building up state systems and not bypassing them, which will mean tolerating reasonable levels of inefficiency and corruption. This vantage point needs to become much more central in the thinking of international actors if they actually want to ensure a reduction in the levels of violence in poor and middle income countries in the future.

## Innocent Chukwuma

**Abstract**

**Fair and Accountable Security Forces as a Strategy for Reduction of Identity-based Violence in West-Africa**

Identity-based violence, particularly the primordial typologies such as kinship, tribal, ethnic, and religious attacks and counter attacks leading to unaccountable deaths, maiming, mass displacements and destruction of property and livelihoods, has been on the rise in parts of West Africa since the end of the cold war.

In the search for preventive solutions, significant scholarly and policy attention have been paid to sources and risk factors with mixed results. These include search for better frameworks for sharing proceeds of natural resources that abound in the region and seen as the major source of violent conflicts. Constitutional reform programs to address what has been referred to as the 'citizenship question', a situation where some groups feel that they are marginalized and denied access to social, economic and political opportunities available to others in their countries. And of course high level of poverty and unemployment among young people, which arguably predispose them to being available for recruitment for all manner of campaigns including group violence.

It would seem, however, that not much policy and programmatic attention has been paid to the conduct of state institutions, particularly security forces, when deployed to intervene in identity-based conflict and mounting evidence from human rights organizations that their actions have contributed in exacerbating violence in such conflicts. As we gather on how to reduce violence by 50% over the next 30 years, this paper calls for more attention to better governance of security intervention in identity-based conflicts in West Africa, partnership with civil society and improved resource commitment to extant measures that address the root causes of the violence with particular focus on ethno-religious and communal violence in Nigeria.

**Summary**

**Fair and Accountable Security Forces as a Strategy for Reduction of Identity-based Violence in West-Africa**

**Introduction**

The 15 countries that make up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have all gone through cycles of military coups, violent conflicts or civil wars over fear of or actual domination by one group or groups over others, leading to death, maiming and displacement of millions of people[[18]](#footnote-18), majorly women and children. This has particularly being the case in the decades following the end of the cold war when identity politics and attendant conflicts previously frozen by brutal dictatorships exploded into violence in Africa (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin, 2008, 2005; Plessis, 2001; Lange, 2001).

Unable to continue to depend on super power allies that provided ideologically-based support without interest in how West African states were internally governed, the change in global power relations and dynamics following end of Cold War and disintegration of the former Soviet bloc resulted to a parallel shift in the internal order of many countries in West Africa. And thus ensued an unstoppable transition process. In countries such as Ghana, Benin and Senegal, the transitions led to successful multiparty elections and thriving plural democracy. Other states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and later Mali were not so successful as they were plunged into brutal civil wars and armed conflicts, which in some countries lasted over a decade (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin (2008: 4).

Over the past decade, West Africa has made significant progress particularly in ending its civil wars, entrenching elected civilian governments (however flawed) and maintaining decent macro economic growth due to rising commodity prices. In spite of these achievements, identity-based violence continues to be a major challenge to the socio-political development of the region and to security of life and economic well being of its over 245 million peoples and thus a major contributor to the fragility profile of the region (Fund for Peace, 2014; World Bank, 2013). 11 out of the 15 countries in the sub-region have been flagged as fragile in the 2014 edition of the Fragile States Index published by Fund for Peace, with rankings ranging from ‘High Warning’ in Benin Republic, ‘Alert’ in Nigeria to ‘High Alert’ in places like Cote D’ivoire and Guinea Bissau (Fund for Peace, 2014). The situation has not been helped by the highhanded intervention strategies of state institutions such as security forces in their response to identity-based conflicts in places like Nigeria.

This paper focuses on better governance of security forces as a viable strategy in the quest for reduction of alarming spate of identity-based violence in West Africa, with particular attention to ethno-religious and communal violence in Nigeria.

**Review of the Evidence**

The continuing fragility of West Africa to large-scale violence in spite of recent progress made in ending civil wars has not gone unnoticed by stakeholders in the region. A 2010 conference in Liberia to review progress in ECOWAS noted that, “West Africa region remains precariously fragile and susceptible to relapse into violence and reversals in the democratization processes (Mustapha, 2013). Another high-level conference organized by the African Governance Institute (AGI) in Dakar, Senegal in 2013, restated the concern about fragility of peace in West Africa. What is significant though is that the AGI conference connected this fragility with the governance of the security sector, noting that:

Recent developments in West Africa, especially in Mali and Guinea Bissau and elsewhere ... [are] consequences of poor governance in armed and security forces.... In order to address the emerging human security challenges facing the continent, there is a need to reconsider the missions, the structures, the training and logistics of the armed and security forces (AGI 2013, quoted in Mustapha 2013:12).

Although official data on the extent of identity-based violence in West Africa, especially ethno-religious and communal typologies, are difficult to find and largely absent because of poor data culture of many countries in the sub-region, reports of non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders highlight the grave extent and size of the problem. In 2002, the Lagos based CLEEN Foundation in collaboration with the Geneva based World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), published a damning report on violence related to identity in Nigeria between 1999 and 2002 and stated: “In over fifty separate and documented incidents, over ten thousand Nigerians have reportedly been victims of extra-judicial executions at average of 200 executions per incident (CLEEN/OMCT, 2002: 9). The report went further to allege the involvement of security forces and stated, “Security agents acting in most cases on direct orders from the government, have been responsible for many of the deaths (CLEEN/OMCT, 2002:9)”.

Similarly, in several reports spanning the fifteen years of elected civilian government in Nigeria, Human Rights Watch (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013) documented incidents of violence linked to ethno-religious and communal identity in Nigeria, with casualty rate in terms of deaths, maiming, displacements and loss of livelihoods and property running into millions of people. In several of the reports, the global rights watch body concluded that security forces bear heavy responsibility in being absent in the face of escalating violence, intervening late and contributing in increasing death tolls by engaging extra-legal killings.

Behind most outbreaks of ethno-religious and communal violence in Nigeria are long standing disputes over land, natural resources, poverty, legally sanctioned discrimination on the basis of ethnic identity, youth unemployment and government preference for ad hoc approaches focused mainly on cessation of violence through massive deployment of unaccountable security forces in resolving what are clearly deep seated grievances requiring deliberate political, constitutional and economic reform measures and accountable of public institutions, especially security forces when deployed to intervene in such conflicts (Human Rights Watch 2013; 2008; Alubo, 2009; Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

**My Research and Contribution**

From a review of the literature and in particular the seven-country West African study (including Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, Burkina Faso, Liberian and Niger) on governance of security intervention in conflicts carried out by the Lagos-based CLEEN Foundation in 2012/2013, which this paper draws heavily from, it is seems clear to me that any serious efforts to reduce violence in the sub-region, especially ethno-religious and communal violence in Nigeria requires significant and focused attention at two broad levels:

At the primary or root cause level, finding equitable frameworks for sharing proceeds of natural resources that abound in the region and seen as the major source of violent conflicts, are key. And so are the need to deepen democracy as the preferred system of government; embarking on constitutional and legal reforms measures to resolve the ‘citizenship question’, particularly marginalization of so called ‘settlers’ by ‘indigenes’ in many states of the federations in social, economic and political opportunities regardless of how long they have lived in the states and pay their taxes; and of course the high level of poverty and unemployment among young people, which arguably predispose them to being available for recruitment for all manner of campaigns including group violence.

At the secondary level, which is the focus of this paper, the conduct and accountability of security forces, especially the police and the military, when deployed to intervene in ethno-religious and communal violence are critical. Political authorities in the sub-region should no longer measure success in such interventions only in terms cessation of violence in particular incidents alone but also by degree of adherence of security forces to national and international human rights standards governing such interventions and ensuring that before security forces are deployed to conflict sites, they are properly trained, provided with clear rules of engagement consistent with human rights standards, adequate logistics and supplies and monitored by variety of stakeholders including civil society groups for effective compliance. These are necessary in order to reduce the unacceptably high level of violence reportedly deployed in such interventions and prevention of community retaliation and security reprisals.

The findings of the study indicates that:

* Wider societal democratic context is critical for proper governance of intervention of security forces in identity-based conflicts. The experience of Ghana has shown that there is a close connection between deepening of democracy and reduction of violence in conflicts associated with identity (Iddi, 2013). In the case of Nigeria, the democratic process has been frozen in a grey zone of politics that is neither out-rightly authoritarian nor deeply democratic and hence the increasing level of violence deployed in identity violence both non-state and state actors.
* Decentralization of the security institution and civil society participation in their governing councils increase legitimacy and accountability. This particularly important if participating representatives of civil society are trained and familiar with concepts and issues in civilian oversight of the security sector: In Ghana, the decentralization of the intelligence institution through the creation of Regional Security Committees (REGSEC) and District Security Committees (DISEC) and the opening up of these committees to civil society participation was one of the contributory factors in the minimization of violence in an ethno-religious conflict in Hohoe district, located in the Volta region (east) of the country in 2012 (Iddi, 2013).
* Clear jurisdictions and development of protocols for collaboration and coordination among security forces, which details procedure for intervention by security agencies, at what stage in an unfolding conflicts and coordination arrangements (Idrissa, 2013; Abdu, 2013). In Niger the legal framework governing the security sector helps to diffuse any tensions between the various services by clearly demarcating their jurisdictions and spheres of operations. Protocols of cross-service collaboration also seem very well articulated. This reduces inter-agency rivalries and misadventures (Idrissa, 2013).
* Presidential Commissions and panels of inquiry periodically established to look into systemic violence and patterns/prevalence of abuse of rights by security forces have been found to be effective especially when their reports are published and recommendations scrupulously implemented. In Ghana, such commissions have reportedly led to improved police performance.
* Others include training of Parliamentarians oversight functions with attention to the security sector; Comprehensive reform of the military and police and provision of logistics and supplies when they security forces are deployed in intervene in conflict situations.

## Maria Stephan

**Biography**

Dr. Maria J. Stephan is a senior policy fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, where she focuses on the dynamics of civil resistance and their relevance for violent conflict prevention and democratic development. Previously, Stephan was lead foreign affairs officer in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), where she worked on both policy and operations. Her last assignment entailed engaging the Syrian opposition in Turkey.  Earlier, she was detailed to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan to focus on subnational governance and civil-military planning.

Prior to government service, Stephan directed policy and research at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC), a DC-based NGO dedicated to developing and disseminating knowledge about nonviolent struggle.  She was an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and American University's School of International Service.  Stephan is the editor of Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization and Governance in the Middle East (Palgrave, 2009) and the co-author of Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2011).  The latter book was awarded the 2012 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Prize by the American Political Science Association for the best book published in political science and the 2012 University of Louisville Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order.

Stephan has worked with the European/NATO policy office of the U.S. Department of Defense, and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.  She received both Harry S. Truman and J. William Fulbright scholarships. She holds doctoral and master's degrees from Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a bachelor's degree from Boston College.  Stephan is from Clarendon, Vermont.

**Abstract**

**Civil Resistance as a Powerful (and more Effective) Alternative to Violence**

The hope that "people power" can successfully challenge dictatorships and usher in new and improved governing systems seems to be dashed. Ongoing carnage in Syria, continued instability in Libya, political assassination and restlessness in Tunisia, a bloody counter-revolution in Egypt, and bloody crackdowns against Ukrainian protestors in the Euromaidan would make anyone skeptical about the promise of nonviolent resistance against oppressive regimes.

This skepticism is understandable but misplaced. Two years ago, Erica Chenoweth and I published a book called Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. In analyzing data from 1900 through 2006, we discovered a simple finding: that campaigns of nonviolent resistance were twice as likely to succeed as campaigns of violent resistance, and that nonviolent campaigns ushered in greater chances of democracy and civil peace than armed struggle. This was true even in highly authoritarian, repressive, and powerful countries where we would think nonviolent resistance to fail.

In fact, despite recent cynicism about the power of nonviolent resistance, a number of contemporary cases suggest that the historical record still holds. Civil resistance remains a superior strategy of social and political change in the face of oppression, and movements that opt for violence often unleash terrible destruction and bloodshed-in both the short and long term-usually without realizing the goals they set out to achieve.

**Summary**

**Civil Resistance as a Powerful (and more Effective) Alternative to Violence**

**I.** Recent events make it tough to be optimistic that global violence can be significantly reduced over the next 30 years. Over 170,000 deaths in Syria after a nonviolent revolution morphed into civil war; thousands dead in the Central African Republic after armed insurgency and militia violence; nearly 2000 Gazans and around 70 Israelis killed following three weeks of resumed combat; thousands more slaughtered in Iraq by the extremist Islamic State; Russian-backed rebels in southeastern Ukraine trying to kill their way to secession; the list goes on. Intra-state wars, whose overall number has fortunately declined significantly over the past few decades, remain responsible for inflicting terrible violence and wreaking havoc around the world. Their victims remain overwhelmingly civilian.

If there is any silver lining, besides the general research findings by Steven Pinker and others that global levels of violence are at a historical all-time low, it is that civilian populations across the globe are increasingly fighting injustice and oppression using forceful but nonviolent methods. Poles, South Africans, Chileans, Filipinos, Serbs, Lebanese, and Tunisians are just a few groups that have challenged repressive governments using political satire, mass protests, consumer boycotts, sit-ins, and other forms of civil disobedience and noncooperation. The track record of nonviolent civil resistance, even against brutal regimes willing to use violence, is impressive. *If civil resistance were to become the predominant method of popular contention over the next 30 years, and the people using it became increasingly skilled and strategic, the world could witness a marked reduction of global violence caused by conflicts pitting populations against governments.*

**II.** Intra-state conflicts pitting aggrieved populations against repressive governments have dominated the global landscape since the end of World War II. Some combination of non-existent or inadequate power-sharing mechanisms, institutionalized discrimination and the manipulation of identity politics, corruption and the lack of economic opportunity, and the denial of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms have fueled these conflicts. Dictatorial regimes, including those led by Mao, Stalin, Hitler, Tojo, Pol Pot, Mengistu, Pinochet, Ceausescu, Sadaam Hussein, Bashir, Mugabe, and Assad have used their repressive apparatuses to launch purges, politicide, and genocide that have killed millions.

Where there is repression, there is typically resistance. Resistance to authoritarian or dictatorial rule has historically taken two forms: violent and nonviolent. Armed groups that have challenged incumbent regimes have lost an astounding 73% of the time.[[19]](#footnote-19) The numbers of deaths, displacement, and destruction following such campaigns have been profound. Studies have further found that most atrocities committed by states occur when they are confronted with armed insurgencies. [[20]](#footnote-20) In those cases where armed insurgents have succeeded and taken over the reins of power they’ve typically ruled with an iron fist, contributing to further cycles of violence. 43% of countries that experienced armed resistance relapsed into civil war 10 years after the campaign ended – compared to 28% of those that experienced nonviolent campaigns. How people fight for basic rights, freedoms, and a different system of governance strongly correlates with how violent or peaceful the society is afterwards.

On the positive side, Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program (UCDP) found that compared to the period right after the end of the Cold War, where more than 50 conflicts were active, armed conflicts have declined by almost 40%. Conflicts claiming more than 1,000 lives, defined as wars, have declined by more than 50 percent, from 15 in the early 1990s to seven in 2013.[[21]](#footnote-21) It is possible that such armed conflicts could be further reduced if people increasingly relied on forceful nonviolent means to advance their social, economic, and political goals.

**III.** Two years ago, Erica Chenoweth and I published a book called *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. In analyzing 323 campaigns from 1900 through 2006, we made a simple argument: that campaigns of nonviolent resistance were twice as likely to succeed as campaigns of violent resistance, and that nonviolent campaigns ushered in greater chances of democracy and civil peace than their violent alternatives. This was true even in highly authoritarian and repressive countries where one might expect nonviolent resistance to fail. Contrary to conventional wisdom, no social, economic, or political structures have systematically prevented nonviolent campaigns from emerging or succeeding.

Building on insights from Hannah Arendt, the basic assumption behind civil resistance as a method of conflict is that no oppressive system—be it a dictatorship, a foreign military occupation, or unjust economic system—is monolithic or permanent. Nor can any oppressive system survive without the cooperation and acquiescence of the people who reside in its pillars of support—the security forces, economic elites, civilian bureaucrats, state media, religious authorities, and educational elites. Many scholars and practitioners suggest that the main object of civil resistance is to use popular collective action to pull those pillars away from the powerholder so as to disrupt or collapse the oppressive system. Practitioners have also recognized this as a fundamental mechanism through which to confront oppression.

Crucially, our argument does not require the opponent to possess even a baseline level of morality. Opponents may be extremely brutal, prideful, self-concerned, and petty. We do not believe in benevolent dictators; if they think they can get away with murder, they will murder. But the morality of the adversary does not matter nearly as much as the ability of the resistance to dislocate, over-extend, and outmaneuver the opponent while eroding its political, economic, social and military sources of power using a broad range of tactics.

In our study, the single most important factor influencing the success of a civil resistance campaign was participation. The larger and more diverse the campaign, the more likely it was to succeed. Large campaigns are more likely to seriously disrupt the status quo, spread out the costs of repression, provoke defections within the pillars of support—and make powerholders pay attention. When large numbers of people engage in acts of non-cooperation and disruption, even the most brutal opponent has difficulty cracking down and sustaining the repression indefinitely.

Diverse campaigns that include women, professionals, taxi drivers, religious figures and civil servants (versus mostly young, able-bodied men who receive training in explosives and hit-and-run attacks) are more likely to be broadly representative of the society, such that cracking down on the movement is more apt to backfire against the opponent. It is much tougher (though not impossible) for regimes to get away with repression targeting civilians considered mainstream or even close to the regime’s social circles than it is to target armed insurgents with lethal force. In fact, we find that under conditions of violent repression, nonviolent campaigns succeeded 46% of the time, whereas violent ones only succeeded 20% of the time. After all, police and military forces can hardly be comfortable in a situation where they are asked to use violence against people who may include their children, cousins, accountants, or imams.

**IV.** With popular uprisings and violent conflicts waging worldwide, policymakers often seem at a loss when confronted with the question of how the international community can support civilians seeking to expand their rights and protect themselves from state violence—and in what form that support should come. At the 2013 UN General Assembly meeting, President Barak Obama flagged the essential role that civil society has played in virtually every transformative social and political change around the world, from the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, to bringing freedom to Eastern Europe, to the civil rights movement in the United States. The right of peaceful assembly and association, “[is] not a Western value; it is a universal right”, said Obama, who drew attention to the shrinking space for civil society in many parts of the world.

Countries are passing laws designed specifically to suppress civil society, restricting NGO’s access to foreign funding, cracking down on communications technology and, in more extreme cases, arresting and using violence against journalists and nonviolent activists. Obama called on governments to embrace civil society groups as partners and to coordinate diplomatic responses when governments try to stifle civil society. In a slightly edgier appeal, the U.S. President, whose civic organizing background is well-known, pressed governments and non-governmental actors to devise more innovative and effective ways to support civic groups and activists, notably in restrictive environments.

The initiative launched during last year’s UNGA, known as “Stand With Civil Society”, is an opportunity to take stock of various forms of external assistance (governmental, multi-lateral, non-governmental) to nonviolent civic groups and evaluate what is working and what is not. “Do no harm” should be an anchoring principle for this work – local civic actors are in the best position to determine whether, and which forms of aid are appropriate, and to evaluate the risks associated with external support.

**My first policy recommendation is for a non-governmental or multi-lateral entity to invest in a systematic study of the tools available to external actors to support nonviolent campaigns and movements – and to develop a framework for intervention that includes guiding principles.** Such a study, to include short case studies, has not been undertaken and could improve policymakers’ understanding of the broad range of options available to support nonviolent transition processes.

Non-state actors, including foundations, are generally able to disburse funds more quickly and with fewer strings attached to local community-based organizations, youth groups and media start-ups and are often better positioned than some governments to support nonviolent campaigns and movements. And these groups often have local legitimacy and a mobilization base unlike many donor-driven NGOs.

**My second recommendation is for the leading (I)NGOs and private foundations involved in supporting civic campaigns and movements to join forces and compile best (and worst) practices related to their interventions – and to develop virtual and off-line ways to disseminate those best practices.** This will help position these non-governmental actors to better assist nonviolent activists in ways that are difficult or impossible for governmental actors.

Support to civil society by diplomats, development practitioners, and policymakers can take many forms: small, catalytic grants to civic actors, monitoring trials of political prisoners, engaging in solidarity actions to support the right of peaceful assembly, helping connect civil society to reform-minded government officials, providing alternative channels of information, targeting warnings to security officials who might be tempted to use lethal force against nonviolent protestors, and supporting general capacity-building for civic groups and independent media are only a few. These and other “tools” available to diplomats, which range from low-risk to more pro-actively interventionist, are highlighted in the Diplomat’s Handbook for Democratic Development Support*[[22]](#footnote-22)*, a practical field guide that also includes over a dozen detailed case studies of effective (and non-effective) examples of external support to civil society and transitioning governments involving diplomats from democratic countries around the world.

A companion guide, *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions[[23]](#footnote-23),* shows how the armed forces from democratic countries can positively influence the behaviors of security forces in nom-democratic and transitioning countries.

**My third and fourth policy recommendations are that the UN or another multilateral actor (like the Community of Democracies) fund the marketing of these practical training tools and invest in the production of animating short videos featuring interviews with diplomats, military officers, and civic leaders featured in the handbooks.** Such an investment in these educational tools, which could be used in diplomatic and military academies around the world, could significantly improve the practice of governmental actors vis-à-vis repressive regimes and nonviolent civil campaigns and movements.

Strengthening civil society is not only a precondition for sustained democratic development. It is also a way to buffer civilians from the worst excesses of violence originating from regime and non-state armed actors. Policymakers focused on atrocities prevention and the “responsibility to protect” doctrine should take note. As Erica Chenoweth’s and my research has shown, civilian casualties may be far fewer in cases where opposition actors opt for active nonviolent resistance – versus armed struggle or mixed approaches – to challenge repressive regimes and foreign occupations. While it is naïve to assume that regimes will refrain from the use of massive violence against nonviolent protestors – Ukraine 2014, Syria 2011, and Iran 2009 are only the most recent cases of regimes’ demonstrated willingness to gun down peaceful challengers – the data nevertheless suggests that helping civic groups maintain nonviolent discipline in these difficult environments, and familiarizing them with the broad spectrum of nonviolent “weapons” they can use to mobilize around repression, is a way to insulate them from the most extreme forms of violence.

**My fifth and final policy recommendation is** **for a coalition of international actors – with the strong involvement of global civil society organizations (CIVICUS, World Movement for Democracy) - to support a normative conversation about the “responsibility to assist” nonviolent activists and civic groups** before “protecting” civilians, including via military force, becomes a moral imperative that may or may not result in any concerted international action.  It is incumbent upon the international community to respond meaningfully, and in a coordinated way, to governments who insist on sovereign inviolability when they unleash mass violence on domestic nonviolent dissenters. Such a conversation should include a sober assessment of the limitations of sovereignty in such cases, and offer guidance for external actors grounded in international law about what types of support, when, and for which actors is both allowed and encouraged.

# Session 6

# Reducing Organised Forms of Violence

**Chair: John Lawrence Aber - New York University, Professor of Applied Psychology at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development**

Violence is highly concentrated globally, nationally, and locally. In violence hot spots effective strategies usually must address forms of organized violence committed in groups as well as the side effects of poor governance such as police corruption. The speakers of this session will identify the global hot spots of violence and the specific challenges to intervening in these areas. They will also present specific approaches that have been found to be effective in some areas of the world.

## Susanne Karstedt

**Biography**

Professor Karstedt's research interests focus on cross-national and cross-cultural comparative perspectives in criminology, and comprise mass atrocity crimes, state crimes, and international and transitional justice. In the area of international and comparative studies of crime and justice her research explores the role of democratic values, institutions and culture for patterns and levels of crime and criminal justice. Of particular interest are democracy's comparative advantages or disadvantages relating to violence, corruption, or state crime, as well as to imprisonment and prison conditions, and legitimacy of criminal justice institutions. Her other major areas of research are international and transitional justice, with a focus on public opinion, emotions, and perpetrators and victims in post-war Germany. Presently she is researching the micro- and macro-dynamics of events of mass atrocities, within the context of 'extremely violent societies'.  To this purpose she has created and is working with a global Index of Violent Societies.

**Abstract**

**Global Hotspots of Violence: How to Focus Intervenion and Prevention**

Collective and organized violence has been the most lethal violence across the past decades with millions of victims, with the state and governments as the most prominent perpetrator of massive violence. The face of organized violence and the groups of actors involved have changed considerably. Collective violence became “multi-polar”. Different groups became victims of massive attacks of physical violence, and diverse groups of perpetrators participate for a multitude of reasons. Campaigns of massive and targeted violence victimize successive groups in waves. Organized and collective violence coalesce with interpersonal violence. These are exactly the “Complex emergencies” that the WHO has identified in its 2002 “World Report on Violence and Health” within the context of collective violence.

Organized and collective violence is highly concentrated in time and space. Over the past decades the global hot spots of extreme violence have migrated from Asia to Latin America and to Africa, though the group of 20 countries with highest levels of organized and collective as well as interpersonal violence has been remarkably stable across the past decades. The nature of contemporary organized and collective violence suggests two routes for violence prevention and intervention. First, a micro-dynamic approach focuses on violent actors, victims and events rather than on root and distal causes. This encourages the transfer of violence programs from other settings, like e.g. gangs in neighbourhoods. Second, the concentrated nature of organized and collective violence offers advantages for intervention and prevention, and the targeting of hot spots of violence might considerably reduce overall violence. Nonetheless, this poses a number of problems and difficult questions. What would be the overall impact on violence levels if hotspots are targeted? How responsive are hotspots to violence reduction programmes, are they “hard” or “soft” targets? In which ways are organised and other forms of violence related in hotspots, and will interventions targeting one form of violence have spill-over effects on another type? Based on a unique global data set of “Violent Societies”, which combines types of organised and non-organised violence for 134 countries since 1976, these questions will be addressed in two steps. First, the contribution of global hot spots of violence to the overall level of violence will be described, for organised as well as for non-organised forms of violence. Next, the relationship between organised and non-organised violence will be explored for hotspots of violence, with particular attention to their contextual pattern. Finally, impact of violence reduction in hot spots on global violence levels will be estimated, for various global regions. Conclusions will be drawn as to the advantages, disadvantages and tools of interventions targeting hot spots.

