Global Violence Reduction Conference 2014

Global Strategies to Reduce Violence By 50% in the Next 30 Years

17 - 19 September 2014
King’s College, University of Cambridge
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Where Do We Want to Get and How? Outlining the Challenges

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ABSTRACT

This talk argues that the global violence prevention field has now reached a crucial phase in its development. If it is to become stronger and more coherent, we should join forces in specifying global baselines and targets for violence prevention in the next 30 years, identifying the scientific and political prerequisites for having those baselines and targets fully owned by global and national stakeholders, and preparing a road map for how to get there. The talk presents hypothetical targets and baselines, reviews the adequacy of the scientific knowledge available to support baseline and target setting, links violence prevention to proposed post-2015 development goals, and outlines a political process to push violence prevention higher up the global political agenda.

SUMMARY

1. Introduction

In discussing global strategies to halve violence in the next 30 years, this paper focuses on interpersonal violence, as distinct from self-directed violence and collective violence. Interpersonal violence includes child maltreatment, youth violence, intimate partner violence, sexual violence and elder abuse. Self-directed violence refers to suicidal behaviour and self-mutilation. Collective violence refers to war and other forms of violence by a group in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives. While each category can lead to the other, and there are many shared causes, interpersonal violence has emerged as a focus of science-based prevention efforts, and a priority concern for many international organizations. This is because interpersonal violence affects a large percentage of the population in every country; it is a risk factor for other lifelong health and social problems; it has substantial economic and social costs; it is highly predictable in terms of person, time and place; there is clear evidence for its preventability, and its prevention and control is firmly within the remit of national governments. This paper will also refer to the global violence prevention field as the main target of efforts to reduce violence. The global violence prevention field consists of international actors that are financially, intellectually and institutionally interlinked and have a common focus on preventing interpersonal violence. The purposes of the field include supporting national actors in countries to strengthen their violence prevention efforts, producing global public knowledge such as standards and the identification of priorities, strengthening capacity, and providing technical assistance. While relevant to all countries, the field’s main focus is on low- and middle-income countries where over 80% of the global population live and where violence prevention is least developed.

The global violence prevention field emerged between the 1970s and the late 1990s when several United Nations (UN) agencies established mandates to address interpersonal violence, and science-based and human-rights based approaches emerged as the main frameworks by which the field is informed. From around 2000 to 2010, the field entered a normative phase of development, as organizations began publishing guidance documents on how to prevent violence. Starting in 2011, the field is currently in an operational phase, with the emphasis having shifted from “what should be done” to “how
can we do it?” This has led to priorities for the field being re-defined as ensuring that partners in low- and middle-income countries are better supported to act on the available evidence for violence prevention, and that large-scale outcome evaluation trials of promising violence prevention strategies be supported in low- and middle-income countries.

This paper argues that the global violence prevention field has now reached a crucial phase in its development. If it is to become stronger and more coherent, we should join forces in specifying global baselines and targets for violence prevention in the next 30 years, identifying the scientific and political prerequisites for having those baselines and targets fully owned by global and national stakeholders, and preparing a road map for how to get there.

2. Baselines and Targets

Any plan for reducing global violence requires baselines and targets for the outcomes (i.e. less violence of different types), for the processes by which the outcomes will be achieved (e.g. more prevention programmes), and a timeline. This section illustrates what such targets and baselines might look like. The conference title “reducing global violence by 50% in the next 30 years” provides an overarching goal and a timeline, and, based on what is known today, a more detailed, set of hypothetical global violence reduction baselines and targets might be the following.

➢ Outcomes:
  o In 2014, the global homicide rate is 8 per 100,000 and by 2044 this must be reduced to 4 per 100,000.
  o In 2014, the prevalence of child physical abuse is 25%, and in 2044 this must be reduced to 12%.
  o In 2014, one in three women experience intimate partner violence, and in 2044 this must be reduced to one in six women.
  o And so on – additional targets could cover other types of violence such as youth violence, sexual violence, and elder abuse, and rates of police-/state-inflicted violence.

➢ Processes:
  o In 2014, 20% of all new parents globally have access to parenting support programmes and by 2044 this must be increased to 60%.
  o In 2014, life-skills training is available to 30% of all children and by 2044 this must be increased to 80%.
  o In 2014, 20% of the world’s population is covered by unemployment insurance and in 2044 this must be increased to 60%.
  o In 2014, 20% of the world’s population live in societies where evidence-based policing is practised, and by 2044 this must be increased to 60%.
  o In 2014, 70% of people in the world live in societies with income inequality coefficients of 50 or more, and by 2044 this must be reduced to 20%.
  o And so on – further targets could cover additional violence prevention programmes and other social determinants such as contraception, access to schooling, and alcohol control policies.

Of course, moving from hypothetical to actual baselines and targets owned by all stakeholders in global violence prevention is a complex endeavour. Section 3 therefore explores the extent to which we have enough scientific knowledge to define quantitative baselines and targets, and Section 4 reviews some of the political prerequisites for the establishment of global plans.

3. Scientific Prerequisites for setting Baselines and Targets

Measurement of violence. Although we have global, and in some instances regional and national prevalence estimates for homicide and several types of non-fatal violence, many are based on thin data and have large confidence intervals. An intermediate goal must therefore be to improve the measurement of violence, in particular non-fatal violence, using methods that can produce findings that are comparable over time and between settings. In respect of homicide, the field should decide whether the WHO Global Health Estimates (available for all countries) are already good enough to inform baseline and target setting, or if they too require further refinement.