**Summary**

**Global Hotspots of Violence: How to Focus Intervenion and Prevention**

Organized or collective violence comprises a range of different forms of violence, committed within different types of organizations, as part of different forms of organizing violence, and by different types of collectivities. Accordingly, collective or organized violent actors comprise state actors – as in wars and internal conflicts -, non-state actors like militias, rebel groups, or terrorist groups, and finally cartels and gangs, as well as organized crime groups. Collective and organized violence includes torture by agencies of the state, forced disappearances and violent displacement of large numbers of people from their homes besides wars, genocide, and internal conflicts. Victims include the victims of torture and repression, civilian and military casualties of civil and other wars, of war crimes and genocide, of imposed policies of famine as well as of other crimes against humanity. Victims further include the victims of organized and collective sexual violence in armed conflicts, as well as the victims of these crimes in refugee camps and under conditions of displacement. Direct and indirect (e.g. through sexual violence in a refugee camp) lethal victimization through organized and collective violence by far exceeds and outnumbers victims of interpersonal violence, even as organized and collective violence decreased as a result of declining armed conflict. States and governments are still the most lethal of collective violent actors, and muster a range of other collective actors from military to militias, police forces and other repressive forces and agents of the state. Over the past decades, state organized violence has resulted in huge numbers of victims of massive violence.

As the number of armed conflicts and its victims declined, the face of organized violence and the groups of actors involved have changed considerably. Collective violence became “multi-polar”. Different groups became victims of massive attacks of physical violence, including mass killings, systematic sexual violence and enforced displacement, and mass violence oscillates between these different forms of violence. In many incidents of mass atrocities systematic sexual violence is the predominant type of violence. Diverse groups of perpetrators participate for a multitude of reasons, ranging from state government forces to militias, and engage in complex and shifting alliances, with states and governments still taking the lead in perpetrating massive violence and atrocity crimes. Engagement of military and paramilitary forces, as well as of the police in para-military action result in forced disappearances, widespread torture, and sexual violence. It is important to recognize the sinuous character of collective violence, with “peaks and lulls”, where campaigns of massive and targeted violence alternate with lower levels, and where indiscriminate violence has different objectives and victimizes successive groups in waves. Organized and collective violence correlates with interpersonal violence, as communities are disrupted, young men become habituated to violence, and massive displacement makes women and children particularly vulnerable. These are exactly the “Complex emergencies” that the WHO has identified in its 2002 “World Report on Violence and Health” within the context of collective violence.

**Micro-dynamics of contemporary collective violence:**

**Implications and principles for violence reduction**

As patterns of contemporary collective violence change, the micro-dynamics of extreme and collective violence become more important than macro-level risk factors. We thus move our vantage point in understanding these types of violence closer to the ‘everyday violence’ that is committed and goes on in wars, civil wars and gang wars, to collective and other forms of political violence, or to organized crime and violence committed by these actors. Violence by collective actors thus becomes comparable to other settings: gang wars in urban areas, violent organized crime and its related territorial disputes, or political violence and mobilization. Local violence that spirals out of control in ‘Hobbesian’ and high-risk spaces might be equally found in Latin American favelas and US American ghettos.

Focusing on the micro dynamics of massive collective violence rather than macro-level causes and risk factors is hugely advantageous for violence reduction from a health perspective as promoted by the WHO for the following reasons:

* rather than addressing root or distal causes related to violence, programmes of intervention and prevention can target violent acts and violent actors directly;
* given the similarities with violence in other settings, successful programmes can be “transferred” and tested within the context of high-level organized violence;
* programmes targeting violent actors can be combined with successful interventions to protect potential victims from violence, and move from single-focus programmes of violence reduction for perpetrators towards multi-focus programmes that enhance protective factors among victims.

This leads on to a **set of principles** of violence reduction / victim protection for collective violence within and beyond the context of “complex emergencies”.

* “migrating” successful programmes between different levels and contexts as between gangs in neighbourhoods and factions in civil war; or peace building programmes and firearm reduction programmes;
* targeting potential perpetrators as part of networks and other collectivities, as e.g. organizations;
* targeting potential victims of organized violence: identifying protective factors and developing programmes;
* developing programmes of monitoring state organized actors, and contributing to existing programmes of oversight, monitoring and auditing the use of force by organized state and government actors (e.g. Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, Istanbul Protocol)

**Global hot spots of violence:**

**Implications and principles for violence reduction**

Organized and collective actors are particularly involved in creating hot spots of violence with a multitude of victims, from gangs in neighbourhoods to units of security forces and non-state actors in countries and regions. Where hotspots are located in conflict zones, sexual violence is one of the most prevalent forms of violence. Global hot spots of violence of violence have the potential to morph into “complex emergencies” at a fast pace.

My research is based on a unique global data set of “Violent Societies”, which combines types of organized and non-organized violence for 134 countries since 1976. The Index of Violent Societies (VSI) includes battle deaths, state violence, terrorism and homicides, thus combining organized and non-organized violence; it gives the relative rank of each country for each year. The VSI and other research demonstrate the following features of global hot spots:

* Global hot spots are mobile: they migrated from Asia in the 1950s and 1960 to Latin America in the1970s and 1980s, to Africa in the 1990s and 2000s.
* Global hot spots of violence are nonetheless remarkably stable and state-dependent: A large proportion of countries that were among the 20 most violent countries remained in this group across three decades.
* Global hot spots provide the conditions for mass atrocity crimes, mainly committed by organized actors. A large proportion of countries in this group experienced mass atrocity crimes.
* Even in global hot spots of violence (on the country level) on average only 15% of the territory is affected by extreme violence and the site of massive violence by organized actors.
* The concentrated nature of violence offers advantages for intervention and prevention, as a focus on global hot spots can achieve a considerable reduction in violence globally, and resources can be targeted. However the nature of organized violent actors might pose particular difficulties. We are presently operating with limited knowledge and data bases about the extent of violence by collective and organized actors, the different types of violence and their relationships, and the responsiveness of these types of violence and actors to interventions and prevention. In a first step these questions have to be answered. What would be the overall impact on violence levels if hotspots are targeted? In which ways are organised and other forms of violence related in hotspots, and will interventions targeting one form of violence have spill-over effects on another type? How responsive are hotspots to violence reduction programmes, are they “hard” or “soft” targets?

In a second step we use the micro-dynamic approach to collective and organized violence for hot spots. The research corroborates a set of recommendations based on the basic premise that - likewise in other contexts - intervention and prevention has to target violent acts and violent actors directly rather than addressing root or distal causes related to violence. This includes the following:

* Developing programmes of “dynamic deterrence” that target leaders and nodes in organized violent networks, and more generally exploring the potential of using networks for intervention and prevention
* Developing / using programmes for reduction of firearms by organized actors involved;
* Developing programmes that change attitudes/ behaviours of organized actors, e.g. those who are equally victimized;
* Developing programmes for enhancing protective factors among potential victims, in particular among refugees and displaced persons;

Developing programmes using successful peace building efforts for organized violent actors, and migrating programmes between different levels and contexts

## James Finckenauer

**Biography**

Dr. James Finckenauer's research and teaching interests include international and comparative criminal justice, transnational organized crime, and criminal and juvenile justice policy, planning and evaluation. He has authored, co-authored or co-edited ten books, as well as numerous articles, chapters and reports.  Professor Finckenauer has been a visiting professor in Australia, China, Germany, Japan, and Russia, and studied or lectured in Europe, Asia, the former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Middle East. From 1998-2002, he was Director of the International Center at the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice; and in 2007 he was a Fulbright Senior Specialist in Hong Kong.  Most recently, Dr. Finckenauer has served as a member of the American Psychological Association Task Force on the Trafficking of Women and Girls, and as a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania Jerry Lee Center of Criminology.  He is a member of the Core Faculty of the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers, and Co-editor of the Online Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Book Reviews.

**Abstract**

**Criminal Groups and Violence**

The perpetrators of organized crime, namely criminal groups or organizations, come in a great variety – ranging from loosely knit networks of just a few individuals up to relatively large and well-structured, hierarchical groupings.  Street gangs, particularly centered in urban settings, are a form of criminal organization.  So too are outlaw motorcycle gangs, drug cartels, various ethnic-based mafias, etc.  At least some capacity for violence and its use is characteristic of just about all of these groupings.  But both the capacities for and the actual use of violence tend to be different – often markedly so.  In addition to differences in violence capacity, there may be differences in the type of violence engaged in, e.g., impulsive and gratuitous, or instrumental, planned and directed toward some specific aim.  These differences, I suggest, have important implications for prevention and control.  The variability in the capacity for violence; the variability in the type of violence; and, the efficacy of various approaches used to confront and contain violence will be explored.  Since we currently have few, solid, empirically-based answers for most of the questions surrounding criminal groups and violence, a research agenda will also be tentatively outlined.

**Summary**

**Criminal Groups and Violence**

**Introduction**

There are many different forms of what is called and thought of as “organized crime.” Not addressed here are a number of groups or organizations that engage in violent crime, but that do so as only a part of a larger political, social, or ideological agenda. These include, for example, terrorist organizations, militias/revolutionary groups such as the FARC in Colombia, hate groups such as the Aryan Brotherhood, and various neo-Nazi groups. Given the varied and complex nature of their agendas and purposes, such groups are not typically considered to be forms of organized crime as traditionally defined.

These exclusions narrow the field considerably, but still leave a range of groups that engage in criminal violence. I will here focus on two prototypical examples within that range for purposes of illustration, as well as for the consideration of the effectiveness of intervention strategies to deal with them.

**The Nature of Criminal Groups**

**And Violence**

Violence and the threat of violence is a critically important dimension of what I call “true” *Organized Crime*. Killings, beatings, burnings and destruction are used against other criminals and against victims who do not pay for their drugs, pay off their bets or pay back their loans. Violence is also used to frighten and intimidate extortion victims and potential competitors. This kind of violence is **instrumental** and utilitarian in that it is used to accomplish a business purpose. Indeed, it is inherent in organized crime’s business operations; and the key word here is inherent. As I have noted elsewhere, one of the essential defining characteristics of *Organized Crime* is “the ability to use, or a reputation for use of, violence or the threat of violence to facilitate criminal activities, and in certain instances to gain or maintain monopoly control of particular criminal markets” (Finckenauer:. 29). “Reputation for” and “threat of” violence are important nuances here, because as studies suggest some Criminal Organizations (COs) engage in “violence-avoidance” whenever possible, because violence attracts attention and is bad for business (See, e.g., Pearson, Geoffrey and Hobbs, 2001; and Desroches, 2003). This supports the idea of violence being instrumental for a business purpose, and thus being used only selectively. Once the authority of reputation has been established, actual violence may no longer be as necessary.

Irrespective of the frequency of actual use, because instrumental violence is innate and at the core of criminal enterprises, it cannot be separated from those enterprises. Combating it thus requires interventions that target the various enterprises and criminal markets themselves. Criminal organizations (COs) of the true Organized Crime type include La Cosa Nostra in the US, Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs such as Hells Angels that have chapters in many countries, the Russian Solntsevskaya, Japanese Yakuza, and the Mexican Zetas, among numerous others.

The other prototype of a violent criminal group is urban street gangs. Unlike the predominantly instrumental violence of the aforementioned groups, these gangs frequently engage in **gratuitous** violence -- that is violence as an end in itself. NYPD Commissioner William Bratton has referred to this as violence for the sake of violence. Gang members are socialized to embrace violent attitudes and norms. This subculture results in a street identity that is characterized by bravado and aggressiveness. Hallsworth (2013) describes the mostly young, male gang members as using violence to “assert and affirm their masculine identity” (p. 160).

In a paper entitled *Gangs 101: Understanding the Culture of Youth Violence* ([www.esperanza.us](http://www.esperanza.us)) the purposes of gang violence are outlined as follows:

Violence is used within the gang to:

• Defend or expand gang turf

• Recruit new members

• Keep members from leaving

• Exclude or remove undesirable members

• Exercise revenge or seek redress for actual or perceived wrongs, no matter how slight they might be

• Enhance perceptions of power and invincibility

• Gain respect or dominance over others

• Enforce rules.

**Interventions**

Whereas COs have a larger reach, are more criminally sophisticated and have greater continuity over time and crimes, urban street gangs tend to be more locally, neighborhood focused – both in terms of where they live and hangout, and in terms of their criminal activity -- and are thus more easily (and as it turns out more effectively) targeted than the COs.

Keeping in mind the need for an approach to combating the violence of COs that must be multi-targeted, we can briefly look at two contrasting strategies recently described by Ayling (2014). Ayling compares and contrasts approaches used in Australia and the Netherlands. She describes the dominant strategy in Australia as one of seeking to “disrupt the structure of criminal groups through anti-associations provisions.” The main target there has been outlaw motorcycle gangs regarded as being particularly dangerous. In effect, membership in certain defined organizations (those for example associated with violence) is criminalized. Criminal penalties are then prescribed for violation of court-imposed civil instruments and control orders. I should add that this would be a very questionable strategy – as to its legality – in the US.

In contrast, the Dutch administrative approach employs a variation of situational crime prevention in which “regulatory and criminal justice measures complement each other, and [target] organised criminal activities more generally.” In brief, the regulatory and licensing powers of various government agencies are used to prevent the infiltration of businesses by COs. In this way, the whole of the government bureaucracy can be brought into play, rather than relying only on criminal justice responses.

As for their comparative effectiveness, Ayling suggests that although the Dutch approach is “far from perfect. It does …provide an example of a whole-of-government scheme that integrates criminal justice and regulatory approaches in a way that institutionalises organized crime risk awareness across the entire bureaucracy.” In contrast, the Australian anti-associations model, she says, is an example of “policy making `on the run’ [that] has militated against the adoption of evidence-based, well-planned and nationally consistent approaches to organised crime.”

At the other end of the group violence spectrum – dealing with the violence for violence sake criminal gangs – a strategy called “pulling levers” has been used effectively in the US. The aim of this approach is to deter violent behavior, in essence by setting clear standards for behavior, and then doing what is called “pulling every [legally available] lever” when the standards are violated. One of the earliest examples of this strategy is Operation Ceasefire in Boston, MA. A partnership between researchers and practitioners assessed youth homicides and firearms violence and then focused attention on the small number of chronically criminal gang members who were responsible for most of the homicides.

Evaluations of Operation Ceasefire and its replications in other US cities have shown significant reductions in youth homicide victimization, “shots fired” calls for service, and gun assault incidents. The deterrence strategy, when combined with various social interventions, creating opportunities, and utilizing the services of community organizations has demonstrated effectiveness in reducing this particular kind of criminal group violence. According to the program assessment by the Office of Justice Programs of the US Department of Justice ([www.crimesolutions.gov](http://www.crimesolutions.gov)):

… the “pulling levers” strategy, involves deterring violent behavior by chronic gang members by reaching out directly to gangs, saying explicitly that violence will not be tolerated, and by following every legally available route when violence occurs. Simultaneously, service providers, probation and parole officers, and church and other community groups offer gang members services and other kinds of help. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a guarantee to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response. When gang violence did occur, Ceasefire agencies would address the violent group or groups involved, drawing from all possible legal levers. For instance, authorities could disrupt street drug activity, aim police attention toward low-level street crimes such as trespassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, seize drug proceeds and other assets, request stronger bail terms (and enforce them), and turn potentially severe Federal investigative and prosecutorial attention toward gang-related drug activity. Because of the multitude of agencies involved in Operation Ceasefire, each gang who behaved violently could be subjected to such crackdowns. The operations could be customized to the particular individuals and characteristics of the gang in question.

It can be readily seen how this approach can be effective against localized street gangs, but would be highly unlikely to work if targeted on national and transnational criminal organizations.

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# Session 7

# Global Actors: International Organisations and Private Philanthropy

**Chair: Simon Sommer - Jacobs Foundation, Head of Research**

Violence is prevented by taking concrete measures within countries, often at sub-national or municipal level. However, international actors can also make an important contribution to violence prevention, directly, by providing funding, policy advice, or operational assistance to countries; and indirectly, by providing global "public goods" for violence prevention – such as international treaties and resolutions, scientific knowledge and databases, and capacity development tools – which can then be applied by national and sub-national actors. In this session, the contribution of international organizations and private philanthropy to reducing violence by 50% in the next 30 years will be spelled out.

## Alexander Butchart

**Biography**

Dr. Alexander Butchart is the Prevention of Violence Coordinator in the Department of Violence and Injury Prevention and Disability at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva, Switzerland. His responsibilities include coordinating the Global Campaign for Violence Prevention, the development of policy for the prevention of interpersonal violence, preparation of guidelines for the prevention of specific types of interpersonal violence, and the coordination of research into various aspects of interpersonal violence and its prevention (more information on the Violence and Injury Prevention Unit of the WHO can be found [here](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/en/)). His postgraduate training includes a master's degree in clinical psychology and neuropsychology, and a doctoral degree for work examining the history and sociology of western medicine and public health in southern Africa. Prior to joining WHO he worked mainly in Southern and East Africa, where he was lead scientist in the South African Violence and Injury Surveillance Consortium, and in collaboration with the Uganda-based Injury Prevention Initiative for Africa participated in training violence and injury prevention workers from a number of African countries. He has been a visiting scientist at the Swedish Karolinska Institutet's Division of Social Medicine, and is a widely published social scientist.

## Susan Bissell

**Biography**

A native of Canada, Susan first served UNICEF in 1987, in New York, in what was then called the Division of Information and Public Affairs. Thereafter she returned to the University of Toronto to complete a Master’s degree in law, economics and international relations. Susan then resumed her work at UNICEF, in the Sri Lanka country office, focused on children in especially difficult circumstances (CEDC). From there Susan moved to Bangladesh and maintained her CEDC concentration, positioning UNICEF particularly on child labour at a time when it was attracting considerable international attention.

In 1997, Susan again commenced academic work, in a doctoral degree in public health and medical anthropology at the WHO Key Center for Women’s Health, Faculty of Medicine, University of Melbourne. While completing her doctorate, Susan also worked with Trudie Styler and the Bangladeshi film team Catherine and Tareque Masud to produce the documentary "A Kind of Childhood." The film screened widely at film festivals in North America, Europe, and Asia, and appeared on Canadian, American, and British television. In 2005, it had a second screening at the London Human Rights Watch Film Festival.

Susan came back to UNICEF in 2001 as the Chief of Child Protection in India. In 2004, she transferred to the Innocenti Research Center, where she led a research unit and a number of studies. These included a 62- country study on the implementation of the general measures of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and global research on the Palermo Protocol and child trafficking. Susan was also a member of the Editorial Board of the report of the UN Secretary General’s Study on Violence Against Children, which was released in 2006.

In 2009, Susan was appointed to her current position in New York, heading all of UNICEF’s Child Protection work. She oversees a team of professionals guiding efforts for children affected by armed conflict, child protection systems strengthening to prevent and respond to all forms of violence against children, and a range of other matters. UNICEF is active in child protection in 170 countries, and the New York team offers leadership, strategic vision, and technical support.

Susan was recently awarded an honourary Professorship at Barnard College/Columbia University. She also received the Dr. Jean Mayar Global Citizenship Award from Tufts University in 2012 and the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal in 2012. Susan was honoured to accept these on behalf of her UNICEF Child Protection colleagues around the world.

**Abstract**

**UNICEF’s Strategy in Prevnetion of Violence Against Children**

Violence against children knows no boundaries. Incresingly, data shows that in a variety of settings and cultures children cultures are affected. Girls and boys xperience violence differently, in different contexts, and across the life cycle. Children living with disabilities suffer disproportional violence, and of course children already ‘living in the margin’ in their societies, for whatever reasons, are particularly impacted.

This presentation will touch briefly on the current data and violence against children, underscoring its scope and global nature. I will then discuss strategies that ‘work’ to prevent and respond to violence. Indeed there are systems and approaches to protecting children from violence that have proven to be effective, though in few cases have been taken to scale. At the same time, there are well designed, child snsietive remedies for those who have experienced violence, and the oftentimes related abuse, exploitation and neglect.

Finally, the papter will look at UNICEF as an organisation trying to ‘center’ the protection of children from violence, abuse, exploitation and neglect on the global stage. From engagement with the academy, to public partnership, and political engagement vis. advocacy, the post 2015 agenda and beyond.

## Patricia Lannen

**Biography**

Patricia Lannen is a Program Director in the field of child protection at the UBS Optimus Foundation, a philanthropic grant-making foundation based in Switzerland that focuses of improving the lives of children facing adversity. Patricia is responsible for all of the Foundation's evidence-based violence prevention programs, and is involved in the Foundation's initiative to promote the integration of violence prevention into early child development programming. Since joining the UBS Optimus Foundation in 2008, she has coordinated the Foundation's global Optimus Study on child sexual victimization. In different countries around the world, this major initiative is aiming to prevent sexual abuse and to improve services for children who have faced such abuse. Prior to working with the UBS Optimus Foundation, she worked with children and adults on issues of psychosocial oncology at the Harvard Medical School's Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston. She has extensive experience in the management of large, multi-site projects with vulnerable populations. These projects have included epidemiological research as well as efforts aimed at intervention and prevention. Patricia holds a PhD in Psychology, and a Masters in Child Development and Clinical Psychology.

## Maya Ziswiler

**Biography**

Maya Ziswiler is Program Director in the field of education and child development at the UBS Optimus Foundation. She joined the Foundation from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria where she was responsible for managing public-private partnerships to provide treatment, care and support for HIV/AIDS and malaria programs in Africa and the Caribbean. Previously, Maya worked for UNICEF in Peru, building partnerships to support early childhood development programs. She also has marketing experience from Procter & Gamble in the Middle East and non-profit consulting experience from China. Maya holds degrees in International Development from McGill University, and an MBA in non-profit management from the University of Geneva. She speaks English, French, Spanish, German and Mandarin.

## Michael Feigelson

**Biography**

Michael Feigelson is the incoming interim Executive Director Director for the Bernard Van Leer Foundation, a private foundation focused on improving opportunities for young children in situations of social and economic disadvantage around the world.  A native New Yorker, he has spent the last 15 years working with children and youth in grassroots and international organizations, as well as serving as a consultant at McKinsey & Company.  He has degrees from Princeton and Wesleyan University.  Most importantly, he is a proud, new father.

**Abstract**

**The Role of Private Philanthropy in Violence Prevention**

The aim of this presentation is to illustrate the potential of philanthropy in fostering lasting social change and how this may be applied to the field of violence prevention.

The presentation will describe the comparative advantages of philanthropic investment including the ability to take risks, serve as an independent convener, capitalize on time-sensitive opportunities, build capacity in a field and exercise patience in waiting for a return on investment.  The presentation will provide historical and current examples, in which philanthropy was instrumental in building a field and creating lasting change.

The presentation will draw conclusions about the opportunities for philanthropy in the field of violence prevention including outlining the different kinds of field building investments already being made by foundations. The authors will describe cases of successful as well as failed attempts of philanthropy in the field in order to discern lessons learned and identify future opportunities for philanthropy in violence prevention.

This contribution will partially draw on an expert survey conducted with key academic experts, practitioners, investors and advocates from the fields of violence prevention and philanthropy.

**Summary**

**The Role of Private Philanthropy in Violence Prevention**

The philanthropic community and charities aim to assist those in need and better society as a whole. It is therefore not surprising that “philanthropy” can be traced back over 2,000 years to its etymological origins in Ancient Greek, when philanthropia literally meant “love for mankind”. Charities usually seek to improve individuals' well-being, whereas philanthropy attempts to help people, communities and institutions to solve social problems at their root causes.[[24]](#endnote-1),[[25]](#endnote-2)

1. Role of philanthropy

Philanthropists and philanthropic organizations are well-positioned to play a unique role in bridging gaps and realizing beneficial societal outcomes. In the following section, we will highlight five broad categories in which we feel philanthropy can play a key role: (1) Absorbing risks to promote progress; (2) Convening innovative partnerships; (3) Capitalizing on time-sensitive opportunities; (4) Building capacity for improved leverage; (5) Investing with patient capital.

2.1 Absorbing risks to promote progress

The philanthropic community has the tools and capital necessary to identify and test promising initiatives with the ultimate aim of demonstrating value and potential scalability. While governments and the private sector may have better capacity to scale-up successful initiatives and programs, they are often too risk-averse to launch activities in the early stages.

A considerable range of real-world examples exist on how philanthropy has benefited social issues by shouldering certain supply-side and demand-side risks in order to generate tangible solutions. For example, innovative financing mechanisms like Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) are able to transfer risk from public agencies to private investors, who provide financing that is only repaid by public agencies if certain agreed upon development outcomes are achieved (CGD 2013). Impact investments, such as DIBs, are meant not only to realize targeted outcomes, but to generate and support greater societal change spanning entire sectors[[26]](#endnote-3). By testing new unconventional approaches, philanthropy has helped to promote and showcase the importance of affordable private schools in low-income settings (Pearson Affordable Learning Fund), and also paved the way for the 1968 US Public Broadcasting Act, which ultimately delivered educational activities for children through mass media (Sesame Street - Carnegie Foundation). Mass media was not traditionally seen as educational tool until philanthropic donors took the risk to test this new approach which proved to be very effective.

Moreover, philanthropy can enhance the visibility of social issues, even advocate for unpopular issues, by raising the profile of frequently overlooked sectors of the population and their concerns. With the potential for operating outside specific political or economic structures, philanthropic organizations can stand up for disenfranchised or disadvantaged groups. The Ford Foundation has provided grants aimed at supporting democratic governance. Many of these grants were provided to corresponding organizations in Latin America in the 1970s and 80s, when many states in the region were characterized by repressive military regimes. Likewise, in 1996, Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) was launched with philanthropic support in order to establish a network of community-based organizations across 33 countries, enabling slum dwellers to engage directly with governments and avoid evictions.

2.2 Convening innovative partnerships

As an independent body, a philanthropic organization can act as a mediator when there are conflicts and as a convener when there is simply a lack of awareness of potential partners. By establishing independent platforms, philanthropic organizations can also aid in depoliticizing scientific findings and provide additional legitimacy and weight to advocacy and policymaking activities. In their role as independent conveners, philanthropic organizations can also bring together unexpected partners, among other things in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs). One such example is the mHealth Alliance, which was founded by the Rockefeller Foundation, United Nations Foundation and Vodafone Foundation to “champion the use of mobile technologies to improve health throughout the world”, while the Skoll Foundation focuses specifically on promoting pioneering partnerships by providing annual grants to support social entrepreneurs and innovators. Philanthropy has spurred the creation of such partnerships around the world, including in Colombia, where an alliance called Primero lo Primero was launched in 2012, aimed specifically at positioning early childhood development on the national government’s agenda and within the private sector. To achieve this objective, the alliance built strategic and financial coalitions that span the public and private sector. Other philanthropic work has aimed to achieve public health goals by taking the expertise and knowledge of both the private and public sectors, and exploiting each of their strengths to find the most efficient and effective solutions, including the Medicines for Malaria Venture spearheaded by Rockefeller foundation, which is working with countries where malaria is endemic, to deliver new and effective antimalarial drugs at affordable prices.

2.3 Capitalizing on time-sensitive opportunities

Philanthropy is poised to play an increasingly important role in providing immediate assistance in the face of emergencies and natural disasters. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction recently found that, since 2000, natural disasters have caused around $2.5 trillion in damages, with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicting that climate change will exacerbate natural disasters in the coming years. For such events, national governments and the UN often struggle with extensive bureaucratic hurdles and delays in providing aid and support in a timely manner. In some cases, philanthropic organizations have more flexibility to move quickly and effectively in providing support, avoiding the extended consensus-building and decision-making processes faced by other institutions.

2.4 Building capacity for improved leverage

In order to increase the impact of their philanthropic resources, foundations provide a broad range of support to non-profit organizations and other institutions to build their capacity. Indeed, a recently completed six-year survey conducted by the Center for Effective Philanthropy (CEP) illustrated how foundations can provide their grantees 14 different categories of capacity building[[27]](#endnote-4). Building on this set of categories, five broad types of support shall be mentioned here: (1) Strategic and financial planning; (2) Development of performance measures and results-based programming; (3) Research and documenting of best practices; (4) Building up communications and advocacy; (5) Fundraising for additional financial support.

In some cases, this support is formalized as a funding requirement to receive support from a philanthropic donor, i.e. setting performance indicators. In other cases, the philanthropic donor can work synergistically with non-profit organizations by making its outreach materials and other communication and dissemination mechanisms available. Additional fundraising support can include giving access to client-based co-financing provided by entities like the UBS Optimus Foundation or Wellspring Advisors.

In a recent article in Harvard Business Review, Porter and Kramer find that:

Foundations can create still more value if they move from the role of capital provider to the role of fully engaged partner, thereby improving the grantee's effectiveness as an organization. The value created in this way extends beyond the impact of one grant. It raises the social impact of the grantee in all that it does and, to the extent that grantees are willing to learn from one another, it can increase the effectiveness of other organizations as well.

2.5 Investing patient capital – aiming for a social return on investment

Another facet of the flexibility that some philanthropic organizations enjoy is that they do not necessarily need to show immediate results delivered via their funding support. While electoral cycles and strategic plans may generate greater risk adversity among public and private sector institutions and also work against medium- and long-term planning, philanthropic organizations can be more patient with their approaches. Likewise, public and private institutions may be prone to frequent shifts in focus, due to changes in leadership and/or their financial supporters. Philanthropic organizations, on the other hand, usually have long-term investment horizons, with a considerable degree of risk tolerance, and the ultimate goal of maximizing social returns rather than short-term financial gains.

Several examples exist of philanthropic organizations that, with patient capital, have successfully supported long-term social change. Support from the Ford Foundation back in 1976 helped to launch the Grameen Bank, whose founder Prof. Muhammad Yunus was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for pioneering the concepts of [microcredit](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microcredit) and [microfinance](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microfinance). Grants provided by the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation in 1960 also helped to establish the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, which over the coming decades has played a crucial role in livelihoods across Asia by developing new rice varieties (Green Revolution). Within the field of early child development, long-term sustained investment has been provided since 1966 by the Bernard van Leer Foundation, supporting socially and economically disadvantaged children up to the age of eight. Collaboration between the Nike Foundation, the NoVo Foundation and the United Nations Foundation communicated via the Girl Effect campaign has also been instrumental in promoting the essential role girls play in development.

In terms of achieving such long-term impacts, the patient capital invested by philanthropic foundations can be further amplified due to the fact that many are created or supported by prominent individuals with substantial networks of personal and professional connections, and may provide access to corridors of power in ways that may not be as accessible to researchers and other individuals. Likewise, it can have a multiplier effect by priming the pump of government investment in the issue.

3. Violence against children

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation."[[28]](#endnote-5)

While violence affects all segments of the population, the impact and overall burden is greatest on children, as this period marks the time of greatest vulnerability in a person’s life. Violence during childhood has been linked to negative risk factors and risk-taking behaviors that appear later in life[[29]](#endnote-6), ranging from depression and obesity to alcohol and drug abuse. These factors, in turn, are major contributors to increased rates of heart disease, cancer and suicide.[[30]](#endnote-7) As Nobel Prize recipient James Heckman puts it: “Family environments of young children are major predictors of cognitive and socio-emotional abilities, as well as a variety of outcomes such as crime and health.”[[31]](#endnote-8)

Furthermore, research has shown that conditions of chronic stress are associated with increased violence in homes, as well as harsh punishment and negative intra-family relationships.[[32]](#endnote-9) The impacts of prolonged exposure to violence and stress are especially prominent in early childhood, as they trigger chronic activation of the body’s stress response system.[[33]](#endnote-10) The biochemical environment imposed on an infant's brain during critical development stages has permanent effects on the individual’s anatomy and brain.[[34]](#endnote-11) The most profound outcome is alteration in brain functions[[35]](#endnote-12), the impacts of which only manifest themselves later in childhood and continue to persist throughout life in the form of deficiencies in physical health, social-emotional wellbeing, memory and learning. Collectively, this range of negative impacts generates a tremendous economic burden on society through morbidity, disability and death[[36]](#endnote-13),[[37]](#endnote-14)

The WHO's Violence Prevention Alliance categorizes violence against children into physical, sexual, psychological and deprivation or neglect. Such forms of violence are truly global in scope, with violence against children confirmed in every geographic context in which it has been measured. Rough estimates suggest that every year 150 million girls and 70 million boys experience sexual violence,[[38]](#endnote-15) 0.5-1.5 billion children experience physical violence,[[39]](#endnote-16) and 133-275 million children witness domestic violence.[[40]](#endnote-17) Children in every country, regardless of socio-economic status, are vulnerable. In low- and middle-income countries, 30-40% of children aged 2-14 experience physical punishment or aggression in the home.[[41]](#endnote-18)

In addition, there is an increasing evidence-base on the intergenerational transmission of violence[[42]](#endnote-19) as well as the severe impacts caused when children witness intimate partner violence.[[43]](#endnote-20) The importance of employing a life-cycle approach to further developing the field has been recognized. However, in consideration of evidence that children, specifically, are subject to the most severe and lasting impacts of violence informs the decision to focus this paper on philanthropy in the prevention of violence against children.

4. The current role of philanthropy in the prevention of violence against children

Violence is still seen by many stakeholders as ubiquitous, intractable or even inevitable. With just a handful of exceptions, governments have not prioritized efforts to address violence against children nor fully appreciated its wide-ranging impact on the health and social development of their countries. As a consequence, funding for preventing and responding to the problem of violence against children remains quite limited. Hence there is a key opportunity for philanthropy to fill this gap.

A survey was conducted for this publication and included a range of interviews with experts from the research, program implementation and philanthropy communities. On this basis, it concludes that philanthropy has played a significant role in the progress to date on violence prevention, and is considered to be crucial to what may be seen as growing momentum in the field of prevention of violence against children. While several such examples are highlighted below, less successful interventions have illustrated the considerable range of challenges inherent to the field, some of which are described in 4.2.

4.1 Highlights of success stories

As described previously, philanthropy has the potential to raise awareness about key issues that, for a variety of reasons, may not be receiving adequate attention or even appear on the agenda of policymakers. This capacity is evident within the field of preventing violence against children, for example in the case of the Girls Not Brides Initiative,[[44]](#endnote-21) a global partnership of more than 350 civil society organizations from over 60 countries committed to ending child marriage, which has succeeded in packaging and framing an important issue in a manner that captures people's attention. Another successful example can be found in the "Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment in Children" in Brazil supported by various philanthropic donors to push for a national law to end corporal punishment against children. A legislation was successfully implemented in 2014 following cooperative efforts spanning donor collaboration, government engagement, celebrity activism, strong ownership and advocacy by local NGOs and participation by key researchers. The funders involved (the Swedish government, Childhood Foundation, Save the Children-Sweden, DFID and local funders, including the Fundacao Xuxs Meneghel) communicated and collaborated, which helped to build momentum that continued on beyond the passage of the law due to sustained efforts.

The above example illustrates not only philanthropy’s role in pushing a critical issue up the policy agenda, but also its capacity to act as a convener of diverse actors, including from both the public and private sectors. This same positive capacity of philanthropy applies not only to the various spheres of public and private life, but also to the, at times, disparate range of academic disciplines that are unknowingly working to solve different pieces of the same puzzle.

Recognizing the benefits that could be derived from integrating the communities of practice surrounding violence prevention and early childhood development, philanthropic support enabled a meeting to be held on precisely this topic as a pre-conference to the Sixth Milestones of a Global Campaign for Violence Prevention Meeting organized by the WHO in Mexico in 2013. Among other things, this meeting was heralded as a success for convening key experts to shape an agenda and work across sectors to reduce fragmentation of the field.

The experts have also noted the significant contributions made by philanthropy in highlighting the magnitude and consequences of the problem (e.g. surveys conducted by Together for Girls[[45]](#endnote-22) and the Optimus Studies[[46]](#endnote-23)). This, in turn, has generated a sense of urgency for moving ahead with identifying solutions and highlighting the fact that some of these solutions are already accessible and actionable. Picking up on this need, the Without Violence project[[47]](#endnote-24) was set up to help reframe the narrative around the issue so that more people will get involved, and with the hopes that this will eventually help to broker relationships that bring new funders and champions into the field.

Considerable success has also been achieved towards strengthening and building up the knowledge base surrounding the prevention of violence against children. One such example can be found in the funding provided by the UBS Optimus Foundation, which enabled the WHO Global Status Report on Violence Prevention including data from 134 governments. The report’s launch is scheduled for December 2014, and will provide a benchmark by generating the first ever evaluation of the extent to which countries have been implementing the recommendations of the World Report on Violence and Health, as called for in WHO Resolution 56.24.. Its ultimate aim is to strengthen the capacity of member states to prevent violence, and it will aid them in assessing their violence prevention efforts, tracking future progress in violence prevention internationally, identifying gaps in national responses to violence that need to be addressed and catalyzing further preventative action.

This constructive role in spurring knowledge generation activities was highlighted by the surveyed experts, who emphasized the importance of funding organizations looking beyond implementation to also consider the science and evidence base for such interventions. In contributing to this important area, philanthropy is considered to be a driving force for many knowledge generation activities, particularly towards determining what does and does not work to effectively prevent violence. The surveyed experts repeatedly mentioned the Children and Violence Evaluation Challenge Fund[[48]](#endnote-25) as a successful example of how to tackle this problem. This Fund, initiated by a consortium of philanthropic funders, aims to evaluate violence prevention programs in low- and middle-income countries, build capacity and raise awareness about the importance of evaluation activities.

Overall, the surveyed experts also found that philanthropy was driving the expansion and implementation of violence prevention programs far more than traditional science funders. The comparative flexibility of philanthropic organizations in such cases is a cross-cutting benefit, spurring innovative research and partnership building. Such research, for example, has led to the consideration that preventative activities are more cost effective than rehabilitation[[49]](#endnote-26), which in turn has spurred philanthropic support for a combination of activities focused on prevention and the provisioning of services to victims of violence.

Other relevant examples include funding provided to support the activities that have culminated in the establishment of Know Violence, an initiative launched by the Bernard van Leer Foundation that aims to synthesize existing evidence and use the findings for advocacy with key decision makers.

It has also been noted that in comparison with funding organizations working on their own, an amplifying effect is often generated by initiatives coming from networks of philanthropic organizations. Elevate Children (formerly known as the Child Protection Funders Group), for example, was founded for this very purpose and acts as a consortium of funders devoted to bridging the gap between evidence-based solutions, policy and practice.

4.2 Identifying challenges and failures

Considering the scale of the challenges posed by violence against children, there is a sense that despite some successes, philanthropy has not yet managed to make a significant dent in the problem. Much work certainly remains to be done. The issue has not emerged as a top priority for many, despite millions of children continuing to suffer from violence, the impacts of which echo across their lives and society as a whole.

One of the most frequently mentioned challenges highlighted by experts was the need to further build the evidence base on prevention of violence against children. Experts raised concerns about how extensive funding continues to be provided to efforts with uncertain outcomes. This constitutes a significant risk that scarce funds may be wasted on ineffective or even harmful programs, while also drawing attention to the lack of knowledge about the effectiveness of programs in specific contexts and environments. A classic example of such a program is Scared Straight, which involved organized visits to prisons by juvenile delinquents or children at risk for criminal behavior. The program was designed to deter participants from becoming repeat offenders through seeing first-hand the realities of prison life and interacting with adult inmates. When the program was finally evaluated, it was not only found to be ineffective, but was even shown to have had a harmful effect on participants, who demonstrated an increased level of delinquency relative to other juvenile delinquents who had not participated in the program.[[50]](#endnote-27)

An additional key problem identified by the experts is that philanthropic support has not yet led to a successful unifying of the field. While different groups are working on different aspects of the problem, their efforts remain largely uncoordinated. The field continues to suffer from fragmentation, and philanthropy can play a significant role in promoting harmonization and coordination of relevant activities. Along the same lines, experts noted that disproportionate focus is currently being paid to certain segments of the population (e.g. reaching lawmakers without also supporting parents/caregivers). The challenge likewise extends to insufficient mechanisms and channels for sharing of experiences among organizations, research agencies and practitioners.

Progress will largely depend on the funds available and the community’s success in attracting new funders to invest in the issue. Currently, prevention of violence against children is not receiving the same amount of philanthropic support as other issues associated with early child development and health. With only a small fraction of these funds being steered towards violence prevention, the issue remains peripheral to mainstream discussions, even those specifically focused on children. The challenge of limited funding support is further compounded by funds being dispersed in some cases to organizations that lack the capacity to follow through on the proposed programs.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

The previous sections have highlighted the important role that philanthropy is already playing to enhance concerted action to protect children from violence. Despite a mixture of success stories and unresolved challenges, it is clear that a push to advance the resolution of the problem is growing. Looking forward, a longer-term aim is to achieve significant reductions in violence against children over the next decades, and therefore interrupt intergenerational cycles of violence. In consideration of the challenges and opportunities facing philanthropy’s role in pushing towards this goal, a set of specific recommendations follows.

5.1 Enhance efforts to convene innovative partnerships

Stronger efforts are needed to foster connections among experts working in a range of more specialized fields, each of which is contributing in some manner to the prevention of violence against children. Many experts even go one step further by suggesting that specialists and practitioners working to prevent violence against children should reach out to other movements and form stronger bonds with communities working to address related topics such as violence against women (e.g. activities by Promundo and the Sexual Violence Research Initiative[[51]](#endnote-28)) and early child development (e.g. Global Alliance for Children[[52]](#endnote-29)).

Philanthropy must be used to enhance individual efforts by bringing together the disparate and uncoordinated activities of different organizations, multi-lateral agencies, governments, and global NGOs. This can help to eliminate overlap and make the best use of limited resources, by promoting more regular and direct communication about the best way to move forward, both independently and as a community. A global meeting on "How to reduce violence by 50% over the next 30 years" in September 2014, led by the University of Cambridge, UK, convened key global experts to develop evidence-based strategies to reach significant reductions of exposure to violence on a population level globally, which will feed into the World Health Assembly Resolution A67/R15 (strengthening the role of the health system in addressing violence) and the post-2015 sustainable development goals[[53]](#endnote-30).While philanthropy can play a critical role in setting and influencing agendas, experts emphasize that such functions need to be exercised in collaboration and on an even footing with practitioners and academics.

5.2 Improve efforts aimed at communications and advocacy

Effective mechanisms need to be developed for communicating both the need to invest in violence prevention and the optimal manner in which to provide such support. An action research survey conducted by Fenton,[[54]](#endnote-31) for example, concluded that decision-makers do not respond well when presented with highly detailed descriptions of problems, and are far more apt to take up an issue when provided with a set of actionable solutions. Many experts are likewise in agreement that there continues to be a lack of coordinated global advocacy for many other major problems, and that it is nevertheless time to develop a well-resourced and long-term advocacy strategy. Within the scope of such a strategy, experts highlight the need for a common narrative. A promising step in this direction may be seen in the efforts of Know Violence to synthesize available evidence and find pathways for effectively communicating it to policymakers.

5.3 Assume acceptable risks to spur innovation and new ideas

Thinking outside the box is necessary in order to advance the field. The philanthropic community must fully utilize its capacity to address thorny or politically divisive issues to bring the field of practice forward. Support should be provided to initiatives like Know Violence that focus on structural drivers for violence against children. Donor-funded agencies are often unable, or unwilling, to seize on such issues like changing social norms. As a result, little is currently known, for example, about the extent to which social determinants such as alcohol, substance abuse and poverty are structural drivers requiring structural solutions (e.g. bans on alcohol advertising and/or higher taxes on alcohol).

5.4 Build capacity and scale up

Sustained focus must be placed on carefully assessing the capacity of organizations implementing violence prevention measures and create buy-in from stakeholders for scale-up. This will serve a twofold purpose. Firstly, prior to designating funding in support of violence prevention measures, due diligence needs to be practiced to assess organizational capacity in order to avoid mismatches or sub-optimal dispersal of the limited funding available to violence prevention to activities. Such assessments can also help to identify appropriate capacity building measures to enhance the likelihood of effective implementation. Secondly, in the case of programs that have been proven to be effective, experts have identified the need to build capacity in order to enable scaling up of activities to achieve population-level impact and move towards integrating violence against children prevention and response measures into existing health and social systems.

Only by significantly increasing the money available to the cause can the problem be solved.

It is still a small select group of funders that chooses to invest in violence prevention. Currently available funds barely suffice to test innovative approaches to tackle the problem. In order to scale the programs to achieve population level impact, additional funders need to be convinced of the urgency of the cause to further build momentum, with an ultimate goal to hand over some of the philanthropic efforts to multilaterals and later governments.

Successful scale-up requires additional resources, such as improving the evidence base and strengthening the capacity of implementers to rigorously monitor and evaluate program outcomes. Furthermore, building appropriate infrastructures and enabling political will is essential so that the importance of violence prevention is fully embraced and prioritized in the decision-making process.

5.5 Invest in patient capital

The philanthropic community must fully exercise its capacity to provide long-term, predictable financing for innovative and pioneering violence prevention measures. The violence prevention field is continuing to emerge, and a mix of successful and unsuccessful interventions is to be expected. By providing a stable source of support for such activities, philanthropy can play a crucial role in advancing the field until the body of knowledge and experience has expanded to a point at which the potential risks fall within the acceptable threshold of governments and other actors.

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# Session 8

# Scaling Up Interventions and Building Evidence-based Support Systems

**Chair: Nancy Guerra - University of Delaware, Director of the Institute for Global Studies**

Scaling up evidence-based violence prevention interventions faces formidable challenges, challenges that go some way to explaining why so few such interventions have been implemented across whole populations. Speakers in Session 8, who will focus on preventing violence against children, will discuss some of these challenges – such as the cross-cultural transportability of interventions – and present case studies of efforts to scale up intervention with high-risk populations in South Africa and in conflict-affected countries.

## Frances Gardner

**Abstract**

**Parenting programmes to prevent violence: Effective, transportable and civilising? (or....from Pinker to Triple P)**

Epidemiological evidence shows that youth violence and antisocial behaviour are common and persistent. Several risk factors have been identified, including family and community violence and poverty and poor parenting, meaning that early detection and prevention are strong possibilities. The problem of parental violence towards children shares similar risk factors, and prevalence is high in many LMIC (UNICEF, 2010). Evidence from systematic reviews and randomised trials in many countries shows that parenting interventions can reduce violence both **by** and **towards** children. This is reflected in major policy statements (eg WHO, UNODC). Specifically, parenting interventions can reduce child aggression and behavioural problems, reduce harsh parenting and improve positive parenting, and appear to be effective in disadvantaged groups. A recent systematic review showed promising evidence for effectiveness from 12 randomised trials in LMIC (Knerr, Gardner, Cluver, 2013).

If there is so much good evidence, then why don’t we just roll these out everywhere? This paper discusses key challenges in doing this, and possible solutions based on recent evidence, concerning transportability of programmes across countries (Gardner et al, 2014), systems for enhancing capacity and sustainability, especially in low-resource contexts, making programmes less complicated and more efficient, investigating for whom they work less well, and ensuring evidence is transparent and believable (Gottfredson et al, 2014). Finally, it discusses whether taking a historical approach, based on understanding factors that may have led to a decline in violence over time, can help in the design of preventive interventions. Parenting could be seen as an important facet of Pinker’s (2011) ‘civilising’ process, and importantly, it is one factor where we have substantial direct evidence about its causal effects, from randomised intervention trials. Nevertheless, many questions are raised by taking a ‘civilising’ approach, especially whether we have the technology for changing attitudes and norms about parenting, as opposed to changing parenting behaviour, which is the focus of most effective interventions.

**Summary**

**Parenting programmes to prevent violence: Effective, transportable and civilising? (or....from Pinker to Triple P)**

1. **Introduction**

A substantial body of evidence from randomised trials suggests that structured, social learning theory-based parenting interventions can reduce violence **towards** children, in the form of reducing harsh parenting and physical maltreatment, and violence **by** children in the form of aggression and antisocial behaviour. This is reflected in major policy statements by national and international policy bodies (e.g., WHO, 2010; UNODC, 2009; NICE, 2013).

1. **Brief review of the evidence:**

Prevalence and risk factors: Evidence about the substantial size of the problem of youth violence and antisocial behaviour is well known in many high income, and in some low and middle-income countries (LMIC). Risk factors have been studied mainly in high-income countries (although with a growing number of studies in LMIC; Gardner et al., 2014a, Murray et al, 2013), and include harsh parenting, parental violence and criminality, parental mental illness, and child temperamental factors. These risk factors are particularly common in communities where there are high levels of poverty or violence, and poverty often co-occurs with, and may exacerbate, these risks. Given that these risk factors are present in early in children’s development, and that there are strong continuities between early behavioural problems and later violence and antisocial behaviour, then a powerful argument can be made for policies of early detection and prevention. The problem of parental violence and harshness towards children shares many of these same risk factors, with prevalence particularly high in many LMIC (UNICEF, 2010).

**Intervention evidence:** There have been many hundreds of randomised controlled trials of parenting interventions and multiple systematic reviews (Barlow et al., 2006; Furlong et al, 2012; Piquero et al.,2008) showing that they:

* Reduce child behavioural problems, including aggression, in children and teenagers;
* Reduce harsh parenting, and improve positive parenting and parent-child relationships;
* Are particularly effective for children (aged 3-10) who show moderate or severe levels of behavioural problems and aggression; evidence is less clear for universal populations (Malti et al., 2011)
* Appear to be effective in disadvantaged groups, including lone parents, parents from ethnic minorities, those living in poverty, or with mental health problems. Some studies of moderator effects suggest effects can be as strong or sometime stronger in more disadvantaged subgroups (Gardner et al, 2009; 2010).

Parenting interventions have been tested in many countries in North America, Europe and Australasia. There have also been some trials in Asian high-income countries. In LMIC, the evidence base is weaker, but nevertheless a recent systematic review (Knerr, Gardner & Cluver, 2013) found a dozen randomised trials, mostly in middle-income countries, in several continents, with promising results.

**If there have been so many successful trials, then why not just roll parenting interventions everywhere: what are the challenges?**

***Transportability across contexts and countries***

If we have strong evidence for the effectiveness of parenting interventions in (say) 25 countries, in 4 continents (Gardner et al 2014b; Knerr et al, 2013), then will these programs work in the other 171? How can we predict what will work in a new context? If unsure, is it better to grow our own programs, or to import evidence-based ones from other countries? How much adaptation is needed, and how much does this affect engagement and outcome? How to avoid the trap where greater levels of adaptation (or, just being home-grown) may lead to higher rates of political and local acceptability, and higher client engagement, but lower levels of effectiveness? (e.g. Gottfredson et al., 2006)

***Capacity and sustainability***

How to have adequate capacity, drive and resources to train, supervise, implement, and sustain interventions, with fidelity? This means reaching an appropriate proportion of the relevant population, at sufficiently low cost for a given country. What does this mean in very resource-poor contexts? What service systems are best suited to engaging families, implementing and championing this work?

***Can we make programmes more efficient and effective?***

Can we make parenting interventions briefer, cheaper and easier to deliver, and still have strong effects? Does this require better understanding of which are the essential components? Or does it need different delivery mechanisms? There are promising data on interventions based on new media, such as web-based programmes, podcasts, reality TV (Calam et al, 2008). There are also models of face-to-face intervention that are briefer and cheaper to deliver, and require a lower level of therapist skill, including seminar series, and brief discussion groups. There have been some promising randomised trials of these low-cost face-to-face approaches in LMIC, including Indonesia and Panama (Mejia et al., 2014) many using versions of Triple P interventions. One such approach is to personalise interventions, by making them more assessment-driven, allowing tailoring to the needs and goals of each family, as in Dishion’s (2008) brief Family Check-Up intervention.

***For whom do they work and not work?***

Even when programmes are delivered with fidelity, they don’t help everyone. Can we identify subgroups who need additional or alternative approaches? Improved methodologies are needed for identifying intervention moderators, including data pooling studies, which aggregate individual participant level data across multiple trials, to overcome the low power of single trials (e.g. Brown et al, 2013). What would these alternative intervention strategies need to be? Do we need greater ‘personalisation’ of programmes, following the trend towards using genetic data in medicine to better tailor interventions to individuals, or do we need just better programs?

***Long-term effects?***

For many programmes, long-term effects are unknown, with follow-ups often lasting only one year. Others follow-up for many years, but without having retained the randomised comparison group, generally because the control group were offered intervention later, as part of a waiting list design. Would we really expect the effects of interventions to last for many years? Or do we need a model which incorporates continuing booster sessions, but with less intensive delivery mechanisms, such as Dishion’s (2008) Family Check Up model?

***Methodological problems may mean some of the effects have been overplayed***

Conflicts of interest (Eisner 2009), poor reporting standards, underpowered trials, and cherry picking are rife in many fields; however, there are many outstanding strategies to solve these problems, including development of better trial conduct and reporting guidelines (Equator Network, http://www.equator-network.org; Gardner et al 2013; Gottfredson et al., 2014), preregistration of all evaluation studies, better systematic review and meta-analysis standards, pooling of individual-level data from multiple trials (Brown et al. 2012), and systems for open access to trial data (BMJ AllTrials, 2014). The challenge is how to encourage and exhort researchers in different disciplines to buy into these, when our vested interests lean quite naturally towards reporting the most interesting and positive results.

***Can a historical approach (à la Eisner, Pinker) help to develop the framework for violence prevention?***

What do we know about how risk factors for youth antisocial behaviour have changed over time? Can this work help us to understand why violent and antisocial behaviour has declined over the centuries? More challengingly, a historical approach to risk factor change would also need to be able to explain the upward trend in violence during the second half of 20th century, and its decline again in many countries since the 1990s.

Pinker argues that the big change over the centuries that accounts for the decline in violence, is a gradual civilising process, consisting of changing norms in ways that we deal with conflict and with relationships, and in our levels of self-control, supported by increasingly strong state institutions for preventing and resolving conflict in a more just and fair way. We could see improved parenting skills are one part of this civilising process, whereby children are treated in a manner that is less violent, and parent-child conflict is resolved in a more open and democratic way, while still setting clear expectations and limits on child behaviour, including aggression.

Is there any evidence that there has been a civilising trend in parenting factors? Given that poor parenting (e.g., harsh, punitive, neglectful, lack of positive parenting) is a key risk factor for child antisocial behaviour, then we could ask, has this risk factor decreased during the time period when antisocial behaviour and offending decreased in young people? Pinker (2011) reviews data on one aspect of parenting norms, showing there has been a decline over the last 6 decades in approval of harsh punishment of children. These changes have taken place in high-income countries such as Sweden, where there are strong laws against hitting children, as well as in other countries (e.g. USA; Finkelhor et al, 2010).

We present data on change in several dimensions of parenting over time, from our work analysing UK representative datasets, and reviewing literature on parental time use from multiple countries (Gardner et al., 2013; Collishaw et al., 2011). Broadly speaking, this work suggests there have been improvements in many aspects of parenting over the last 25 years, supporting the idea of a civilising trend in the way that parents deal with children. (Note: timing is not entirely tidy, some data suggest the improvement in parenting may have predated the fall in antisocial behaviour, and we lack good data pre-1980s).

The historical approach suggests it might be fruitful for us to think more broadly of ways to accelerate this ‘civilising process’, by further improving the norms around parenting and the ways that we treat children and young people. Parenting of course is only one part of this civilising process, and we cannot know where it might fit within multiple causal chains of historical and population influences, but it is notable in being one of the few ‘civilising’ areas where we have a large amount of causal intervention evidence about how to make change.

Some universal parenting programs have just this intention, to change norms across a population, as well as offering specific programmes to targeted populations, using individual-level interventions. Some of the best ideas for combining these approaches have been well articulated by Sanders’ (2002) Triple P parenting programme. We really need to know whether universal programs that intend to change parenting norms (a civilising culture shift?), and to bring useable new parenting strategies to large parts of the population, actually work or not. The evidence is much less clear for universal approaches, as opposed to those that target children showing high levels of behavioural problems. Such intervention systems now need implementing and testing by independent evaluators, perhaps using Triple P - or other generic social learning theory-based parenting programs, as the ideas and methods are not unique to Triple P. These community-level interventions might be combined with further legal measures (these would also need evaluation) proscribing chastisement of children, but in a context where parents are simultaneously offered alternative strategies for socialising children and dealing with misbehaviour.

As these parenting programmes were developed in a few high-income countries, is there a danger of simply imposing Western child-centred values on families and cultures that may not want them? I would argue that evidence suggests otherwise. Evidence from randomised trials involving ‘importation’ of US and Australian parenting interventions suggests these strategies and programmes are highly acceptable and wanted by parents in new countries, including those with very different cultural value systems (Gardner et al, 2014b; Lachman et al, 2014; Mejia et al, 2014). Secondly a large UNICEF (2010) survey found that many women, in multiple LMICs, reported using high levels of physical punishment, but at the same time showed high social disapproval of these methods, indicating a readiness for change.

So is a more fundamental culture shift needed in the way that we think about and behave towards, and parent children? How is this best achieved? Would this be a key way to enhance the quality of parenting, and also to potentiate the effects of systems for those wanting more intensive programs?

**Conclusions:**

*Main recommendations to funders and policymakers:*

1. Above all, lend your vital support to bolstering strong, transparent methodologies for testing effectiveness- only this way can we be sure the evidence is reliable. You can do this by funding good evaluations, funding implementations that are supported by good evidence, supporting efforts to improve methodologies, and supporting the difficult job of revising or stopping existing programmes, if the evidence suggests they are not effective. Children in resource poor settings deserve at least as high a standard of evidence as children in rich countries
2. History may suggest that norm changes are key, but intervention evidence suggests its behavior change that is needed. How can we best combine the two? - not forgetting to test for what are the most vital ingredients. Universal and community-level parenting interventions aimed at behavior change may be a promising way forward, but they need much fuller testing. We know even less about how to enhance norm change, but community-level approaches, if well-evaluated, may prove able to tackle both, hand in hand.
3. We also need to find better ways to make these interventions scaleable, sustainable and affordable for all countries. Key would be finding the systems and organisations that would make the most suitable champions and sustainers of such initiatives. How would WHO recommendations be translated into action on the ground? Would national action plans help?
4. Don’t worry that programmes need necessarily to be ‘home grown’ in order to work - in the hands of staff with local cultural competence, imported intervention strategies appear to be surprisingly widely applicable.

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## John Lawrence Aber

**Biography**

Lawrence Aber is Albert and Blanche Willner Family Professor in Psychology and Public Policy at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development, and University Professor, New York University, where he also serves as board chair of its Institute of Human Development and Social Change.  Dr. Aber earned his Ph.D. from Yale University and an A.B. from Harvard University.  He is an internationally recognized expert in child development and social policy and has co-edited Neighborhood Poverty: Context and Consequences for Children (1997, Russell Sage Foundation), Assessing the Impact of September 11th 2001 on Children Youth and Parents: Lessons for Applied Developmental Science (2004, Erlbaum) and Child Development and Social Policy: Knowledge for Action (2006, APA Publications).  He served as Director of the National Center for Children in Poverty from 1994-2003.  He is Chair of the Board of Directors of the Children's Institute, University of Cape Town, South Africa; and served as consultant to the World Bank on their project, "Children and Youth in Crisis". From 2003-2006, Dr. Aber chaired the Advisory Board, International Research Network on Children and Armed Conflict of the Social Science Research Council, in collaboration with the Special Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations on Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF.  In 2006, Dr. Aber was appointed by the Mayor of New York City to the Commission for Economic Opportunity, an initiative to help reduce poverty and increase economic opportunity in New York City. Currently, he conducts research on the impact of poverty and HIV/AIDS on children's development in South Africa (in collaboration with the Human Sciences Research Council), and on school- and community-based interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (in collaboration with the International Rescue Committee).

**Abstract**

**On the Front Line of Violence Reduction: Generating Evidence for School-based Strategies to Promote Children's Development in Conflict-affected Contexts**

Schools are the front line of strategies to reduce violence by 50 percent in the next 30 years, given both the increasing number of children around the world attending school and the potential for education to promote the skills necessary for children's – and nations' – prosperity and peace. Nowhere is the need for school-based strategies to reduce violence more urgent than in conflict-affected contexts (CACs), where over 32 million children lack access to the quality education that can mitigate the severe consequences of conflict for children – and potentially help break the intergenerational transmission of violence– through the effective provision of safe and supportive spaces that promote children's academic and socioemotional development. While organizations are increasingly implementing programs to improve access to and quality of education in CACs, there remains a "stunning lack of evidence" as to what works. To address this, we report evidence from collaborative efforts with the International Rescue Committee to implement programs with a socioemotional learning focus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lebanon. Attention is given to understanding process and impacts in context, while identifying common elements of programs across contexts that can be used to guide the development of effective and scalable programs.

**Summary**

**On the Front Line of Violence Reduction: Generating Evidence for School-based Strategies to Promote Children's Development in Conflict-affected Contexts**

Schools are the front line of offense and defense in mounting strategies to reduce violence by 50 percent in the next 30 years. Consider the following:

* Thanks in part to global efforts like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 90 percent of primary school aged children around the world are now enrolled in school (United Nations, 2014).
* Moreover, children ages 5-11 globally are increasingly spending a significant portion of their weekday hours in school (Lloyd, Grant, & Ritchie, 2008). As such, schools are important *settings* in children’s lives that profoundly shape children’s physical, academic, and socioemotional development (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006).
* School-based mental health and violence prevention programs can be useful in secondary and tertiary *prevention* of violence by identifying and targeting for treatment children who have experienced family or community violence and/or who are at risk of perpetrating violence (Stein et al., 2003; Wilson, Lipsey, & Derzon, 2003).
* School-based social-emotional (SEL) interventions that create safe and supportive school ecologies are effective in *promoting* children’s academic and socioemotional competencies, which in turn enable them to become productive and healthy members of society (Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011; Jones, Brown, & Aber, 2011)

Taken together, this indicates that we must focus on schools in our efforts to address violence at a population-based level: They are the key settings that allow us to *reach* and *teach* the broadest population of children in order to ensure our global sustainable and peaceful future.

**Education in Conflict-Affected Contexts**

Nowhere are such school-based efforts more urgent than in states afflicted by ongoing conflict.[[55]](#footnote-24) Over 1 billion children are currently growing up in situations of armed conflict, the direct and indirect exposure to which poses enduring threats to individual physical and psychosocial health while potentiating future collective violence (UNICEF, 2009; Devakumar, Birch, Osrin, & Sondorp, 2014). As outlined above, the provision of quality education can play a protective role in mitigating some of the most severe consequences of conflict for children. Yet to date, children who live in conflict-affected contexts (CACs) lag far behind in both access to and quality of education. Of the over 75 million children around the world who are currently out of school, over half live in CACs (INEE, 2014); of the children in CACs who are in school, they are not learning (Torrente, Aber, Shivshanker, Annan, & Bundervoet, 2013). Moreover, research suggests that the lackof quality and equitable education can further fuel conflict (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; Burde et al., under review), creating a vicious cyclical relationship between violence and educational disadvantage.

**School-based Strategies to Promote Children’s Development in Conflict-Affected Countries**

Recognizing this, national and international organizations have recently made strides to implement programs to improve the practice of education in conflict-affected countries (IRC, 2014; Save the Children, 2010; INEE, 2014). Such programs have yet to be as effective as possible for as many children as possible due the “overwhelming lack of evidence” as to what works to promote children’s development in the context of conflict (Masten & Narayen, 2012). The few rigorous evaluations of programs to promote children’s education in CACs have focused either on programs that: (1) increase access to education via the provision of community-based schools (Burde & Linden, 2013); or (2) promote cooperation and reduce intergroup conflict through the provision of curricular materials (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). We were able to identify no evaluations of programs besides the one described below that assess how school-based interventions in CACs improve the quality of education in order to promote children’s academic and socioemotional learning.

**Building an Evidence Base**

The nascent international research center at New York University (NYU), Intervention Design, Evaluation, and Applications at Scale (IDEAS) for Kids, is currently engaged in efforts to improve the practice of quality education in conflict-affected contexts by generating the rigorous evidence needed for action. In this work, IDEAS for Kids takes the positions that children’s learning and development requires:

1. **More than improving access to education.** Children must have access to *quality* education that promotes multiple and interrelated domains of children’s learning, including literacy, numeracy, and socioemotional skills (Learning Metrics Task Force, 2013).
2. **More than the provision of classroom and school resources.** Children’s learning requires the effective use of such resources through the provision of classroom instructional and emotional support and classroom management (Cappella & Kim, 2014).
3. **More than promoting children’s academic learning.** While it is important for children to gain literacy and numeracy skills, it is equally important for children to develop the socioemotional skills that can facilitate their engagement, productivity, and well-being (Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006; Durlak et al., 2010). This is particularly true in CACs, where school-based programming to promote mental health, life skills, and socioemotional skills has the potential to ameliorate trauma and develop children’s natural resiliencies (Winthrop & Kirk, 2008; USAID, 2013).

IDEAS for Kids also recognizes that evaluating one program at a time does not build the body of strong evidence needed for action. As such, IDEAS has established a strategic partnership with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) – a global leader in humanitarian interventions working in over 30 conflict-affected countries – in order to collaborate on the design, implementation, evaluation, and synthesis of a cohesive set of effective and scalable interventions with a social-emotional learning focus to promote children’s learning and development in CACs. To date, we are collaborating in two conflict-affected countries, described below.

**The Democratic Republic of the Congo.** The nearly five-year long Second Congo War ended in 2003 and led to over 5.4 million deaths and the displacement of millions more across nine African nations. Millions of Congolese still face poverty and ongoing violence at the hands of armed groups. With funding from USAID and in collaboration with DRC’s Ministry of Education (MoE), between 2011-2014 the International Rescue Committee targeted 353 primary schools and approximately 480,000 children in three eastern provinces of the DRC (Katanga, South Kivu, North Kivu) to increase opportunities for equitable access to quality basic education through the “Learning in Healing Classrooms” intervention. Learning in Healing Classrooms has two major components: an integrated curriculum that infuses social-emotional learning principles(Durlak et al., 2011; Torrente et al., 2013) into improved reading and math curricula (Integrated Curricula); and a system of in-service teacher training and coaching via “Teacher Learning Circles” (Teacher Professional Development). The intervention was evaluated using a stratified cluster randomized design, data from the first year of which have been analyzed to date (*KClusters =* 40, *JSchools =* 64, *IChildren =* 4,465). Cross-culturally adapted and validated measures of children’s perceptions of their school ecologies (caring, supportive schools and teachers; predictable/cooperative learning environments), academic outcomes (early grades reading and math abilities) and psychosocial outcomes (mental health symptoms, victimization) were collected pre-intervention (2010) and after one academic year of intervention (2011). Three-level models (children nested in schools nested in intervention clusters) were run to estimate the causal impact of LIHC. Results after one year of (partial) implementation indicate that: LIHC improved children’s reading and math scores, but had no impact on their mental health symptoms or their experiences of victimization. LIHC also impacted children’s perceptions of their school ecologies, improving how caring and supportive they felt their teachers and schools to be, but decreasing how predictable and cooperative they perceived their learning environments to be (Aber et al., 2014; Torrente et al., 2014).

**Lebanon.** More than 2.8 million refugees have fled the four-year conflict in Syria, with over half of that number – 1.5 million – now residing in informal tent settlements (ITS) and elsewhere in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2014). An estimated 540,000 of the refugees in Lebanon are children, 80 percent of whom are currently out of school. While the Lebanese government has opened Lebanese public schools in second shifts to accommodate the influx of refugee children, the public school system would need to *triple* in size by 2015 in order to give all Syrian children the chance to go to school (IRC, 2013). As a complement to the formal education system, the IRC is collaborating with the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs to implement a widely used model of community-based education (CBE) with an SEL focus in areas where public schools are difficult to access. Such models, however, are vastly understudied, with little available evidence as to how best to target, implement, and improve them across different types of is CACs (Burde & Linden, 2013). As such, we are working with the IRC to incorporate the lessons learned from our work in the DRC to: (1) describe the population of Syrian refugee children and their families in Lebanon; (2) understand how the CBE model is being implemented for Syrian refugee children in Lebanon; and (3) evaluate the impact of the establishment and improvement of CBE on Syrian refugee children’s development.

**Future Directions**

We recognize that the type of school-based intervention (e.g., CBE, Teacher Learning Circles) that will work to promote children’s development and reduce violence needs to be tailored to the intervention context, as the programming in the DRC and Lebanon makes clear. At the same time, we are working to identify and provide evidence for common elements – with a focus on SEL programming – of school-based programs that are effective in promoting children’s development across contexts. Our ability to do so, however, is limited by the challenge the instability of CACs poses to the use of traditional rigorous research methodologies (e.g., defining a sampling frame, longitudinal tracking, impact evaluations). Thus as we engage in this work, we are concurrently committed to developing research tools and methodologies adaptable to and deployable in CACs (Montjourides, 2013).

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## Catherine Ward

**Biography**

Catherine L. Ward is an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Cape Town, South Africa.  She holds a PhD in Clinical-Community Psychology from the University of South Carolina, USA.  Her research interests are in violence prevention from the perspective of children's development, and particularly in public health approaches to this – in developing evidence-based approaches to violence prevention that have a wide reach and are effective in improving children's development and reducing their likelihood of becoming aggressive.  Much of her current work is focused on preventing child maltreatment, and on understanding the epidemiology of risk factors faced by South African children.

Recently, she and her colleagues Amelia van der Merwe and Andrew Dawes produced the edited volume Youth violence: Sources and solutions in South Africa.  The book reviews the current state of the science in understanding how to prevent children from becoming aggressive, and how to adapt the evidence-base for use in low- and middle-income countries.  It is available [here](http://www.uctpress.co.za/catalogue/itemdisplay.jsp?item_id=9989&nav_id=2009&tier_id=3723&qsHasChildren=true).  With Peter Donnelly from St Andrews University, she has edited the forthcoming Oxford Textbook of Violence Prevention: Epidemiology, Evidence and Policy, to be published by Oxford University Press in late 2014.  This book presents the current state of the science in violence prevention.

In addition, she co-leads the Parenting Project Group of the World Health Organisation's Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA), serves on the Advisory Board of the Alan J. Flisher Centre for Public Mental Health and the Steering Committee of the Safety and Violence Initiative at the University of Cape Town; and on the Editorial Boards of the journals South African Crime Quarterly, Psychosocial Interventions, and Child Abuse and Neglect.

**Abstract**

**Building an Evidence-based Support System for Parents in South Africa**

Several policy documents from both national and provincial government in South Africa have recently identified parenting programmes as important interventions to prevent violence (including child maltreatment and youth violence).  This paper describes the process of using a theory of change approach (a participatory approach to programme planning and evaluation) with the Provincial Government of the Western Cape to help realize this goal.  Key stakeholders were identified, including government decision-makers and non-governmental organisations which implement parenting programmes.  A workshop and a series of interviews were conducted with these stakeholders, in order to reach agreement, first, on critical assumptions (e.g., that all parenting programmes taken to scale will be evidence-based, and that the goal of the initiative is primary prevention), as well as a series of vital practical questions that needed resolution, e.g.: which programmes should be selected for scale-up; targeting, recruitment and retention of programme participants; distribution and location of services; timing and resource allocation; and monitoring and evaluation of services. This paper describes this process, reflects on it as a strategic policy intervention, and on the possibility that it could be adapted for use in other contexts where parenting (or other violence prevention programmes) are to be taken to scale.

**Summary**

**Building an Evidence-based Support System for Parents in South Africa**

**Introduction**

**Why support parents, if the goal is to prevent violence?**

There are two main reasons for doing this:

1. Child maltreatment (with the exception of sexual abuse) is typically

perpetrated by a caregiver or in the child’s home (May, Chahal & Cawson,

2005; Sedlak et al., 2010), and is itself a form of violence.

2. Harsh, inconsistent parenting is associated with child conduct problems,

including aggression that may persist into later life (Farrington, 1988).

By contrast, parenting that enables children to attach securely to their caregiver, to learn to manage their emotions and behaviour, and provides cognitive stimulation, appears to reduce the likelihood of violence in children and improve a range of other outcomes (Ogilvie, Newman, Todd, & Peck, 2014;Repetti,Taylor,&Seeman, 2002;Walker,Chang,Vera Hernández, & Grantham McGregor, 2011).

Parenting programmes have shown promise as a means of reducing child

maltreatment (Barlow, Johnston, Kendrick, Polnay, & StewartTBrown, 2006;

Mikton & Butchart, 2009) and of improving child conduct problems (Kaminski,

Valle, Filene, & Boyle, 2008). Low and middle income countries tend to have the

greatest need: they tend to have higher rates of child maltreatment (Runyan,

Wattam, Ikeda, Hassan, & Ramiro, 2002), higher rates of youth violence (Mercy,

Butchart, Farrington, & Cerdá, 2002), and conditions – such as poverty – that increase the difficulty of parenting (Elder, Eccles, Ardelt, & Lord, 1995; Kotchick & Forehand, 2002).

**Parenting programmes as a means towards the goal of reducing violence by 50% in the next generation**

Reaching enough parents to reduce child maltreatment and child conduct problems by 50% in the population means rollTout of programmes at scale.

There are several well established criteria for taking programmes to scale

(Bradach, 2003; Flay et al., 2005; Milat, King, Bauman, & Redman, 2012): the

programme has evidence of effectiveness, it is manualised, there is a clear theory

1. In this paper, the word “parent” is used to imply anyone who has a caregiving role with regard to a child. The term thus includes biological, foster and adoptive parents, as well as other adults who have caregiving roles with regard to children.
2. of change, training and technical support is available, there is an available workforce, it has been costed, and monitoring and evaluation is possible (particularly to ensure fidelity of implementation).

Using the Western Cape Province of South Africa as an example, this paper

describes the process of planning to take parenting programmes to scale in the

context of a middle income country.

**Methods**

**Policy review**

First, a policy review was conducted, in order to understand the policy environment. This demonstrated that there was a coalescence of both national and provincial policy that pointed to the importance of parenting support for

preventing violence, for preventing child maltreatment, and for improving children’s outcomes – a coalescence that provided a critical policy window

(Shiffman & Smith, 2007) when decisionTmakers were amenable to the idea of taking parenting programmes to scale. That there was such a policy window was also evident when members of the Western Cape Provincial Government asked the authors to assist with developing a plan for taking parenting programmes to scale. That request was specifically to assist in meeting a target specified in the new Western Cape Youth Development Strategy: to reach 100,000 families with parenting support over 5 years, a target that would require massive scale up of existing services in the province.

**Development of a theory of change**

A theory of change lays out the “how” and the “why” for how an initiative might achieve its desired effect (Birckmayer & Weiss, 2000), and has been used in other complex initiatives such as improving mental health service delivery (Breuer et al., 2014). In this instance, the theory of change considered the following:

1. Critical assumptions (for instance, that only programmes with evidence of effect would be taken to scale).

2. Principles for programme selection (for instance, recommendations about how to build the evidenceTbase in a context where only one existing programme had any evidence of effect).

3. Recruitment and retention of parents into programmes (which families – if any – should be prioritised for receiving services, and how to avoid stigmatising the delivery of prevention services).

4. Distribution and location of services (whether programmes could be an

Add on to existing services, and where in the province delivery should be prioritised).

5. Practical realities of delivering parenting programmes (which organisation or organisations would provide the institutional “home” for parenting programmes, and how would staff be recruited, trained and managed).

6. Timing, fidelity and sustainability (how can mechanisms for ensuring fidelity be set up as a central part of roll out).

7. Important ancillary services (working with vulnerable families living in difficult environments requires access to a wide range of ancillary services, such as HIV treatment, intimate partner violence services, and food parcels).

8. Monitoring and evaluation (questions of whether the government wished to, and could, go beyond monitoring numbers served to assessing outcomes of programmes).

**Consultations**

Initial consultations were with the three government departments most closely involved in policy development (the Department of the Premier) and in rolling out parenting programmes (the Departments of Social Development and of Health). Other key stakeholders were identified by this group, including other decision makers in government, civil society institutions currently implementing parenting programmes, academics involved in developing and evaluating programmes, and individuals involved (for instance, private practitioners involved partTtime in the supervision of paraprofessionals delivering programmes). Some were interviewed individually, others in groups.

**Results and Conclusion**

Initial decisions have been to roll out only evidenceTbased programmes, and – in line with a policy thrust that focuses on the first thousand days of life – to explore the possibility of taking the one evidence based programme in South Africa, an infant attachment programme, to scale. Further developments will be reported at the meeting.

This process should offer a model for use in other contexts where parenting (or other violence prevention programmes) are to be taken to scale.

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# Session 9

# Reducing Intimate Partner Violence Against Women

**Chair: Charlotte Watts - London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Sigrid Rausing Professor, Director of the Gender, Violence and Health Centre**

Recent prevalence estimates show that between 25% (in Europe and the Western Pacific) and 37% (Africa and South and South East Asia) of women experience physical and/or sexual violence by a partner during their lifetime. While the issue has long received considerable attention from advocates in many parts of the world, there are still few effective interventions to prevent and respond to this form of violence, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Speakers in this session will highlight what is being done to strengthen the evidence-base and present a case study of efforts to address violence against women in India.

## Harriet MacMillan

**Biography**

Harriet MacMillan is a psychiatrist and pediatrician conducting family violence research.  She is a member of the Offord Centre for Child Studies, and Professor in the Departments of Psychiatry and Behavioural Neurosciences, and Pediatrics at McMaster University with associate memberships in the Departments of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, and Psychology. Harriet holds the Chedoke Health Chair in Child Psychiatry.  Beginning in 1993 until 2004, Harriet was the founding Director of the Child Advocacy and Assessment Program (CAAP) at McMaster Children's Hospital, a multidisciplinary program committed to reducing the burden of suffering associated with family violence.   She continues to see patients as an active staff member of CAAP and provides consultations to child protection agencies.  Her research focuses on the epidemiology of violence against children and women; she has led randomized controlled trials evaluating the effectiveness of approaches to preventing child maltreatment and intimate partner violence.  Funding for this work has been provided by organizations such as the WT Grant Foundation, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Brain and Behavior Research Foundation (previously NARSAD) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Harriet is the principal investigator of a CIHR-funded Centre for Research Development in Gender, Mental Health and Violence across the Lifespan (PreVAiL: http://www.prevailresearch.ca/).  PreVAiL is an international Network made up of researchers in the areas of mental health, gender and violence, and of partner organizations with service, research and policy mandates in these areas.  Through PreVAiL, Harriet works closely with organizations such as the Public Health Agency of Canada and the World Health Organization.

**Abstract**

**Primary Prevention of Intimate Partner Violence: Current Evidence and Future Prospects**

Intimate partner violence (or domestic violence as it is often referred to) is a major public health problem associated with significant morbidity and mortality, particularly among women. Most of the interventions aimed at preventing and responding to intimate partner violence (IPV), not surprisingly, address violence by men against women.  This session will provide an overview of what is known about primary prevention of IPV - reducing the incidence and prevalence of initial exposure - through programs and policies.    Prevention of IPV typically focuses on adult women, but the importance of considering children's exposure to IPV will be discussed.  Gaps will be identified and a framework will be presented that outlines the need to consider the overlap between other types of child maltreatment and IPV, as well as approaches that can reduce causal risk factors.

**Summary**

**Primary Prevention of Intimate Partner Violence: Current Evidence and Future Prospects**

This presentation will focus on the primary prevention of IPV: stopping IPV before there is any exposure. IPV is defined as physical, sexual or psychological harm by a current or former partner or spouse (World Health Organization (WHO), accessed 2014). Much progress has been made in understanding the distribution and correlates of intimate partner violence (IPV; often referred to as domestic violence). The emphasis has been predominantly on examining the epidemiology of IPV against women, since the morbidity and mortality associated with IPV is higher for women than for men. A recent systematic review that included data from 66 countries found that one in seven homicides is committed by an intimate partner; this figure is six times higher for female victims than for males (Stöckl et al., 2013). The prevalence of IPV against women varies across countries; a comparative study conducted by WHO found a lifetime prevalence of physical and/or sexual violence ranging from 15 to 71%. WHO estimates indicate that women are overwhelmingly at greatest risk of violence from a partner or ex-partner compared with other people (WHO, 2005). Much less is known about the prevalence of IPV against men by women and between same-sex partners.

Similarly, most of what we know about increased risk of IPV is based on studies examining violence against adult women, and the majority is cross-sectional. In a recent report (WHO/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 2010), a list of risk factors for IPV, based on the ecological framework includes variables such as young age, unemployment (individual level); educational disparity (relationship level), high proportion of poverty (community level), and traditional gender norms and social norms supportive of violence (societal level), among others. The factors are organized according to victimization of women and perpetration by men. Of particular note, no distinction is made amongst the risk factors between those that are time-varying or not (variable versus fixed) and those that are causal, where research has shown that change in the factor alters the outcome (Kraemer et al., 1997). Many of the variables referred to as “risk factors” in the IPV field are in fact only known to be correlates – factors that show an association, but for which no information is available about time sequence. What the field of IPV primary prevention requires is identification of causal risk factors for IPV – variable risk factors that can be changed within an individual (or relationship, community or at the societal level). Such change may occur spontaneously, or (and most importantly for prevention) as a result of intervention, including programs and policies. Identification of causal risk factors requires longitudinal population studies; cross-sectional surveys of risk are insufficient.

The overlap between IPV and dating violence – defined as physical, sexual or psychological violence within a dating relationship – is unclear. Dating violence is sometimes considered as a subtype of IPV, but is also conceptualized as a precursor for IPV in adulthood (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006). Typically dating violence refers to relationship violence among adolescents where the perpetrators are most commonly peers. It is in fact dating violence among adolescents that has been the focus of IPV primary prevention efforts, specifically educational and skills-based programs that emphasize conflict resolution strategies, respectful relationships and acquisition of knowledge and attitudes aimed at preventing initial violence. (Often prevention of further violence is also identified as a goal of these programs, however this presentation focuses on primary prevention.) Most of these studies have identified changes in attitudes or knowledge as the primary outcome, but it cannot be assumed that improvement in proxy measures leads to changes in behaviour resulting in violence reduction. Increasingly, studies are including self-reports of violence perpetration and victimization (direct measures) as primary outcomes, which is an important step forward. The summary that follows focuses on direct rather than proxy measures (Fellmeth et al., 2013).

There have been two systematic reviews on this topic; both included predominantly school- and community-based programs administered to middle- and/or high-school aged students (Whitaker et al., 2006; Fellmeth et al., 2013). The earlier review (Whitaker et al., 2006), which included a total of 11 studies, identified two programs evaluated in randomized controlled trials (RCTs) (Safe Dates (Foshee et al., 1998) and the Youth Relationships Project (Wolfe et al., 2003)) that reported a positive intervention effect on changes in behaviour. Safe Dates, a universal program, which included classroom sessions and community activities for 11th grade students, found reductions in perpetration of physical, serious physical and sexual violence, but not psychological violence, in the intervention group, compared with controls. The Youth Relationships Project was a targeted program of classroom and community activities for 14 to 16 year-olds with a history of child maltreatment; there was less physical violence perpetration reported by intervention participants compared to controls. The review authors evaluated both these studies as of high quality, but referred to the evidence as promising because of questions regarding mechanism of effect and generalizability.

Fellmeth and colleagues (2013) included 38 studies in their systematic review and conducted a meta-analysis of a subset of 33, with eight studies assessing episodes of relationship violence and four studies of behaviour related to relationship violence. The meta-analyses showed no evidence of a statistically significant effect of the interventions on the outcomes of changes in episodes of relationship violence or violence-related behaviour. They concluded that there is no evidence of an effect for educational and skills-based interventions for preventing relationship and dating violence. Of particular note, as highlighted by the review authors, none of the studies included health outcomes. A limitation of the meta-analysis was the inability to include results from a large RCT examining the intervention, Safe Dates, referred to above (Foshee et al., 1998) because of insufficient raw data.

Many authorities recommend intersectoral collaboration of health, education, social and legal services to advocate for IPV prevention programs and policies, including raising public awareness. The scientific evidence for such approaches is lacking however, and they need to be evaluated (Stewart et al., 2013).

To date, as is evident from above, the main focus of primary prevention research in the area of IPV has been on reducing adult IPV by preventing dating violence among adolescents. While programs such as Safe Dates warrant further evaluation, it is also important to consider how efforts to reduce children’s exposure to IPV could hypothetically prevent dating violence as well as IPV during adulthood. Exposure to IPV in childhood and other types of maltreatment are well recognized as risk factors for IPV (Stöckl et al., 2014). Two critical research questions are as follows: 1) is children’s exposure to IPV and/or other types of maltreatment a **causal** risk factor for subsequent victimization and perpetration of IPV during adulthood; and 2) if so, what approaches can reduce children’s exposure to IPV? Research into prevention of IPV and child maltreatment has traditionally been conducted in silos, but it is becoming increasingly apparent that the strategies for primary prevention of these common types of family violence may overlap. An example from an ongoing trial examining an intervention to reduce IPV within the context of a nurse home visitation program that has been shown to prevent child maltreatment will be discussed.

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## Suneeta Krishnan

**Biography**

Dr. Suneeta Krishnan is a social epidemiologist with 15 years of research and program and policy development experience in gender and health equity promotion in India. She is a senior researcher in RTI International's Women's Global Health Imperative (WGHI), the technical lead of RTI India, and associate director of the RTI Global Gender Center. Dr. Krishnan is also Adjunct Associate Professor at the St. John's Research Institute in Bangalore, India and, since 2014, is a member of the Gender and Rights Advisory Panel of the World Health Organization's Department of Reproductive Health and Research. She is a recipient of the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (2004).

Dr. Krishnan's training and expertise are in social epidemiology, biostatistics, and medical anthropology. Her research has focused on the development, evaluation and scale-up of programs and policies to promote gender equity and reduce adverse health outcomes and health disparities among women in India. She is leading several projects in collaboration with non-governmental organizations and municipal and State governments in India that use health as an entry point to prevent and respond to gender-based violence, equip women with information and skills to resist and overcome violence, and promote women's sexual and reproductive health and rights. Her work has been funded by the Indian Council of Medical Research, US National Institutes of Health, US Agency for International Development and private foundations.

Dr. Krishnan, who is fluent in several Indian languages, divides her time between Bangalore and San Francisco.

**Abstract**

**Using Health as an Entry Point to Address Intimate Partner Violence: Insights from India**

With extraordinarily high levels of intimate partner violence (IPV) against women, India needs effective policy and programmatic interventions. Although Indian women who experience IPV do not typically seek help from police or support agencies, they will seek health care for injuries as well as a range of other services. In fact, women's utilization of reproductive health services (including family planning and maternal and child health services) has increased substantially across India over the past few decades, and has made these services important entry points for IPV prevention and management. Moreover, given that IPV is known to increase the risk of adverse reproductive, maternal, and child health outcomes, failure to address the issue in these settings threatens the effectiveness of women's health promotion efforts. Research has demonstrated the feasibility, acceptability and potential effectiveness of IPV prevention and management interventions within and by the public primary and tertiary health care systems in India. Research and small scale programmatic efforts have also underscored the need for policy-level responses to support continued evidence generation and scale-up of successful strategies. In this presentation, I begin by describing the prevalence of IPV and related adverse outcomes in India, and then go on to highlight research and programmatic experiences that support the use of health as an entry point to address IPV. I conclude by proposing four key recommendations to policy-makers, namely, articulation of a commitment to health systems responses to IPV, development of guidelines and protocols for health systems responses, allocation of resources to build systems-level capacities, strengthen inter-sectoral linkages to improve access to health and non-health support services, and establish accountability mechanisms, and support of research and evidence generation on health-based interventions to address IPV.

**Summary**

**Using Health as an Entry Point to Address Intimate Partner Violence: Insights from India**

1. **Introduction:** **Intimate Partner Violence - a Global Priority**

Intimate partner violence (IPV) - physical, sexual, or emotional abuse typically perpetrated against women by a husband or other intimate partner – is one of the most common forms of violence against women worldwide and widely recognized as a major health and human rights challenge. Reducing IPV must be a component of efforts to reduce global violence by 50% in the next 30 years.

Indeed, recognition of the importance of addressing all forms of violence against women has been enshrined in the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly (with 130 votes in favor, none against and 10 abstentions) in 1979. To further strengthen the implementation of CEDAW, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in 1993. A number of subsequent global statements and actions (e.g., resolutions on violence as a public health problem, the UN Secretary General’s campaign - UNiTE to End Violence against Women) have continued to emphasize the importance of addressing VAW.

1. **IPV in India: Scale and Status of Current National Response**

The prevalence of IPV in India is staggeringly high. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), there has been a 120% increase in the incidence of crimes against women over the last decade.[[56]](#endnote-32) (Note: evidence suggests that only 2% of women who experience violence disclose to a formal source such as the police.[[57]](#endnote-33)) NCRB data also reveal that an Indian woman is most unsafe in her marital home, with cruelty inflicted by husbands or his relatives constituting 44% of all crimes against women. The decade-old National Family Health Survey (2005-2006) found that approximately 40% of a representative sample of married women in the reproductive age group (15-49 years) had ever experienced IPV by their husband at some point in their married lives. In the southern India city of Bangalore, our longitudinal research with young (16-25 year old) married women residing in low income areas found that over half had been hit, kicked, or beaten by their husband in the six months prior to study enrolment; over half of those who disclosed violence at enrolment continued to report violence over the 2 year follow-up and 20% newly disclosed violence during this period.[[58]](#endnote-34)

Global attention to the issue of violence against women and girls in India has increased dramatically in the past few years, sparked by the death of a young woman in New Delhi in December 2012. This attention has forced a national conversation about the scale and severity of violence against women and the status of women in India more broadly. Of note, the Prime Minister addressed the issue during his address to the nation on August 15, 2014, India’s Independence Day, noting that “when we hear news reports of rapes, our heads hang in shame.”[[59]](#endnote-35)

Although this acknowledgement of violence against women is an important development, it is not enough. India urgently needs effective policy and programmatic interventions. The country is a signatory to CEDAW and national-level responses are framed by a range of laws to promote gender equality and combat discrimination and violence against girls and women. These include the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and the 2005 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. More recently, in 2012, the National Mission for the Empowerment of Women (NMEW) was launched with the goal of promoting inter-sectoral convergence of all women-focused programs across Ministries. In the following year, the Sexual Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act was passed. As part of the implementation of this law, the national government announced that it will establish 100 One Stop Crisis Centres and create the Nirbhaya Fund of 1000 crore Rupees (or 98,400 British Pound Sterling) to respond to violence against women and girls.

At the local level, governmental and non-governmental agencies (largely urban) provide a range of supportive services to women, including counseling, shelter, vocational training, and income-generation opportunities.[[60]](#endnote-36) Yet, the majority of women are unaware of these services. They tend to seek external help only after enduring multiple acts of violence, and, often, when it is too late. The onus of both learning about these services and utilizing them rests entirely on women.[[61]](#endnote-37) Overall, little evidence is available to suggest that these interventions are effective in reducing the incidence of violence and/or responding to the needs of victims.

Although Indian women who experience IPV do not typically seek help from police or support agencies, they do seek health care for violence-related injuries as well as a host of other reasons. For example, women’s utilization of reproductive health services (including family planning and maternal and child health services) has increased substantially across India over the past few decades, and has made these services important entry points for IPV prevention and management. Moreover, given that IPV is known to increase the risk of adverse reproductive, maternal, and child health outcomes, failure to address the issue in these settings threatens the effectiveness of women’s health promotion efforts.

Evidence from the developed world and some developing countries demonstrates that interventions at health-facilities that include case identification and/or routine screening, assessment, psychosocial support and other clinical care, and referral for IPV can be beneficial to women experiencing violence. This observation has led to the World Health Organization issuing clinical and policy guidelines on responding to IPV and sexual violence against women in 2013. On 24 May, 2014, the 67th World Health Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by a group of 22 countries (including India) on “Strengthening the role of the health system in addressing violence, in particular against women and girls, and against children.”[[62]](#endnote-38) As noted by the WHO, this resolution “adds legitimacy to addressing violence against women and girls as a public health problem,” and provides the public health community a clear mandate. In the remainder of this talk, I will describe the development and testing of health sector responses to IPV in India.

1. **A Primary Health Care Response to IPV in Bengaluru, India**

Based on nearly a decade of research on the prevalence, correlates and health impacts of IPV in Bengaluru and a study of primary care physicians’ perspectives on IPV, in 2011, we launched a project to develop and evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention to build capacity of urban primary health care providers (HCPs) to respond to IPV. Our capacity-building intervention had three components: 1) training of HCPs (including physicians, nurses and community outreach workers) on gender, IPV and its impacts on women’s and children’s health (including the application of guidelines, protocols and job aids to identify women experiencing IPV and provide support); 2) increasing access to comprehensive referral services through the establishment of a network of governmental and non-governmental agencies; and 3) advocacy at the municipal and state levels to adopt a policy on health systems responses to violence against women. The intervention drew on successful programs elsewhere in India (namely, Dilaasa, the one stop crisis center model implemented in Mumbai by the municipal corporation with support from the Center for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes [CEHAT]) and in higher income countries such as the United States.

Using a quasi-experimental design and a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, we conducted a process and outcomes evaluation of the capacity building intervention. Data from surveys of health care providers (conducted prior to the training and at several time points post-training) demonstrated that, among nurses and community outreach workers, knowledge regarding screening, identification and documentation of IPV significantly improved after the intervention. Scores on the knowledge, attitudes, and practices survey declined over time, indicating the need for continuing education and reinforcement of training.

A comparison of responses to exit interviews with women before and after the intervention showed that awareness of IPV had substantially increased among those seeking care at the primary health centers after the health care providers had been trained. In addition, 61% of women in the post-intervention exit interviews (n=100) reported being asked about “problems at home” and various forms of IPV, compared to none being asked about these issues at baseline. About half of the women interviewed post-intervention indicated that they had been informed about IPV, and the majority found the information to be useful. About 70 women who disclosed IPV and other forms of domestic violence to their health care provider used referral services (primarily, counseling, shelter and legal aid).

Despite these successes, the process evaluation revealed inconsistent adherence to the case identification and response protocol and poor documentation of service provision due to weaknesses in the training and documentation systems and processes as well as due to the pilot nature of the project (and the lack of a formal policy on the health sector response to IPV). Although the data indicated that training can improve health care providers’ knowledge and practices, scaling up the training is likely to be challenging because of the limited number of expert trainers available.

We have responded to these challenges in two ways. First, we are exploring the use of mHealth innovations. Specifically, we are using mHealth applications to enhance the scalability and quality of training for health care providers (using an “mTrainer” application), promote protocol adherence and documentation (through an application for nurses), and assist in disseminating critical information regarding IPV, women’s rights and services (through an application for community outreach workers). Second, we are leveraging the current attention to the issue of violence against women to intensify advocacy with municipal and state policy-makers and program implementers to actively take leadership of this initiative.

1. **Conclusions/recommendations**

Our research in Bengaluru, India has demonstrated the feasibility and acceptability of a primary health systems response to IPV. The identification of effective responses to IPV is an urgent priority in India, with important health and human rights ramifications. The sustainability, replication and scale-up of interventions to prevent and mitigate IPV require several key actions by Indian policy-makers. First, there is a need for a clear commitment to a health systems response to IPV at the national, state and municipal levels. India has taken a very progressive step by helping to draft the resolution adopted by the World Health Assembly on health systems responses to violence against women and girls; this must be followed by similar actions at the local level. Second, existing WHO guidelines and protocols should be adapted for the Indian setting; researchers, advocates and care providers have initiated this effort, but greater governmental engagement is necessary. Third, policy-makers must allocate sufficient resources to build systems-level capacities to respond to IPV, strengthen inter-sectoral linkages to improve access to health and non-health support services, and establish mechanisms to promote accountability. Finally, policy-makers must support research – to spur the development and testing of innovative health-based interventions for IPV prevention and management and to identify strategies to promote adoption and scale- up of evidence-based interventions.

## Claudia Garcia-Moreno

**Abstract**

**Preventing Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in Low- and Middle-Income Countries**

Intimate partner violence against women is a widespread and global problem affecting the health and lives of millions of women and their children. WHO 2013 estimates that worldwide, almost one third (30%) of women who have been in a relationship have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner, with regional prevalence of 37% in the WHO African and Eastern Mediterranean region and 37.7% in the South-east Asia regions.(1) This same report documents the tremendous impacts of this violence on women’s physical, sexual and reproductive and mental health.

Most of the published evidence for prevention comes from high-income countries, but there are also experiences of promising interventions, several of them from low- and middle-income countries, which need further testing. These include interventions to empower women economically and financially and to change social norms, laws and policies that perpetuate inequality between women and men. Interventions to prevent child abuse and dating violence are also important but will be addressed in a separate presentation.

While a focus on preventing violence before it starts (primary prevention) is necessary, identification and early intervention when violence is present is also important and the health system has an important role to play in this. The health system can also contribute to address factors like depression, or harmful use of alcohol, or other substances, which frequently co-exist with violence and can exacerbate its impacts. Interventions to address partner violence in antenatal care have been shown to be effective in reducing recurrence of partner violence in high-income countries and there is potential for using antenatal care services for preventive interventions with fathers.

**Summary**

**Preventing Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in Low- and Middle-Income Countries**

**Introduction**

Intimate partner violence against women is a widespread and global problem affecting the health and lives of millions of women and their children. WHO 2013 estimates that worldwide, almost one third (30%) of women who have been in a relationship have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner, with regional prevalence varying from 23% in high-income countries to 37% in the WHO African and Eastern Mediterranean region and 37.7% in the South-east Asia regions. (1) This same report documents the tremendous impacts of this violence on women’s physical, sexual and reproductive and mental health.

Most of the published evidence for effective prevention strategies comes from high-income countries, but there are also experiences of promising interventions, several of them from low- and middle-income countries, which need further testing. (2, 3) These include interventions to empower women economically and financially and to change social norms, laws and policies that perpetuate inequality between women and men. (2,3,4) Interventions to prevent child abuse and dating violence as precursors of intimate partner violence are addressed in another presentation by MacMillan so will not be covered here.

While a focus on preventing violence before it starts (primary prevention) is necessary, secondary prevention through identification and early intervention of women subjected to partner violence is also important and the health system has an important role to play in this.(5,6)

This presentation will summarize new information on the role of macro-level factors and how they interact with individual level risk factors and the relevance of this for primary prevention of IPV in low- and middle-income countries. It will also review some of the health-sector based interventions and their role in prevention.

**A review of the evidence and ongoing research**

A 2013 report by the WHO, the LSHTM and the MRC South Africa presenting the first global systematic review and synthesis of the prevalence of intimate partner violence worldwide found that globally 35% of women worldwide have experienced either physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner or sexual violence by a non-partner.( 1 ) Most of this violence is intimate partner violence. Worldwide 30% of women who have been partnered experience physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner. While intimate partner violence is widespread, there are wide variations in its prevalence. (1, 7) In particular ‘current’ partner violence (i.e. in the last 12 months) varies greatly between high income countries where it is between 3% to 6% and low-income countries where it is between 30% and 56%.

Globally as many as 38% of all murders of women are committed by intimate partners. Women who have experienced intimate partner violence also report higher rates of important health problems, including depression, sexually transmitted infections and HIV. Violence against women is also associated with unwanted pregnancies, abortions, injuries, and when it occurs during pregnancy it can also lead to miscarriage, premature birth, or low-birth weight or (1).

The ecological model has been used to explain the range of factors that have found to be associated with intimate partner violence (8,9). The focus of research has been on individual level risk factors, but it is hard to identify one causal factor, rather it is the interaction of individual, family, community and macro-level factors that contribute to the prevalence of violence at a population level. (2, 8, 10) At the macro and community level, inequality in ownership rights, laws that discriminate against women, GDP, social norms approving ‘wife beating’, social norms of male control of female behaviour appear significant. Woman-related factors include child sexual abuse, witnessing parental violence during childhood, employment/participation in credit schemes/owning land or other assets and completing secondary school, all of which are amenable to interventions. Partner-related factors include child abuse, antisocial behaviour or other psychological problems, attitudes and beliefs related to partner violence and to acceptance of violence, alcohol misuse. Qualitative data suggests that the presence of ‘sanctuary’ (safe spaces) for women and of social sanctions also contribute to the overall levels of violence. (11)

While attention has been focused on individual risk factors such as exposure to violence during childhood, personality disorders, harmful alcohol use, new analyses by Heise and Kotsadam, show that macro-level factors, in particular gender norms (i.e. norms related to male authority over female behaviour) or norms justifying partner abuse and the presence of laws that disadvantage women predict to some extent the prevalence of current partner violence. (12) They also mediate individual risk factors. Addressing these factors can potentially impact the population level prevalence of intimate partner violence in low- and middle-income countries.

Two recent reviews of what works to prevent violence against women identify a range of areas for potential intervention, but few strategies have been rigorously evaluated with more than one randomized controlled trial in different settings. (2,3) Most of the evidence comes from high income countries and is primarily focused on preventing dating violence through school-based interventions among young people. (2)

There are, however, other promising strategies that require further testing and that seek to address gender inequality. One of these is an intervention focused on economic and social empowerment of women which was shown in a cluster RCT to reduce violence by 50% over a two year period. (4, 13). Increasing women’s access to secondary education is also important as this has been shown to be a protective factor, although its effects can be mediated by social norms. There is some evidence that economic empowerment interventions reduce violence, although this varies by setting. The impact of conditional cash transfer programmes on partner violence has found mixed results, but none of these programmes have set out to impact partner violence. Designing and evaluating programmes that specifically address intimate partner violence would be useful.(3)

Prevention programmes need to address the context of gender inequality in which most intimate partner violence takes place. In particular social norms on the acceptability of violence against women and on male dominance over women. Efforts to do this range from media awareness campaigns to ‘edutainment’ efforts that include media but combine this with educational and peer support interventions aimed at changing attitudes and behaviours. Two of these have some form of evaluation: Soul City in South Africa and Sexto Sentido in Nicaragua. Both showed changes in attitudes and beliefs but neither evaluation looked at behaviour changes. (2,3) Other approaches to social norm changes have focused on small group participatory transformative interventions, such as Stepping Stones which was evaluated through an RCT. (14) Others target community level change like SASA in Uganda (15) and the Gender Roles, Equality and Transformation (GREAT) project in Uganda which seeks to promote formation of gender-equitable norms and adoption of attitudes and behaviours that will influence health positively among boys and girls ages 10 to 19 years (16), both of which are being evaluated.

Health sector based responses to women subjected to violence have an important role to play in secondary prevention. Health systems can play a stronger role in identifying violence and addressing its associated health problems, e.g. maternal depression and alcohol and other substance misuse, so as to prevent or reduce recurrence of violence and mitigate its consequences. Early identification and psychotherapeutic responses for children witnessing partner violence can play a role in primary prevention. (5,6) The health sector can also advocate for violence prevention support community-based prevention efforts. Antenatal care offers opportunities to reduce violence, address its consequences. (5, 17). An example of intervention in antenatal care with potential for primary prevention is a programme targeting first-time fathers to enhance the mental health and marital relationship of expectant couples being tried in Hong Kong. (18)

**Conclusions/recommendations**

Addressing gender inequality is central to reducing intimate partner violence in low- and middle-income countries. This includes attention to laws, policies and other regulations that disadvantage women and perpetuate inequality, for example in inheritance, or property or credit rights, access to divorce or to safe and remunerated employment. It also requires interventions targeting community-level and individual-level social norms around the acceptability of violence and male control over women.

Preventing violence requires a multi-sectoral response where each sector has a clear role to play. All entry points are useful, as long as there is coherence across the spectrum of prevention programming.

The health sector’s role in this multi-sectoral response needs to be strengthened as their role in identification and early intervention is critical.

There is an urgent need for more evaluation of ongoing programmes, adaptation and replication of existing promising programmes in different settings. Research is needed to support evidence building for addressing intimate partner violence, but it needs to be based on building stronger partnerships between researchers and programme developers and implementers.

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# Session 10

# Controlling Triggers to Violence

**Chair: Richard Matzopoulos - Medical Research Council of South Africa, Specialist Scientist at the Burden of Disease Research Unit; University of Cape Town, Honorary Research Associate at the School of Public Health and Family Medicine**

An important element of violence reduction is the control over situational mechanisms associated with violence. This includes more effective control over drugs, alcohol, and access to firearms, but also the application of crime science to improve the surveillance of violence hotspots, giving victims more effective access to support, and increasing the chances that perpetrators are caught. In this session speakers will address how security-enhancing technologies and control over firearms, alcohol and drugs can contribute to the decline in violence.

## Graham Farrell

**Abstract**

**Lessons for Global Violence Reduction from Recent Crime Declines: Security, Problem-Solving and Situational Prevention**

Most advanced countries have experienced reductions of 50 percent of more in many common crimes over the last two decades. Recent research suggests that reduced crime opportunities was a key cause. There is strong evidence that improved vehicle security reduced car crime, mounting evidence that improved household security reduced household burglary. Most crime is property crime, and it dominates criminal careers, so its reduction may have triggered knock-on reductions in violence. This study explores the implications of these findings for other countries and crime-types.

**Summary**

**Lessons for Global Violence Reduction from Recent Crime Declines: Security, Problem-Solving and Situational Prevention**

**Introduction**

It is here taken as given that the pursuit of democracy and the rule of law, as well as improved education, health, social and living standards generally, are laudable aims for society and social policy respectively. They remain so, and we would pursue them, regardless of the crime rate. Moreover, the enormous increases in crime in the second half of the twentieth century went hand in hand with tremendous socio-economic development in industrialised countries, to the extent that we now know such development often increases crime. It does so by changing the opportunity structure, that is, by increasing crime opportunities and the likelihood that they are taken. There are more consumer goods worth stealing, with changes to our lifestyles, routines and movement that facilitate and precipitate the taking of more crime opportunities. The classic example is that as more women entered the workforce there was less guardianship of households and an increase in daytime burglary. This seemingly simple view of things, known as the routine activity theory of crime, was arguably the most important criminological insight of the twentieth century.

However, the last quarter century has seen crime peak then decline, sometimes rapidly, in many industrialised countries. Crime drops of 50 percent or more in many common crimes have been experienced. Seen from that perspective, the aim of this conference of generating a 50 percent reduction in global violence over the next 30 years does not seen overly ambitious: it has been done in the recent past in some countries, so perhaps it can be done elsewhere. The aim of the present study is to begin the process of teasing out the lessons of the crime drop and its implications for other countries and crime types. I thank Prof Eisner for this invitation to, as he put it, get outside of my comfort zone, and extrapolate from the evidence.

**Crime Drop Research: Phase I and Phase II**

Violence declined by more than 50 percent in the United Kingdom over the last two decades, as well as in much of the rest of Europe and north America. The crime drop was first heralded in the United States where, from around 1991, violence plummeted rapidly and unexpectedly. What is referred to here as ‘Phase I’ crime drop research had, with some honorable exceptions two main frames of reference: violence and the United States. Blumstein and Wallman’s (2000) landmark book summarised and framed much of this research agenda, which continues in some forms to this day.

What is here referred to as Phase II of crime drop research entails three developments. First, the importance of property crime is now evident. In the United States, car theft declined just before, and with a trajectory and subsequent trend almost identical to that of violence including homicide. In the UK, a steep decline in a broader set of property crimes slightly preceded and was tracked by the drop in violence. Second, it is now recognised that the crime drop occurred in many different countries. This fact tends to rule out a range of explanations for the crime drop that focused solely on US violence, including imprisonment, abortion, gun control, the death penalty, etc., that now appear somewhat parochial. Third, the theoretical framework has evolved and, in particular, greater attention is now paid to what is referred to here as crime opportunity theory, which is taken to include the rational choice and routine activity perspectives alongside problem-solving approaches and situational crime prevention. These three developments underpinned the research in which I have been fortunate to be involved for much of the last decade with Nick Tilley and Andromachi Tseloni, and we thank the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council for funding what we hope is beginning to look like a programme of research on the topic.

**The Security Hypothesis**

The security hypothesis proposes that security that has induced much of the crime drop. There is now rather compelling evidence that the decline in motor vehicle thefts was induced by the spread of more and better quality vehicle security, particularly electronic immobilisers and central deadlocking systems. Independent research relating to Australia, England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States indicates that security caused car theft to fall by fifty percent, and sometimes three quarters or more. This conclusion is based on multiple distinct patterns, or data signatures, occurring while crime fell. The average age of stolen vehicles increased because new vehicles had better security, the means of entry to vehicles changed as lock-forcing became more difficult, and theft for joyriding declined earlier and faster than professional or organised theft, as would be expected if less experienced and opportunistic adolescent offenders were kicked out of the market by improved security. Australia afforded a natural experiment where car theft declined earlier in the one state where mandatory immobilisers were introduced on new vehicles earlier than elsewhere. There is more evidence than this but it gives a flavour of the research.

There is mounting evidence that security has played a key role in relation to household burglary, and it can reasonably be anticipated that commercial burglary fell for similar reasons. Here, it appears to be not just an increase in the prevalence of security, but improvements in the quality of security and its settings, that were responsible. Again there is triangulation of evidence from multiple sources and indicators. Burglaries which involved the breaking of security (such as door and window locks) fell before and much faster than those that did not (such as those when the door or window was open or unlocked, or where there was deception).The spread of double-glazing in the UK brought stronger frames for doors and windows, double-paned and strengthened glass, and integrated stronger locks that were activated as part of normal usage. In the US, one hypothesis is that the spread of central air conditioning (rather than add-on air conditioning units) was the vehicle by which household security was, somewhat inadvertently, improved. The America Housing Survey shows central air increased gradually from 10.5 percent of all US households in 1970 (burglary began to fall in the 1970s in the US) to 72 percent in 2010, the period over which the burglary rate fell steadily and by over half.

There remains much security hypothesis research to be done. Should reliable data be available, it seems reasonable to anticipate we will find that, at minimum, improved security was critical in reducing robberies at banks and stores, and that improved design of stores, store layout and product management is largely responsible for major declines in shoplifting.

**Elegant Security**

The best security is elegant. Vehicle security used to be inelegant: clunky add-on crooks-locks or clubs for the steering wheel, and poor-quality door lock individually pushed down. Nowadays a multi-layered security system is activated remotely by a single button push or even by just walking away from the vehicle. Modern household doors and windows are predominantly self-locking when closed, and typically combined with secure frames and double-paned strengthened glass: in contrast with windows with flimsy frames, no locks and easily broken windows and, perhaps, an awkwardly added screw-it-on-yourself-please-oh-I’ve-lost-it-or-can’t-be-bothered lock.

As a society we are just beginning to scratch the surface of the potential for developing elegant solutions wherein security is the default and where liberty and welfare are promoted. When security is elegant, naysayers’ fear of fortress and big brother society look very dated. We identify the characteristics of elegant security as DAPPER: the **D**efault is secure, they are **A**esthetically neutral or pleasing, have a **P**owerful preventive mechanism, are **P**alatable to everyone except offenders, **E**ffortless to activate, and **R**ewarding in cost-benefit terms. Many evolving smart technologies have great potential to provide dapper security solutions at home, at work and leisure facilities, and on transportation routes. This notion of elegant security is introduced here because to some extent it encapsulates a philosophy.

**The Keystone Hypothesis: How Security reduces Violence**

Let us skip to the assumption that security caused most of the drop in property crime. What, then, caused the drop in violence? First off, some violence is acquisitive crime that is addressed by security: robberies of various sorts, particularly at banks and stores, fall into this category. Most other violence is rare, relatively speaking. It is committed by offenders who commit mostly property crimes. Repeat victimization research shows it is disproportionately committed against victims who also experienced property crime. Some instrumental violence is committed as part of the commission of property offences. Other violence is underpinned, facilitated or provoked by property crime. Moreover, the onset of criminal careers often begins with easy-pickings property crime. Imagine these connections between property and violent crime being disrupted, and the possibility emerges that major reductions in the numerically dominant property crime triggered the reductions in violence.

Consider car theft. Stolen cars are used for many other types of crime. They are used to facilitate suburban burglary, as getaway cars for various crimes, for drive-by shootings, for transportation to other crime sites. Other crimes take place in vehicles including drug dealing and prostitution. Hence stolen cars facilitate drug markets in various ways, and violence occurs disproportionately in relation to drug dealing and drug markets. Cars stolen for transportation or joyriding are transporting individuals who are, other things equal, more likely than other drivers to be violent at their destination.

The keystone in a traditional doorway arch is the large stone at the apex. Its removal causes the other stones to tumble and the archway to collapse. The analogy is also used in ecology to refer to key members of an ecosystem whose removal is disruptive. When property crime is prevented by security, we might expect violent crime to fall as a consequence, by various mechanisms. The broader strategic implication for global violence reduction elsewhere is that preventing property crime and acquisitive crime may be an effective means of reducing violent crime.

There is ample evidence from criminal career research, victimization research, and situational crime prevention research, to justify further study of the keystone hypothesis. Sex offenders, for example, are often not specialists, so it is not too far-fetched to conjecture that sexual offences may have been reduced by disruptive security technologies. And conceptual precursors of the keystone hypothesis include the free-rider effects from economics, halo effects, and studies of crime displacement and the diffusion of benefits, with keystone arguably being a specific application of the latter.

**Global Violence Reduction in the Next 30 Years**

The trickiest bit is extrapolating existing research to other places and crime types. It behoves us to try, while recognising that others may be better placed to do so than those researching the security hypothesis. There are clear general implications for vehicle manufacturing and the design and building of household and business premises, for product manufacture more generally, and for the design of the urban landscape and transportation systems. More generally, situational crime prevention developed through problem-solving approaches, is likely to prove a cost-efficient crime reduction option to any particular crime problem including particular forms of violence.

So, to simplify, let us assume reducing property crime is the way to reduce violence as a knock-on, and that we know how to do it. This leaves How To Get It Done - implementation – which is likely to prove the more difficult bit. There is market failure when it comes to crime, so government and police will need to actively pursue an agenda of situational crime prevention and security. Regulation and various market-based incentives offer two broad approaches. The threat of regulation may be sufficient to start some balls rolling, as it is arguably preferable for industry to self-regulate. Market-based incentives include publicity about which products are safest (or riskiest). Theft indices, for example, can be used to stimulate manufacturers and managers to take public safety from crime more seriously. Where goods are being imported from developed countries, security requirements, at least to the level required in the country of export, could perhaps be a component of export/import licencing. Despite typical industry reluctance (and here crime is no different to other areas of social and environmental policy), most security measures are relatively cheap, particularly over time as per-unit costs fall. Generally speaking, promoting crime reduction as a form of Corporate Social Responsibility has significant potential.

It may feel awkward to talk of improving security or inducing corporate social responsibility in locations where there is extensive poverty, other major social problems, or where good governance is far from assured. With respect to the latter though, it is possible that secure cars, secure properties and other products are likely to prove at least as attractive to potential consumers as elsewhere, if not more so. New-build residential areas warrant consideration in terms of Crime Prevention Through Housing Design, to use the title of Armitage’s recent book. Preventing the repeat victimization of the same persons and premises remains an efficient use of police and security resources - getting the preventive grease to the crime squeak.

Trafficking and smuggling of many items, including humans, are areas where crime opportunities have increased with globalisation. Likewise, a plethora of new crime opportunities are provided by the Internet, as well as by new technologies including smartphones and emerging personal technologies: smartwatches and smartglasses will offer some new and interesting possibilities for crime as well as for cheating on tests. In each instance, progress bringing new crime opportunities - as before and as usual. Here, problem-solving efforts to develop situational prevention are needed. We are already seeing the emergence of some forms of preventive security. Anti-virus softwares have been around long enough to have evolved and become fairly elegant: Microsoft Defender is the built-in default, which is self-updating and continually active, cheap and relatively less resource-intensive than predecessors and as such, more Dapper. At the same time, Internet Service Providers are being encouraged to take responsibility for illegal activity on their services: in 2014 there have been some cases in the media of child pornographers detected by algorithms developed by Google and Microsoft. It is warming to see corporate giants beginning to take their responsibility for crime seriously. Sometimes there are relatively simple measures that require greater cooperation from international bodies to promote their implementation. The international IMEI database, for instance, with the potential to reduce trafficking of stolen phones through the harmonisation of blacklisting, has existed for around two decades and individual countries and their network providers appear to need some encouragement.

**Conclusion**

The Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2006; p. 300) states that

“Governments and civil society, including, where appropriate, the corporate sector, should support the development of situational crime prevention programmes by, inter alia:

*(a)* Improved environmental design;

*(b)* Appropriate methods of surveillance that are sensitive to the right to

privacy;

*(c)* Encouraging the design of consumer goods to make them more

resistant to crime;

*(d)* Target “hardening” without impinging upon the quality of the built

environment or limiting free access to public space;

*(e)* Implementing strategies to prevent repeat victimization.”

The recommendation by the United Nations may provide a springboard for the development of national-level strategies. Much criminology is still concerned with promoting various other forms of social wellbeing rather than reducing crime, and while much of this may be well-meaning, I would expect it to continue to be ineffective. Situational crime prevention through problem-solving is barely on the policy radar in some counties.

Harnessing the knowledge and power of industry to reduce crime, and to mobilise industry’s technological expertise in particular, will require a balance of regulation and incentives. Yet this is also where society’s comparative advantage over offenders lies: in harnessing the massive existing amount of knowledge that we have in relation to the design of consumer products and services, the urban landscape and architecture, transport networks and telecommunications and the Internet. Society has the skills, expertise and technological know-how to outpace even the most adaptive of offenders, but getting that message to policy-makers is a necessary prerequisite.

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## Mark Bellis

**Abstract**

**Reducing Alcohol-Related Violence – Equity, Environment and Early Years**

Globally, consumption of alcohol is strongly associated with violence. The Crime Survey for England and Wales reports that approximately half (49%) of an estimated 1.9 million violent incidents each year are alcohol-related. This excludes many of the two million cases of domestic violence and nearly half a million incidents of sexual assault committed in England and Wales each year where between 25%-40% are likely to be alcohol-related. Alcohol is also associated with child maltreatment, elder abuse and self-directed harm (e.g. suicide). With many violent incidents occurring near where people drink, prevention efforts often focus on adapting the design and management of drinking locations (e.g. nightlife settings) to reduce risks of violence. In addition, policy initiatives have aimed to limit access to alcohol through: taxation and pricing policies that increase price and restrict the number of establishments licensed to sell alcohol; altering hours of trading; and controlling advertising of alcohol products. Such measures have proved effective at reducing alcohol-related violence. However, evidence increasingly suggests that individuals' propensity to engage in violence is also related to their current socio-economic conditions and their history of exposure to violence and other stressors since conception. This presentation discusses the relative contributions of environmental, socio-economics and early years experiences to alcohol-related violence. It explores the potential consequences of an expanding global alcohol market which is vigorously pursuing sales in developing countries and examines how understanding relationships between alcohol and violence can be utilised in violence prevention.

## Keith Krause

**Abstract**

**Controlling Access to Firearms**

Most analyses of effective strategies for violence prevention and reduction have focused on specific – often very limited – experiences and diagnoses of “what works.” Most have also focused on characteristics of perpetrators, or specific types of violence; and occasionally on the role played by particular “triggers” for violence, includes such things as the co-presence of drugs, alcohol or firearms.

My presentation will come at this from a slightly different angle, and adopt a global perspective on one particular trigger (no pun intended): the role of firearms. It will do so in four steps. It will first dress a portrait of “who dies violently where?” and then match this with what we know about the role of firearms in violent deaths. It will then trace what is known about different legislative approaches to firearms control to show the wide variation in national legal frameworks, and discuss the strengths and limitations of legislative approaches to firearms control and violence reduction.

Finally, some (very) tentative conclusions can be drawn, both about the overall picture (“do more firearms lead to greater – or lesser – violence?”) and about the more intricate ways in which firearms are linked to lethal violence. Aside from highlighting major gaps in our knowledge, my presentation will focus on some useful strategies for certain kinds of armed violence prevention, and raise some more general conceptual problems with the “triggers” approach to thinking about change in complex social systems.

**Summary**

**Controlling Access to Firearms**

Headline tragedies such as the Sandy Hook school massacre, or the Utoya killings in Norway, draw public and policy-makers’ attention to the role of firearms in violence prevention and reduction. Too often, however, simplistic and politicized narratives (especially in the US) dominate, to the detriment of a better understanding of the role played by firearms in violence. A focus on an “assault rifle” ban, for example, obscures the role played by small arms (pistols and revolvers) in most firearms violence. Likewise, a focus on the US hinders a global perspective on different approaches to firearms regulation, and the way in which small arms are implicated in different sorts of lethal violence around the world – which includes such diverse things as conflict deaths, gang violence, intimate partner or inter-personal violence, suicide, and even lethal violence perpetrated by police and security forces.

Firearms are one factor that helps explain the incidence of violence in any particular context, but not the only – or even sometimes not the most important – one. My presentation will focus first on the overall distribution of lethal violence world-wide, then on what we know about role and distribution of firearms in lethal violence, and on the various different legislative and regulatory responses that we find around the world. I will close with some observations on what we know – and what we do not know – about the relationship between guns and violence, and how to think about this relationship. Perhaps not surprisingly, one major conclusion is that the gaps in our knowledge are greater than our knowledge itself.

Approximately 508,000 people die violently around the world each year (excluding suicides) – in conflict and non-conflict violence – with firearms and by other means – for an overall global “violent death rate” of 7.2 per 100,000.[[63]](#footnote-25) These deaths are, however, very unevenly distributed: 36 countries have rates greater than 10 per 100,000; 12 greater than 30 per 100,000. Most of the most violent countries are war zones (such as Syria or Iraq), or found in Latin America and Caribbean – none of them are in Western Europe, and only a few in the developed world. Broadly speaking, advanced industrial states have very low levels of lethal violence – generally ranging between one and three deaths per 100.00 (average 2004-2009). As I will note below, however, most of the world’s firearms are in these countries, putting the lie to the simple equations of availability and violence.

Worldwide, guns account for around 46 percent of violent deaths, but this number varies tremendously from region to region. In extremely violent places such as Colombia or Guatemala, firearms are used in more than 80 of the lethal incidents. In the United States, roughly two-thirds of the lethal violence is perpetrated with firearms and in Switzerland and Italy it is about the same, with the figures for Germany, the Netherlands and Finland around 20 to 30 percent. In the UK, which has very few firearms, 6% of the deaths involve the use of guns. In Japan, which of course as we know has extraordinary strict laws and very few guns, less than 1% of the lethal violence is perpetrated with firearms. There may be little variation among developed states in their overall rates of lethal violence (one to three per 100,000), but there is much wider variation, in terms of the use of firearms, and there is no clear pattern even within this group of countries.

What do we know about the global distribution of firearms? There are approximately 875 million firearms in the world – including all of those held by armed forces, the police and security forces, armed groups and gangs, and civilians. Roughly two thirds of these small arms are in civilian hands (about 765 million), with xx in the hands of armed forces, and approximately 20 million with the policy. Most importantly, however, around 300 million of these civilian firearms are in the United States – or roughly one firearm per person. If the rest of the world was as heavily armed as American citizens – there would be closer to 7 billion firearms in circulation, not somewhere around 950 xx million. This underscores that the US is really a unique case – in all ways – and comparisons between it and any other country are often not helpful or possible.

The next “most heavily armed” countries are far behind the US: Yemen, at around 55 firearms per 100 population; Switzerland and Finland around 45, followed by a cluster of northern and European states (including Sweden, Canada, Norway and Finland), all around 30 per 100. Other European states are somewhat lower – clustered around 10-20 per 100. Some countries, such as England and Wales, have very low rates of ownership, around 4 per 100. What this points to is significant variation even among Western states, of between 5-10 times (excluding the US), with the determining factors appearing to be particular history, culture, law, pattern of urbanization, or traditional hunting and sport shooting activities.

By contrast, states in the Global South, in Africa and Asia in particular, have relatively few weapons per population. Intuitively, this makes sense, since many of these are relatively poorer countries, in which a firearm would be an individual’s (or household’s) most valuable capital asset – and an unproductive one at that – unless one was engaged in criminal or predatory activities. One result is that in countries, such as in Central America, for example, where levels of lethal violence are extremely high (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras), levels of firearms ownership among the general civilian population are relatively low (Honduras, 13, Guatemala and El Salvador, around 7-8 per 100). The lethal violence in these societies is concentrated among particular groups of the population, mainly young men in armed groups and criminal gangs involved in drug trafficking or other illicit activities, with ready access to firearms even if they are not individually owned.

States have come up with a bewildering array of ways to regulate and legislate on firearms, and there is no easy was to rate “stronger” versus “weaker” legislation on a simple spectrum, as some states focus on banning particular types of weapons or making them hard to obtain; while others focus on particular purposes or possessors of weapons. A fundamental distinction can be made between jurisdictions that regard civilian firearm ownership as a basic right (two states (US and Yemen)) and those that treat it as a privilege (all others), and this has an impact on the nature of the controls in place.

Almost all states prohibit or restrict civilian access to weapons that they consider ill-suited to civilian use, and in almost all cases this includes automatic weapons. The vast majority of states also have a system of licensing in place to prevent certain types of civilians from owning firearms, but in making their assessments, many use considerable discretion, rather than following specific criteria. It is also clear that gun ownership and the nature and extent of regulation are often governed by cultural and historical factors. Some of the types of criteria that different jurisdictions apply when making a decision to license an individual include age requirements and whether not minors can possess firearms; mental health considerations; drug dependency; a criminal record; issues of public safety; and competency requirements. In many jurisdictions you must be a dedicated hunter or sports shooter; or a collector; or you must prove you need a firearm for professional reasons (for instance, if you are a private security guard) in order to get a license. Although some states permit the possession of firearms for self-defense, many others explicitly refuse applications for such purposes (in New Zealand, for example self-defense is explicitly not a valid reason for possessing a firearm).

It would be convenient if there were a simple link between firearms availability, legislative control, and levels of armed violence. But there is not. The most succinct conclusions that can be drawn, from Phil Cook, (based on a synthesis of American research) are that:

the prevalence of gun ownership in a community has a direct effect on weapon choice by robbers and assailants—more guns, more gun use in crime. The prevalence of gun ownership has little or no effect on the overall volume of violent crime—more guns, same amount of violence. But the lethality of that violence depends on the mix of weapons—more guns, more murders[[64]](#footnote-26)

In this light, what can be said about effective violence prevention and reduction strategies? Perhaps the most significant issue is *how* we think about violence reduction policies. Many policies rely on embedded assumptions about (linear) causal mechanisms, and reductionist approaches to human behaviour; few are appropriate to the complex social environments in which violence occurs, and to the effect of structures (institutional and normative) on behaviour. Until we bring these into the picture, it will be very difficult to craft policy that can achieve the headline goal of a “sustained reduction in interpersonal and political violence across the world over the coming three decades.”

Although there is no simple link between the availability of firearms and levels of gun violence, it would be a mistake to conclude that the availability of firearms – of what sort, in whose hands, and under what conditions – is completely irrelevant to levels of violence and insecurity. Armed violence is concentrated among particular groups in the population, and follows particular pathways linked to factors such as drug trafficking, armed gangs, conflict, inequality, and organized crime. The same is probably true for any complex social issue in which many factors are at play, such as alcohol availability and automobile accidents, or illicit drug availability and levels of substance abuse.

It is difficult to follow the pathways of gun violence directly, but indirect evidence – such as the geography of gun violence – is indicative. In countries such as Mexico and Guatemala, lethal violence is concentrated in border areas where trafficking is widespread, in particular zones in main cities, and along smuggling routes. In Brazil, violence in port cities and favelas, also linked to drugs and gangs, is also higher than elsewhere, and firearms violence is linked to other things such as drug trafficking, gangs, alcohol abuse, systematic racism, and inequality. A social network map of a Boston immigrant community that tracked gunshot victims (injured or killed), noted that the likelihood of being shot dropped by 25 percent with each “step” away from a victim node. Given that the difference between victims and perpetrators is often “who shot first,” this case illustrates that firearms violence is often, at least in gang and crime-related violence, linked to broader “social networks,” and does not spread epidemic-like throughout society.[[65]](#footnote-27) It must therefore be tackled with policies that address networks (one of the features of city-based projects such as the Boston’s Operation Ceasefire).

Other forms of firearms violence are equally complex to untangle. With respect to intimate partner violence, it is clear – at least in the US – thatfirearms in the home are “a risk factor for intimidation and for killing women in their homes, and it appears that a gun in the home may more likely be used to threaten intimates than to protect against intruders.”*[[66]](#footnote-28)* On average, however, women are killed by means other than firearms much more frequently than men. So if a country’s percentage of homicides with firearms is, for example, 60 percent, then roughly 30 percent of violent deaths of women are likely to be caused by firearms. Likewise, the homicide rate for African American women was nearly 2.5 times higher than for white women, although roughly similar proportions of black and white women were killed by an intimate partner and with a gun, which speaks to other factors involved in intimate partner violence.

The big take away – for national and global public policy initiatives to regulate small arms availability and misuse – is that one needs a sophisticated and targeted approach to armed violence, identifying who is vulnerable, under what conditions, by what means, and to what forms of lethal violence. Good research and evidence is indispensable to the development of sound policies.

# Session 11

# Reforming Police Forces and Making Them Better Serve Their People

**Chair: Peter Neyroud - University of Cambridge, Affiliated Lecturer at the Institute of Criminology**

Especially in societies with high levels of crime and violence police forces across the world are frequently insufficiently trained, unable to effectively enforce the law, and exposed to corruption. As a result they often lack the support of the populations they are meant to serve.  However, an effective, accountable and legitimate police force is an essential component of violence reductions strategies. In this session three experts in police research discuss strategies that can help to make police forces more accountable and that can improve police effectiveness.

## Etannibi Alemika

**Biography**

Etannibi E. O. Alemika obtained B.Sc. and M.Sc. Sociology from the University of Ibadan (Nigeria) and M.S. and Ph.D. Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia (USA). He is currently a Professor of Criminology and Sociology of Law at the University of Jos, in Nigeria. His areas of research include policing, organised crime, security sector reform, conflict studies, and penal administration. He is a member of the editorial board of several international journals, including Police Practice and Research; Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, and the Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology. His recent publications include Alemika, EEO. 2013. Organized and Transnational Crime in West Africa, in Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung and Regine Schonenberg (eds.) Transnational Organized Crime: Analyses of a Global Challenge to Democracy. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag; Alemika, EEO. 2013. Organised Crime and Governance in West Africa, in EEO Alemika (Ed.); The impact of organized crime on governance in West Africa. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 16-34, and Alemika, EEO. 2013. Criminal victimization, Policing and Governance in Nigeria. Lagos & Abuja: CLEEN Foundation), and Police Practice and Police Research in Africa, Police Practice and Research, 2009: 483–502. Prof. Alemika was a member of Nigeria's Presidential Committee on Police Reform (2006); Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Prisons Reform (2005/2006); Member, Committee for the Restructuring of Fire Services in Nigeria (2012). He is a member of several professional associations, including Social Science Academy of Nigeria; Nigerian Society of Criminology; Academy of Criminal Justice Science (USA); American Society of Criminology; Altus Global Alliance and the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

**Abstract**

**Police Effectiveness, Accountability and Violence in Nigeria**

Nigeria is currently witnessing unprecedented level of ethno-religious violence; violent crimes, and terrorist attacks by insurgent groups since its existence. The civil war (1967-1970) did not generate as much discontent among diverse groups in the country. The capacity of the country to contain the growing violence is weak. The deployment of the military for civil policing has exposed the ineffectiveness of the Nigeria Police Force and led to the militarisation of civil life, which is inimical to the consolidation of the country’s democratic transition.

The common forms of collective and inter-personal violence frequently experienced in the country are violent inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts; intra-and inter-communal violence; armed robbery, kidnapping, assassination (motivated by political and economic competition, and ransom money); gender-related violence; ritual killing and mutilation; ethno-religious militia and terrorist violence, extra-judicial killing and brutality by security personnel, and violent attack against security officials. The Nigeria Police Force has generally been ineffective in preventing and controlling these forms of violence due to lack of capacity in the core policing functions of intelligence, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of suspects. In this presentation, we examine the factors that undermine the effectiveness and accountability of the Nigeria Police Force and offer recommendations for the reform of the Force.

**Summary**

**Police Effectiveness, Accountability and Violence in Nigeria**

**Introduction**

Police work and violence and intrinsically related. Police agencies and officials are responsible for preventing and controlling violence; empowered to use violence, are targets of violence (Sherman 1980)[[67]](#footnote-29). Police are the major mechanism through which the state exercises its monopoly over legitimate use of violence. However, police are often perpetrators and victims of violence in many societies, thereby fuelling rather than combatting collective and inter-personal violence in society. The police are central to any effort to prevent and reduce violence and enhance public safety. Reduction of violence in a society requires that critical attention be given to the identification and mitigation of political, economic, social and organizational structures in which high levels of violence and impunity are embedded. In addition, a democratic and effective policing system is necessary for maintaining minimum level of collective and interpersonal violence in a country. In the a absence of a democratic policing philosophy and culture, the police can become a vicious force for extortion and brutality, pre-occupied with regime protection instead of “policing for the people” (Mastrofski 1999)[[68]](#footnote-30) and “policing through human rights” (Greene 2010[[69]](#footnote-31)).

The Nigeria Police Force is not guided by the elements of ‘democratic policing’, ‘policing for people’ or ‘policing through human rights’, which significantly accounts for its ineffectiveness and lack of accountability. As a result of police ineffectiveness in tackling or containing the diverse forms of violence in the country, the armed forces personnel have largely been deployed to take over policing duties. At present, military task forces are present operating in thirty-two of the thirty-six states and the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. Paradoxically, protracted military rule created much of the factors that currently undermine the effectiveness of the police. During the military rule, the functions of the police were taken over by armed forces personnel and the police were neglected in terms of capacity and organization development due to inter-agency rivalry and sense of superiority over the police by members of the ruling military regimes.

Police forces and officials exercise enormous powers and are conferred with authority to use force to enforce laws in order to main public security and order. Goldstein (1977: 1)[[70]](#footnote-32) observed that the power of the police “to arrest, to search, to detain, and to use force – is awesome in the degree to which it can be disruptive of freedom, invasive of privacy, and sudden and direct in its impact upon individual”. Enormous human, material and financial resources are also allocated to police organisations to enable them carry out their responsibilities. In view of actual or potential abuse of powers and misuse of resources, democratic societies maintain mechanisms for ensuring that the police are answerable for their functional efficiency (performance), action and conduct (integrity), and managerial efficiency (management of resources).

**Nigeria Police Force**

Nigeria has a national police organisation, which is the Nigeria Police Force[[71]](#footnote-33). The functions of the Nigeria Police Force were specified in section 4 of the Police Act (*Laws of the Federation 2004*)[[72]](#footnote-34) as: prevention and detection of crime; apprehension of offenders; preservation of law and order; protection of life and property; enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged, and military duties within or outside Nigeria as may be required of them.

**Violence in Nigeria**

Official crime statistics in the country are very unreliable due to poor record keeping. Nonetheless, an indication of the extent and pattern of violence in Nigeria can be obtained from an annual crime victimization conducted by CLEEN Foundation. Results from a national crime victimization survey in 2011[[73]](#footnote-35) in Nigeria showed that:

1. 2.2% reported murder of a household member, compared to 1.3% in 2010;
2. 10.2% reported a household member being a victim of armed robbery compared to 6.7% in 2010;
3. 1.3% reported the rape of a household member compared to 1.0% in 2010;
4. 1.4% reported kidnapping of household member as against 0.8% in 2010
5. 19.8% reported domestic violence compared to 13.8% in 2010.

Insight into violence from the following official statistics can be obtained from police statistics on armed robbery and associated casualty from 2005 -2009:

1. 1,043 citizens were killed in armed robbery incidents;
2. 16,925 robbery suspects were arrested by the police;
3. 3,651 armed robbery suspects were prosecuted, which constitute only about 20% of robbery suspects arrested during the period;
4. 2,216 robbery suspects were killed in encounter with the police
5. 517 police officers were killed in encounter with robbers.

Official statistics from the police indicated that 2.184 cases of kidnapping were recorded between January 2008 and June 2012.

Since 1999, violent conflicts have claimed the lives of thousands of citizens; inflicted grievous injury or harm to hundreds of thousands of citizens; engendered internal displacement of hundreds of thousands and the destruction and looting of property worth billions of naira. The current Boko Haram insurgency has been credited with more than 5000 deaths since 2011 and the kidnapping of hundreds of victims, including more than 200 students that were kidnapped on April 14 and had not been released as mid-August 2014. Hundreds of personnel of the Armed Forces, Police and Prisons have been killed by Boko Haram insurgents.

Political violence is also a major problem in Nigeria. The violence that erupted after the presidential election in 2011 resulted in 943 deaths, 838 injured persons, and 626 arrests. In Kaduna state alone, 827 deaths were recorded, followed by Bauchi State with 36 deaths; Adamawa 26 deaths and Gombe 20 deaths[[74]](#footnote-36). Two major problems associated with violence and corruption in the country is impunity. The perpetrators of these crimes are hardly detected. But even when arrested, they are hardly charged to court, and when charged to court, the cases are not effectively prosecuted resulting in dismissal and a high population of detainees awaiting trial in Nigerian prisons.

**Police Performance and legitimacy in Nigeria**

In spite of its national jurisdiction and presence with staff strength of over 350,000 personnel, and wide power to carry out its function, the Nigeria Force is generally perceived as functionally inefficient; repressive and corrupt, resulting in mutual hostility and mistrust between the police and the citizens in Nigeria. Sources of police-public hostility and distrust in Nigeria include (a) the colonial origin of police forces and their deployment to defend exploitation and repression; (b) retention of repressive and paramilitary police system preoccupied with regime protection instead of democratic policing culture; (c) absence of functional efficiency, accountability and responsiveness by the police forces; (d) unprofessional conducts, especially corruption and brutality, on the part of the police, and (e) the disposition towards law and law enforcement agencies by members of the public (Tamuno 1970; Kayode 1976; Alemika and Chukwuma 2000; Odekunle 1979; Alemika 1993; 2003a, 2003b; Ahire 1991, 1993; Rotimi 1993; Working Party Report, 1967)[[75]](#footnote-37). The antagonistic relationship between the citizens and the police constitutes an impediment to police efficiency and accountability and fuels violence between members of the public and the police.

Analysis of the responses of respondents in the CLEEN criminal victimization for 2011revealed the following public perception of police performance:

1. 48.8% of respondents considered police performance in 2011 to be good or very good (good - 40.4% and very good - 8.4%);
2. 40.8% of those with contact with police officials reported that they were required to pay bribe;
3. 24.8% of the entire sample trusted the police somewhat or a lot;
4. 65.9% perceived most or all police officers as corrupt;
5. 69.4% of the (477) respondents who reported the violation of their rights by security agencies identified police officials as responsible;
6. 20.8% of the (810) victims of crimes reported to the police;
7. 47.7% of the victims that reported to the victims were satisfied with the handling of their report by the police;
8. Among those (312 respondents) who were dissatisfied with the police handling of their report, the principal reasons for dissatisfaction were failure to apprehend offenders (26.3%); failure to recover property (32.7%); police were slow to arrive (12.2%); failure to provide feedback on actions (11.5%); demand for bribe (4.8%), and disrespect (4.5%)

**Police Accountability in Nigeria**

Accountability involves an obligation to act in conformity with designated laws, rules and standards, failing which there are agencies to sanction deviation and thereby eliminate impunity.The Constitution and laws of Nigeria provide for several external and internal mechanisms of police oversight and accountability. The Police Council chaired by the President of the Federation with state governors as members, and The Police Service Commission are police oversight agencies were created by the Constitution. Major functions of the Police Council are dealing with matters relating to (a) the organisation and administration of the Nigeria Police Force and all other matters relating thereto (not being matters relating to the use and operational control of the Force or the appointment, disciplinary control and dismissal of members of the force); (b) the *general supervision* of the Nigeria Police Force; and (c) advising the President on the appointment of the Inspector-General of Police.

The functions of the Police Service Commission are to (a) appoint persons to offices (other than the office of the Inspector-General of Police) in the Nigeria Police Force; and (b) dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding any office in the Force, except the Inspector-General of Police. The *Police Act* and *Police Regulations* provided for internal disciplinary measures and mechanisms in the Nigeria Police Force. Section 339 and 340 of Police Act (*CAP 359 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990)* provide for the standards of conduct and attributes required of a police officer. Section 341 of the *Police Act and Regulations* provides for personal liability for misconduct. The First Schedule of the *Police Regulations* listed several offences which are referred to as offences against discipline and which are subject to internal disciplinary processes and sanctions. Notwithstanding these and other elaborate oversight and accountability mechanisms, the Nigeria Police Force and its officials are not effective and accountable. Police misbehaviours in Nigeria are not entirely due to lack of rules or accountability mechanisms but are rather due to ineffective enforcement and lack of compliance.

**Conclusion and recommendations**

Police efficiency and accountability are determined by the political system of a country and dynamics within the police organisation as well as the relationships between the police and citizens. Respondents in the National Criminal Victimization Survey for 2011 recommended the following measures for strengthening the Nigeria Police Force: more training (28.3%); provision of better equipment and facilities (23.9%); more discipline and supervision (oversight) by the government (17.6%); better remuneration (9.8%); adequate funding (9.0%), and greater autonomy from government interference (5.5%).

Over the past ten years, the Nigerian federal government established three presidential police reform committees (2006, 2008 and 2012) with identical terms of reference, in particular to identify causes of police inefficiency and make appropriate recommendations. But the government has demonstrated a general lack of political will in implementing the recommendations even though they do not involve fundamental changes. Thus, the government appears to be content with ineffective and unaccountable police force, provided the regime tenure protection is prioritized over citizens’ security and public safety.

Effective and accountable police and policing in Nigeria require the deepening of democracy and good governance culture; reform of the police force, including the laws on its structure, composition, functions, powers and oversight. The following measures are recommended: decentralized and effectively coordinated multi-level police authorities at the federal, state and local government levels; adoption and institutionalization of democratic policing culture, including the elements captured in the ideas of policing for people and policing through human rights (Mastrofiski 1999; Greene 2010) to enhance public-police partnership which is a precondition to police efficiency and legitimacy; legal provisions stressing respect for the rule of law and human rights by the police; measures to reduce political and executive interference and manipulation; effective anti-corruption measures; security of tenure for police executives and commanders; improved human resources management (personnel and training need analysis, recruitment, training, specialization, deployment, remuneration, professional standards and discipline, insurance and retirement benefits); strong and coordinated internal and external professional standards and accountability/oversight mechanisms (for police performance, conduct and resource management); adequate and sustained resources. Proper implementation of these measures will enhance police capacity to prevent and control violence in the country.

The government needs to demonstrate political will in enhancing police efficiency and accountability by strengthening the Police Council and Police Service Commission to perform their constitutional roles of organizing, administering, equipping and overseeing the Nigeria Police Force. The analysis in the paper will aid the understanding of the various factors associated with the ineffectiveness of the police in combatting the complex and growing culture of violence and impunity in the country. It will also aid the development, adoption and implementation of relevant policies to enhance police efficiency and accountability.

## Daniel Ortega

**Biography**

Daniel E. Ortega is Senior Research Economist and Impact Evaluation Coordinator at CAF – and associate professor at IESA Business School in Caracas. His research has broadly been in the area of microeconomics of development, with a recent focus on social experimentation and impact evaluation of anti-crime interventions in Latin America. He has coordinated CAF's research program on citizen security and has recently led several experiments with tax authorities to evaluate strategies for increasing tax compliance. His research has been published in several peer reviewed scholarly journals. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Maryland.

**Abstract**

**Social Experimentation and Evaluation for Better Policies**

Social experimentation and evaluation is being increasingly used for broadening the evidence base of public policy. However, policing and crime prevention are not areas area that have benefited much from this trend in Latin America, and leading examples of what is possible may be useful for stimulating this agenda. I will present results from two randomized evaluations of police training programs in Argentina and Colombia and an ongoing experimental evaluation of a hotspots program in the second largest municipality in Caracas, Venezuela.

One of the main challenges for promoting evidence-based decision making to reduce violence is to create the demand for scientific knowledge by policymakers. Above and beyond the estimated impacts from the three evaluations discussed here, the process by which each of these projects came to be leaves significant lessons for advancing this agenda in the region and which has shaped efforts led by CAF – Development Bank of Latin America – to catalyze evaluation efforts in violence reduction and other programs. Specifically, an evaluation project is much more likely to get off the ground and be supported into later phases by the authorities when the policymaker’s questions or concerns are at the center of the research effort, and when the process of experimentation and evaluation is rightly seen as a management tool and not as an externally imposed condition or requirement.

**Summary**

**Social Experimentation and Evaluation for Better Policies**

Every government is constantly making decisions on a grand or a small scale. With varying degrees of sophistication, these decisions are based on someone’s notion of how the world works; on someone’s belief about the ways in which each particular intervention will affect our society. All too often these beliefs have no grounding on scientific knowledge, but are rather the result of habit-think passed down through the genealogy of policy practice. The developing world’s greatest problem is not so much the lack of resources to implement the right policies but, rather, the lack of knowledge about what those right policies are.

This is true in many areas: state capacity building, education, health, social assistance and, importantly, citizen security. There is great need for a deeper knowledge base for policymaking and international organizations like CAF - Development Bank of Latin America - can play a significant role in catalyzing the production and use of this base. However, a key challenge is that what appears to work well in one context may not be feasible in another; even if feasible, it may turn out to have much smaller or even counterproductive effects. Overlooking this has often led to unsuccessful adoption of policies from foreign places.

Thus, impact evaluation and experimentation in specific contexts is a powerful management tool for public policy, and is increasingly being embraced by public officials in Latin America as a way to improve the effectiveness of their policy initiatives. A good understanding of the mechanisms through which policies affect outcomes is essential for translating results from one context, to another. Through its PILAR initiative (Policy, Innovation, Learning, And Results), CAF is helping public sector authorities experimentally evaluate the impact of their initiatives in policing in several countries in the region.

In Colombia, for example, the National Police launched its landmark “Plan Cuadrantes” in eight metropolitan areas in 2010, a major community policing initiative that required patrol police officers to engage citizens in conversation, mediate in conflicts, and generally support their empowerment. Four months after a set of instructions with specific protocols for patrol police we issued, a preliminary report on the implementation of the plan showed a marked clash between the existing culture and the proposed community policing approach. This led to a significant soft skills training effort of over 9,000 sworn officers, which CAF helped turn into the first large scale randomized controlled trial on policing in Latin America. 120 police stations were randomly assigned to one of three cohorts which received the training at different times, with a lag of 3 months between the first and second and 5.5 months between the second and third cohorts.

Official reports of crimes and contraventions were monitored throughout the period on a month-to-month basis, as well as a management and a culture survey taken both before the first cohort received training and after the first cohort was trained. The evaluation showed that the training was instrumental to improve police behavior and increase reporting, especially in high-crime areas. This result led the authorities not only to expand the program to smaller cities, but also to include soft skill building in the basic police training curricula (García, Mejía and Ortega, 2013). The main driver of this evaluation was the national police’s interest in getting their flagship program off the ground: the demand for scientific knowledge was grounded in a very specific interest on the part of the policymaker.

Similarly, in Argentina the government put in place a rational use of force training program for the Federal Police as part of an effort to improve policing practices in favor of the safety of patrol officers and the community. The PILAR initiative helped the authorities implement an experimental evaluation of the program’s impact on the police’s attitudes towards their personal safety in risky situations involving one or more suspects, and the potential use of their firearm. Although, ultimately, the outcome of interest in this case would be the number of times treatment and control officers get involved in instances of unnecessary use of force or firearm engagement, this was not feasible within the initial timeframe of the study, although this outcome is being monitored continuously. The design incorporated a list experiment into a police survey, designed to elicit truthful responses to potentially uncomfortable or delicate questions. Despite the fact that the training program lasts only 1 week during the morning shift (and all day on Friday), the estimated impacts are significant: police officers are much more likely to value verbal communication when facing a suspect (68% in the treatment group as compared to 47% in the control group) as a result of the training, are more likely to “first assess the safety and state of consciousness of the victim in a dangerous situation” (70% treatment versus 54% control) and are much less likely to risk their lives to prevent a robbery (38% treatment versus 51% control).

The promising impacts of the training program unveiled by this evaluation are currently being taken into consideration for the allocation of resources to training or other spending categories within the Federal Police and the Ministry of Security. In addition, program administrators have used some of the insights to make adjustments to the curriculum and to prioritize certain lower skilled officers. They are also considering changing the delivery frequency and intensity, as the evaluation showed that content that is complementary to their daily routine gets reinforced over time (i.e. “risk awareness”), while content that is not (i.e. “verbal communication is important when facing a suspect”), tends to be gradually forgotten. This initiative also arose from the Security Ministry’s need to better understand whether the resources devoted to this kind of program were worthwhile or not and to be able to bring this information to the budget negotiating table.

Finally, in Venezuela, the municipality of Sucre is the second largest (with a population of one million) in the city of Caracas, and includes one of the largest and most violent urban slums in Latin America: Petare. In this municipality, 80% of its 500 annual homicides occur in less than 6% of the street segments, a diagnosis that sparked a collaborative effort with the local police and municipal authorities to identify the area’s hotspots and design a randomized controlled trial to evaluate the effectiveness of a hotspots policing strategy for reducing the incidence of homicide. A total of 46 pairs of hotspots were selected for the experiment, and one in each pair randomly allocated to receive increased police presence of up to 4 daily visits of 15 minutes each – in line with the Koper (1995) principle – for an initial period of three months.

Given that even homicide is a statistically infrequent event (even in this high violence area) the difference between the number of homicides in the treatment and control hotspots was not statistically or materially significant after the trial period, however, the careful monitoring system that was put in place helped the authorities gain better control of their human and physical resources. By drawing an electronic fence around each hotspot, we were able to create an alarm system that records exactly the amount of time each patrol (fitted with a GPS device) spends at the hotspots and therefore closely measure dosage delivered on a daily basis. The levels of compliance (delivered dosage / planned dosage) were strikingly low (around 18 – 20%) for several weeks, then increased to around 60% only to drop very low again.

The focus of the research program has now shifted to the issue of compliance of the protocols on the part of the patrol police. While retaining the original experimental design, a survey of the entire municipal police force is being undertaken in order to better understand police officers’ motivations, incentives, opinion of the current leadership, among other issues. The goal is to identify areas where police behavior may be ‘nudged’ or incentivized into compliance with the hotspots program’s protocols. A pilot of such incentive program or nudge intervention will also be experimentally evaluated, as is the policymaker’s hope.

Once again, the guiding principle in this research program was the policymaker’s demand for quality quantitative knowledge on the effects of its intervention. This has allowed us to shift focus to the compliance matter as a symptom of a potentially much deeper issue of institutional capacity, or the causes of the causes as Sherman et. al. (2014) have termed it in the context of a similar policing experiment in Trinidad, but which has general relevance for all of Latin America and possibly the rest of the developing world as well.

The general goal of the PILAR initiative is to contribute to a culture of evidence-based policymaking in criminal justice and other areas, by helping policymakers embrace social experimentation and impact evaluation as a tool for improving their initiatives, regardless of their size or scale. This process, however, requires that policymakers’ questions and concerns be placed as the top priority and scientific tools at the service of these questions. In our view, this is the only way that resistance to evaluation and experimentation will subside, and the only way in which the stream of policy innovation that constantly washes over Latin America will leave a knowledge footprint deep enough to change the tide of underdevelopment.

## Patrick Burton

**Biography**

Patrick Burton is the Executive Director of the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP), a Cape Town-based  organization engaged in the field of crime and violence prevention.  Patrick holds an H.Dip. in Development Planning from the University of the Witwatersrand, and a MSc. degree in Development Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He has spent time seconded to the National Department of Provincial and Local Government, and to the Department of Communications.  He co-designed, and led the second South African Crime Victimization study, undertaken by the Institute for Security Studies, as well as several site-based victimization surveys.  As a consultant to the ISS, Patrick was the lead researcher on a number of Malawi qualitative and quantitative studies.  While at CJCP, Patrick has worked on two national youth victimisation studies; on youth resilience to violence; and extensively, on school-based and cyber violence.  He is currently a co-investigator and project manager on a national study on child abuse, violence and neglect, as well on a five-year epidemiological study on sexual violence against girls at school. He is the lead on the development of a National School Safety Framework for the National Department of Basic Education. He has extensive experience in the design of monitoring and evaluation frameworks and studies for violence prevention, and is responsible for the research component of the Kenyan Crime and Violence Observatory. He has led the design of numerous local safety strategies for local government throughout the region.  Patrick regularly delivers training on crime and violence prevention management through the University of Witwatersrand, and the Polytechnic of Namibia, and is responsible for the M&E for crime and violence prevention module of these courses. He has undertaken work in South Africa, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

# Session 12

# What Penal Policy for Less Violent Societies?

**Chair: Christof Heyns - United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions**

Criminal justice policies are an integral part of violence reduction strategies. This session examines the ways in which penal policies can support the goal of violence reduction. Issues addressed here include whether increased imprisonment is a viable option, what lessons can be learned from failed past penal policies, and whether changing legislation on drugs or firearms can produce violence-reducing effects.

## Daniel Nagin

**Biography**

Daniel S. Nagin is Teresa and H. John Heinz III University Professor of Public Policy and Statistics in the Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University.  He is an elected Fellow of the American Society of Criminology, American Association for the Advancement of Science, and American Academy of Political and Social Science. He was awarded the American Society of Criminology's Edwin H Sutherland Award in 2006 and the Stockholm Prize in Criminology in 2014. His research focuses on the evolution of criminal and antisocial behaviors over the life course, the deterrent effect of criminal and non-criminal penalties on illegal behaviors, and the development of statistical methods for analyzing longitudinal data. His work has appeared in such diverse outlets as the American Economic Review, American Sociological Review, Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Journal of Sociology, Archives of General Psychiatry, Criminology, Child Development, Demography, Psychological Methodology, Law & Society Review, Crime and Justice Annual Review, Operations Research, and Stanford Law Review. He is also the author of Group-based Modeling of Development (Harvard University Press, 2005) and chaired and co-edited the report of the (US) National Academy of Science's Committee on Deterrence and the Death Penalty.

**Summary**

**When the inevitable happens—rising, not declining, crime rates—what to do?**

For two decades crime rates, particularly for violent crimes, have been declining across the globe. Homicide rates, the best-measured violent crime, are down by 50% or more in many Western European countries and in the US. The crime drop is not limited to wealthy western countries. Over the past 20 years the homicide rate in large numbers of developing countries has declined by two-thirds or more.

While these declines may be reflective of a long term secular decline documented by Eisner, Pinsker, and others, just like short term trends in the stock market, short term trends in crime rates are not immutable. At some point, possibly in the not too distant future, the crime drop will reverse itself in Europe, the US and elsewhere and we will move into an era of rising, not falling, crime rates. So what should policy makers do, or at least what does research suggest they do when crime rates start rising?

In this talk I outline how in my judgment policy makers should respond particularly as it relates to the use of prisons and police. Evidence-based crime policy must be grounded in the recognition that the response should have two arms: one involving resources outside the criminal justice system; another involving the resources of the criminal justice system.

Research tell us that crime is, in part, the product of forces that are far beyond the reach of the criminal justice system. Consequently, mobilization of resources outside of the criminal justice system should be an integral part of the crime prevention strategies of all countries regardless of the direction of crime trends. Three responses of this type are particularly important: (1) Investing more in early childhood enrichment programs targeted at high risk children, (2) greater investment in drug treatment, for the purpose reducing the number of people who commit crimes in order to support drug habits, (3) provision of better mental health services to those who find their way into the criminal justice system but the aim of keeping the mentally out of prison.

Notwithstanding the importance of these three non-criminal justice policy responses, the focus of my remarks will be on the criminal justice response particularly as it pertains to the use of prisons and police. More than 250 years ago the Enlightenment philosopher Cesare Beccaria admonished that “It is better to prevent crimes than punish them.” The U.S. response to rising crime rates from the 1960s through the 1980s was predicated on two faulty premises that ignored Beccaria’s warning:

The first was that sending more people to prison for longer periods of time was an effective way to prevent crime and the second was that the police were impotent to prevent crime.

Over the past 5 years I have completed a number of reviews of the literature on deterrence and the crime prevention effect of imprisonment. Four important conclusions about the crime prevention effectiveness of criminal penalties have emerged from these reviews. They are:

1. Imprisonment may reduce crime by the physical isolation of offenders. My first key conclusion concerns preventing crime by incapacitation. American-style incapacitation is an inefficient method of crime control and also extremely unjust. A linchpin of US sentencing policy has been the imposition of lengthy prison sentences on repeat offenders. The reasoning was that repeat offenders were also high rate habitual offenders whose offenses could be averted by their incapacitation. This reasoning is faulty because it ignores two important facts about crime. The first is that nature’s best cure for crime is getting old. The second is the extreme skew in offending.

Criminologist have long drawn a distinction between specific deterrence, which refers to how the experience of punishment might affect recidivism and general deterrence which refers to how the threat of punishment might affect criminal behavior in the public writ large.

1. Conclusion 2 concerns specific deterrence. Implicit in the label is the assumption that experiencing punishment will have a chastening effect. There are, however, many sound reasons for predicting that the experience of punishment, in particular, imprisonment may exacerbate, not reduce, recidivism—for example, prisons may themselves be schools for crime. In fact there is no evidence of the chastening effect.
2. Conclusion 3 pertains to the severity punishment. In the context of imprisonment, severity refers to sentence length. Debates about the deterrent effect of severe sentences are commonly posed in terms of questions such as: Will a 10 year sentence deter armed robbery? This is the wrong framing of the question because it does not specify the alternative. From a policy perspective the correct framing is whether a 10 year sentence will serve as a greater deterrent than an acceptable alternative—say a 5 year sentence? Viewing the findings of research on severity effects in their totality, there is evidence suggesting that short sentences may be a deterrent but a consistent finding is that increases in already lengthy sentences produces at best a very modest deterrent effect whose crime prevention benefit falls way short of the social and economic costs that are incurred.
3. Conclusion 4 pertains to the certainty of punishment. Conventional wisdom is that certainty of punishment, not the severity of punishment, is the more effective deterrent. My review of the evidence has led me to a refinement of this conclusion that has very important policy implications. There is no evidence of a deterrent effect of increasing the risk of conviction or punishment given apprehension. Consequently, the more precise statement of the certainty principle is:

It is the certainty of apprehension, not the severity of the ensuing consequences, that is the effective deterrent. The most important set of actors affecting certainty of apprehension is the police—absent detection and apprehension, there is no possibility of being charged, convicted or formally sanctioned.

The revised certainty principle has two important policy implications.

First, it makes clear the fallacy of claims that harsh punishments deter crime.

Second, it places police center stage in preventing it. This brings me to my recommendations for the criminal justice policy response to the inevitable era of rising crime rates, whenever it might occur. If sending more people to prison isn’t an effective response to the inevitable era of rising crime rates, how should the resources of the criminal justice system be mobilized in response? Here my key recommendation again follows from the revised certainty principle and is likely to be greeted with skepticism at least in some quarters. That recommendation is that the police needed to be strategically mobilized to deter crime from happening in the first place. This needs to be done in a way that does not violate the civil liberties of the citizens that the police are supposed to be protecting. The objective is to create a safe democratic society not a safe police state. Countries around the world, including in Europe during the lifetimes of most people in this audience, have experienced the tyranny of a police state. We need to better understand how to mobilize the crime prevention capacities of the police in a way that is consistent with the values of a democratic society. In my remarks I will elaborate on how police can better play this role.

## Michael Tonry

**Biography**

Michael Tonry is McKnight Presidential Professor of Criminal Law and Policy and director, Institute on Crime and Public Policy, University of Minnesota; senior fellow in the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, Free University Amsterdam; and a Scientific Member of the Max Planck Institute on Comparative and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany. Previously he was professor of law and public policy and director of the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University, and a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He has since 2001 been a visiting professor of law and criminology at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. His books include Crime and Justice in America, 1975-2025 (Chicago 2013), Prosecutors and Politics—A Comparative Perspective (Chicago 2012), Punishing Race (OUP 2011), Thinking about Crime (OUP 2004), and Punishment and Politics—Evidence and Emulation in the Making of English Penal Policy (Willan 2004). He was from 1990 to 1999  editor of Overcrowded Times—Solving the Prison Problem and from 2000 to 2010 editor of Criminology in Europe. He founded and edits Crime and Justice - A Review of Research and two Oxford University Press book series: Studies in Crime and Public Policy, and Oxford Handbooks on Criminology and Criminal Justice.

**Abstract**

**What Can Courts and Prisons Do to Reduce Violent Crime?**

Courts and prisons can do precious little to reduce violent crime, although they can exacerbate it. How courts and prisons deal with violent crime is not unimportant, of course, but that is a product of the same social, economic, and political conditions that determine levels of crime and violence in a society. Countries in which courts are apolitical institutions that consistently impose punishments that are fair, proportionate, and humane tend to have relatively low levels of violence. Both legal cultures and social conditions associated with low rates of violence are products of historical and cultural forces that shape a country. Countries with strong human rights values, high levels of citizen trust in the state and one another, low levels of income inequality, and strong social welfare systems tend to have both low levels of violence and humane and principled legal cultures. The overwhelming implication is that serious efforts at violence prevention, though they should and will embody strenuous targeted efforts to reduce violence per se, must be equally or more focused on building the social and economic conditions that make violence and other predatory crime less common. As Scandinavian scholars and officials often say, the best crime policy is a good social policy.

**Summary**

**What Can Courts and Prisons Do to Reduce Violent Crime?**

Courts, and prisons as implementers of punishments for the most serious crimes, have important roles to play in humane well-ordered societies. That role, as Emile Durkheim long ago saw, is not to reduce crime through deterrence and incapacitation, but by example to reinforce fundamental social values. Modern evidence of the limited direct preventive effects of criminal punishments confirms Durkheim’s view. Whether people do or do not commit serious crimes is seldom because of their perceptions of foreseeable punishments but because of their socialization into fundamental values of right and wrong. In that task, criminal justice institutions can play small roles. The heavy lifting must be done by primary social institutions, preeminently the family, the church, the school, and the local community.

The role of the courts and prisons is dramaturgical. They can reinforce basic social norms learned in primary processes through the actions they take and the processes they are seen to follow. They can also undermine basic social norms and thereby imply social dissensus about them, as when the crimes of the powerful and politically connected or serious crimes more generally are disregarded, when punishments flout conventional notions of what is more serious than what (e.g., when drug crimes are punished more severely than violent ones), or when processes systematically treat members of minority and immigrant groups differently from members of politically dominant groups.

The observations set out in the preceding paragraphs are not new, as the mention of Durkheim indicates. Their validity, however, has in many countries long been obscured by ideology, parochialism, and lack of confirmatory hard evidence. Two of these blinders, parochialism and lack of evidence, are slowly falling off as cross-national and comparative evidence and modern social science research findings accumulates. The blinder of ideology will likely take longer to fall. Many people who want to believe that deterrence and incapacitation are primary mechanisms of crime prevention are hard-wired to see what they want to see and to disdain and disregard evidence that undermines their prejudices.

Four bodies of evidence support the claim that basic social values, not the severity and relentlessness of punishment, shape crime rates. One, in some ways the most mundane, is social science evidence on the effects of sanctions. A recent American National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Causes and Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration in 2014 released a report surveying evidence on the effects of recent laws prescribing severe punishments and on research findings on deterrent and incapacitative effects of sanction. Major conclusions were that there is no credible evidence that severe penalties have significant, if any deterrent effects; that for a large number of reasons incapacitation effects are at best slight; and that all else being equal sending an offender to prison does not reduce later criminality, and may make it more likely. The evidence on the effects of recent harsh American sentencing laws shows that they are often evaded by police, prosecutors, and judges because they are believed to be unjustly severe and that even when they are imposed judges often do so believing them to have been unjustly severe. Both of these latter findings illustrate the importance of congruity between what courts do and what basic social norms indicate they should do. Imposition of punishments believed to be unjust undermines the norms they are ostensibly meant to acknowledge.

The second body of evidence is comparative and shows that there is no simple relationship between crime and punishment. Although a lay person might assume that rising crime rates lead to rising imprisonment rates, this is not what happens. Overall crime rates, violence rates generally, and homicide rates rose in all developed Western countries between the 1960s and the early 1990s before peaking and beginning a two-decade-long decline. During that period, imprisonment rates rose dramatically in only two countries, the US and the Netherlands. In most Western countries including much of Western Europe and Canada, imprisonment rates were stable or increased slightly. In Finland they fell by two-thirds. The same point can be observed comparing contiguous and culturally comparable countries. Crime rates in Canada and the US moved in parallel between 1973 and 1990. Canadian imprisonment rates held stable while the American rate increased four-fold. The four Scandinavian countries experienced almost perfectly parallel trends in crime rates between 1970 and 1990. Finland’s imprisonment rate plummeted. Those in the other three countries were broadly stable.

The third body of evidence is also comparative and shows that, almost regardless of the nature, changes in, or severity of crime control policies in individual countries, crime rates in developed Western countries have moved in parallel since the 1950s. Rates rose from the 1960s through the 1990s and have fallen since. No informed person would challenge that statement in relation to homicide or property crime rates. In many countries that pattern is also clear for nonlethal violence in both official and victimization data. In some countries, the post-1990s drop in nonlethal violence is unclear in official data but that is misleading. Because of cultural declines in tolerance of violence, victims have become more likely to report incidents to the police and police have become more likely to record reported incidents as crimes. More generally, what counts as violence has changed. Incidents that 30 or 40 years ago would have been regarded merely as unpleasant incidents are now seen as crimes. Examples include minor sexual incidents, fisticuffs between married or other partners, and alcohol-influenced fights. Many such incidents that formerly would not have been thought of as crimes at all now appear in police registers.

Finally, the fourth body of evidence concerns procedural justice and legitimacy. Those two recently emerged literatures counsel that citizens accord greater respect and acknowledge greater legitimacy in official processes that treat them even-handedly and with respect and that allow them a fair chance to state their case. Those findings in some ways do no more than document what most people’s intuitions would tell them. All of us resent being treated unfairly or disrespectfully, and have less or no respect for those who treat us in those ways. These findings, or truths, dovetail nicely with comparative research on the severity of punishment. High levels of trust in state institutions and fellow citizens are among the most powerful predictors of humane and restrained criminal justice policies.

The message is clear. Although targeted efforts should be made to address circumstances and situations associated with high rates of violence, the more fundamental challenge is to build societies that adequately address basic human needs and foster development of social values and norms that are antithetical to violence. Courts and prisons can support or undermine those values, but little more.

## Hualing Fu

**Biography**

Hualing Fu is a professor of law in the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong. He graduated from the Southwestern University of Politics and Law in Chongqing, China, and received his MA in criminology from the University of Toronto and a doctoral degree from Osgoode Hall Law School in York University, Canada. His research interest includes policing, criminal justice reform and human rights in China. He has published widely in those areas. He has previously taught in City University of Hong Kong, University of Washington, New York University, University of Pennsylvania and other universities in the North America.

**Abstract**

**China's Penal Policy Against Violence: Resilience and Challenges**

Although homicide is tragic in terms of its consequences, the causes are often mundane and inextricably linked to ordinary, pre-existing social relationships, including domestic arguments, disagreements between neighbors, disputes over land, water, contractual and lease disputes or simply frivolous grievances which perhaps inevitably arise in overcrowded communities. When homicide is embedded in slowly simmering disputes that escalate gradually and finally boil over into violence, there is undoubtedly an opportunity to detect early warning signs and intervene effectively to prevent such a tragic outcome. In this sense, notwithstanding fraught philosophical debates on the thorny topic of causation, it can be credibly argued that homicide and even murder happen because of missed opportunities for more effective early intervention.

So this seems to be the essence of the Chinese experience in mitigating violence. China's authoritarian state relies heavily on performance for its legitimacy. China's economic miracle is well-known and the high rate of economic growth in the past three decades has transformed Chinese society and provided much needed legitimization for the Chinese Communist Party which faces a democratic deficit. What is less widely publicized, however, is the social miracle, if I may use the term, in the sense that the state has thus far managed to maintain stability and social order during a period of tremendous social and economic transformation and upheaval.

In essence, the key to success from the Chinese experience of reducing violence has been three types of intervention, especially with regard to the escalation of ordinary disputes with tragic consequences. Those interventionist measures include: 1)  a proactive state  in containing social conflict and suppressing disputes; 2) strong gated communities in maintaining local order and disciplining their members; and 3) situational control of good Samaritans, vigilante citizens and responsive bystanders.

Despite the Chinese state achieving a low rate of violence in society, it is now facing tremendous challenges in maintaining this. It will be an uphill battle to further curtail the level of violence in society and reduce the level of violence by 50% within the next 30%.

My core recommendations are:

1) While the state continues to take a firm stance in proactively intervening to reduce violence, the basis of such intervention should be adjusted to a substantially legal and moral footing as distinct from its presently overly politicized character. State intervention should be extended beyond the narrowly defined category of public order, i.e. violence with direct political repercussions, to cover all types of violence: for example, domestic violence is a significant social issue that requires urgent attention and direct action by the state.

2) The state should institutionalize its own conflict resolution mechanism by moving beyond typically ad hoc informal and extra-legal interventions. With greater legitimacy, conflict could be effectively channeled to legal institutions for effective resolution instead of resorting to frequently violent forms of 'self-help'. Much of the communal violence over land, water resources and contractual disputes engendering violence and death could have been avoided had the legal institutions been more viable and credible.

3) The state should nurture civil society organizations and allow them to play a more active and direct role in nurturing a sense of citizenship and bolstering trust. Social intervention is more effective in preempting violence than state institutions and efficacious social intervention is predicated upon on the accumulation of social capital, forging bonds and bridging the gap between citizens, underpinned by robust social organizations that entrench a sense of belonging.

**Summary**

**China's Penal Policy Against Violence: Resilience and Challenges**

As is the case elsewhere, the perpetrators and victims of homicide in China are usually directly related, or at least romantically or platonically acquainted. According to the Chinese Supreme People’s Court, as many as 10 per cent of murder that are tried result from domestic violence. The majority of murder cases in China result from everyday conflicts between non-strangers. Although homicide is tragic in terms of its consequences, the causes are often mundane and inextricably linked to ordinary, pre-existing social relationships, including domestic arguments, disagreements between neighbors, disputes over land, water, contractual and lease disputes or simply frivolous grievances which perhaps inevitably. *When* homicide is embedded in slowly simmering disputes that escalate gradually and finally boil over into violence, there is undoubtedly an opportunity to detect early warning signs and intervene effectively to prevent such a tragic outcome. It can be credibly argued that homicide and even murder happen because of missed opportunities for more effective early intervention.

China does not systematically publish homicide statistics and it is estimated that in 2006 slightly more than 30,000 homicides occurred in China as a result of the eight most serious categories of crime, including murder, grievous bodily harm causing death and death caused by explosion, poisoning, arson, robbery, kidnapping and rape. Murder comprised approximately 70% of the total number of recorded homicides, resulting in a per capita murder rate of less than 1.5 per 100,000. By 2011, official statistics claim that this figure has been reduced to 0.9 per 100,000.

In essence, the key to success from the Chinese experience of reducing violence has been three types of intervention, especially with regard to the escalation of ordinary disputes with tragic consequences.

The first is institutional/political intervention whereby the state provides proactive and effective conflict resolution or alternatively conflict prevention. China probably offers an extreme example in terms of the politicized methods the state uses to preempt private disputes and conflict. The imperative for enhanced social stability and political legitimacy under Communist Party rule offers a stronger explanation for the prevailing model of social control and crisis intervention. In this highly politicized model of control, disputes are regarded as abnormal and constitute a destabilizing factor which needs to be identified promptly and eliminated efficiently. The entire political system is geared to dispute suppression with the principal goal being to end a conflict as soon as it emerges.

It is in this particular political context that early dispute intervention has been practiced in China over the past decade. In solving conflict in particularly sensitive or potentially explosive confrontations, the state relies on multi-institutional co-operation to effect coordinated dispute resolution, which, is literally translated, and referred to as “Big Mediation”. In short, it is big because of the political priority that is attached to social stability due to the volatile, potential wider repercussions of conflict. This in turn is big because failure to end a conflict may have direct repercussions for local political leaders. Facing disputes that may impact on local order, the idea is that the government is able to pull all the relevant resources together in order to effect a short, sharp resolution. Thus, conflict resolution is organized and implemented by state agencies in order to achieve the overriding state objective of maintaining state control.

Proactive early intervention serves multiple state goals and forms part of the larger panoply of pre-emptive mechanisms reduce the overall, aggregate effect by ensuring that individual disputes are not allowed to cyrstalise into a perilous and violent confratation or collective actions. Therefore, the government is adopting a pragmatic approach in identifying and classifying potential threats according to the relative level of danger, thereby taking pre-emptive measures accordingly and minimising the risk factor. Ultimately, the government has orchestrated, and invested in, a costly control network whose focal point is the identification of the sources of disputes together with the aggressive imposition of a timely settlement.

In the course of the intervention process I have described, legal rules matter little, and rights are often irrelevant. Indeed, at the heart of this political model of control is a presumption of the irrelevance of established rules, in particular, legal rules. A defining characteristic of so-called ‘exceptional states’ such as China’s, in imposing the semblance of stability in the face of tremendous social transformations can be found in the extensive use of informal and extra-legal measures with the aim of responding to any given crisis, perceived or real, with a high degree of efficiency. Police power is crucial in this process and the Chinese success in reducing violence depends on the pivotal role the police play in social ordering.

The second type of intervention is the community-based intervention, including work place-based intervention and residential community-based intervention. Community-based intervention offers the institutional basis for politicized intervention and demonstrates unique characteristics. While increasing social mobility in China has caused a gradual decline in the power of residential communities as agents of the state that used to exert substantial political and social control, gated workplaces remain instrumental in controlling migrant workers who constitute the majority of China’s new working class. Since the vast majority of migrants that work in the manufacturing sector, factories serve a crucial function of policing and disciplining labor on behalf of the state.

After farmers were allowed to enter cities to work in factories from the early 1990s, as a strict rule with few exceptions they live within the confines of the same factory compounds where they work. The institutionalization of migrant workers on such an industrial scale is unprecedented in human society. When 150 million migrant workers left their homes and arrived in different cities, they did not create the kind of urban slums which are a regular phenomenon in societies undergoing dramatic social and economic transitions. Instead they vanished quickly and quietly within the factory walls, quickly becoming invisible- in Chinese, rural migrants are colloquially referred to as a ‘floating population’. They work and live largely in isolation in a highly disciplined fashion and there is very little interaction between these migrants and the surrounding urban life. Low violence and low crime rates in China have a lot to do with the effective institutionalization of those young men and women; this near total institutionalization significantly reduces the destabilizing potential of rapid urbanization.

Of course, how long these walls erected by the Chinese state and economy can continue to remain impregnable and detain migrants workers within the environs of the factory, however disciplined and silenced, is highly questionable. The process of urbanization is slowly and steadily ratcheting up its destructive impact on Chinese urban and rural communities as it slowly eats away at the traditional or revolutionary Leninist norms and control mechanisms. People are changing because of the social and economic climate is shifting. In general, younger generations are much less tolerant of authoritarian leaders; there is a stronger demand for private space where public power is kept at arm’s length; and rules are beginning to matter more in guiding human interaction and restricting state powers. Quite simply gated communities, whether workplaces or residential communities, no long have the power or resources to discipline and control their members so tightly.

While the institutions of the *ancien regime* are crumbling, China lacks a strong and vibrant civil society that is independent of the state and can fill the void opened by the gradual decline of the gated communities. While the state promotes or organizes “Big Mediation” and solicits societal support, it is suspicious of autonomous societal organizations and tries to limit their growth so that they would not constitute a challenge to the Party’s monopoly on political power. Social control that is exerted by churches, trade associations, unions and other civil society organizations is simply not available. Instead the state steps in and fills the gap leading to an over-politicization, which in turn weakens society’s capacity for self-governance. Indeed, private conflict resolution is often interpreted as a negative, unnecessary intrusion into government authority unless it is effectively co-opted by the official system, creating a dependence on the authoritarian state for conflict resolution and the trap of what Fukuyama refers to as a ‘low trust society’ in which cooperation cannot be effectively extended beyond clientelist family and patronage networks.

This brings me to my final category of early intervention by bystanders, which comprises the situational control of good Samaritans, vigilante citizens and responsive bystanders who perhaps exceptionally care about the wellbeing of fellow citizens at personal risk to the extent that they are willing to render help when it is needed. Situational intervention by fellow citizens is in fact the most effective means of early intervention. Conflict necessarily originates from regular human interactions and, as such, occurs everywhere with the upshot that all institutions, no matter how effective and resourceful, are intrinsically limited in dealing with the specter of omnipresent conflict. It is this bottom-up, citizen-initiated and spontaneous intervention as embryonic conflicts unfold that is most effective in controlling the escalation of conflict and reducing violence.

That said, situational social intervention by civil society in general and bystanders in particular is the weakest link in the chain of the outright prevention of violence in China. Just as there is an excessive politicization of conflict resolution, there is only a limited socialization of early intervention. The state enjoys a monopoly over resources and sets the agenda, however in the process of controlling conflict, the state perversely diminishes the self-governing capacity of civil society and limits the spontaneity of citizen activism. There is a well-recognized bystander apathy as demonstrated by a series of high-profile cases in which bystanders withhold help from fellow Chinese at the very time that they need it the most leading to shocking human tragedies. Good Samaritans in China are commonly viewed with suspicion, misunderstood or else generally receive negative treatment, effectively disincentivizing the natural human instinct to hold out a helping hand. In the final analysis it is this concerted institutional indifference fostering an unwillingness among neighbors to intervene for the common good that is the most serious cultural and institutional hurdle to further reducing violence in China.

Policy Recommendations:

State intervention should be adjusted to a substantially legal and moral footing as distinct from its presently overly politicized character. State intervention should be extended beyond the narrowly defined category of public order, i.e. violence with direct political repercussions, to cover all types of violence such as domestic violence.

The state should institutionalize its own conflict resolution mechanism by moving beyond typically *ad hoc* informal and extra-legal interventions. With greater legitimacy, conflict could be effectively channeled to legal institutions for effective resolution instead of resorting to frequently violent forms of ‘self-help’.

The state should nurture civil society organizations and allow them to play a more active and direct role in nurturing a sense of citizenship and bolstering trust.

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11. See J Putzel and J Di John (2012), *Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States*. Crisis States Research Centre. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
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21. See UCDP/PRIO Dataset, updated 2014: <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See *Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support,* which exists as an on-line living document: [www.diplomatshandbook.org](http://www.diplomatshandbook.org). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
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54. [*https://www.dropbox.com/s/hz2wia9b3a94q13/WithoutViolenceMarch2014Taxonomy.pdf*](https://www.dropbox.com/s/hz2wia9b3a94q13/WithoutViolenceMarch2014Taxonomy.pdf) [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
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