Effectiveness of specific violence prevention programmes. Examples of specific violence prevention programmes include nurse home visiting programmes, life skills training for children, school-based dating violence prevention programmes, and hotspot policing that targets high-risk places and times. There is strong evidence for the effectiveness of several such programmes in preventing violence, although to date almost all the evidence is from high-income countries. More studies in low- and middle-
income settings, where levels of informal social control, police legitimacy, social protection and overall governance capacity are different, are needed to identify which of these evidence-based programmes should be selected for a global plan.

Effectiveness of non-specific social and economic policies. David Finkelhor and others have noted that programmes which are not specifically about child maltreatment (such as early childhood development or family planning) may be more effective in preventing child maltreatment than programmes specifically designed to do so (e.g. parenting education). Given the strong associations between most types of violence and factors such as economic inequality, access to and misuse of alcohol, educational attainment, and gender equity, it is reasonable to extend this line of reasoning to violence in general. Indeed, most organizations that advocate for violence prevention argue that specific programmes should be implemented within a context of broader policy reform that will create a pacifying society and ensure sustained low levels of violence. However, given that violence seems to increase in some countries as they move from low- to middle-income status, it cannot be assumed that non-specific social and economic policies are a panacea, and we need more knowledge to decide on what the balance in any global plan should be between specific and non-specific violence reduction measures.

Measurement of what’s being done to address violence. Indicators for national plans and coordination mechanisms, data collection mechanisms, and policies, laws, prevention programmes and victim services that can be repeatedly measured are essential. The Global status report on violence prevention 2014, currently being finalized by WHO, UNODC and UNDP, provides an example of how violence prevention efforts can be measured. Monitoring tools such as this have a dual function, on the one hand collecting information about what is being done, and on the other providing an opportunity to remind governments about their role in preventing violence.

Scientific capacity. Developing national action plans, coordination mechanisms, information systems, policies, programmes, services, and laws to prevent violence cannot occur without the requisite human and institutional capacity to do so. A final prerequisite is therefore training of the violence prevention work force and the building up institutions and networks to support the work.

4. Political Prerequisites for Setting Baselines and Targets

Governments, professional associations and non-government organizations (NGOs) play key roles in the establishment and implementation of global plans. Ensuring that these sectors are fully invested in realising the overarching violence reduction goal and achieving the same set of targets is critical. Clearly, while global violence prevention actors cannot directly shape national government policy, they can shape their own organizational policies. A priority should therefore be to ensure that all international organizations – be they UN bodies, professional associations or NGOs – are explicitly mandated to engage in violence prevention work. For example, a May 2014 World Health Assembly resolution calls on WHO to develop a “global plan of action to strengthen the role of the health system within a national multisectoral response to address interpersonal violence”. The health sector is just one part of the violence prevention field, and if other relevant UN agencies - such as UNICEF, UNODC, UNDP, UNESCO and UN Women - also have clear mandates to address violence then the global prevention field will be significantly stronger.

5. What is to be Done?

Many actors are working to advance global violence prevention, most of them are doing so at least in the knowledge of what the other actors are doing, and there is close collaboration in several instances. Perhaps this level of loose cohesion is adequate, and we should simply continue as before.

Alternatively, it can be argued that the global violence prevention should intensify advocacy for high-level political prioritisation at a global level, in its own right as a topic deserving of its own global plan of action, and with financial resources that are commensurate with the size of the problem. If we think this is the route to take, then we need to identify a country or small group of countries that will call for a high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly on the prevention of violence. The outcome of this meeting should be a political declaration that requests countries to:

- Strengthen capacities to address and effectively prevent violence, including through the provision of increased and sustained financial resources, and
- Develop, strengthen and implement multisectoral action plans and policies to reduce risk factors for violence and promote pacifying societies;

and requests the international community to:
➢ Prepare recommendations for a set of voluntary targets for the prevention of violence, and develop and adopt a global plan of action to prevent violence.

Examples of where this approach has succeeded in galvanizing global prevention activity include road traffic injury prevention, and noncommunicable disease prevention.

Of course, the global violence prevention field must make as much headway as possible through the opportunities that may arise if several goals and targets being discussed for inclusion in the post-2015 development agenda survive into the final version. The Millennium Development Goals came to be reflected in national policies and international financial aid flows, and if the post-2015 development goals are similarly influential they can play a pivotal role in the future of global violence prevention. Among the post-2015 draft goals and targets relevant to violence prevention are:

➢ Proposed goal 5. Attain gender equality, empower women and girls everywhere:
   o End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls;
   o Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spaces and end their trafficking and sexual exploitation;
   o Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilations.

➢ Proposed goal 16. Achieve peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and effective and capable institutions:
   o Reduce levels of violence and halve related death rates everywhere, and
   o End abuse, exploitation, and violence against children everywhere.

Relevant process goals and targets are:

➢ Proposed goal 3. Attain healthy lives for all:
   o Reduce substantially morbidity and mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment, promote mental health and wellbeing, and strengthen prevention and treatment of narcotic drug, alcohol, and substance abuse.

➢ Proposed goal 4. Provide quality education and life-long learning opportunities for all:
   o Provide all children access to quality early childhood care and pre-primary education, and
   o Integrate into education programs knowledge and skills necessary for sustainable development, human rights, gender equality, promoting a culture of peace and non-violence and culture’s contribution to sustainable development.

➢ Proposed goal 10. Reduce inequality within and between countries:
   o Sustain income growth of the bottom 40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average.

Global violence prevention actors should do all they can to advocate for the retention of these draft post-2015 development goals by highlighting their value for violence prevention and broader social development goals, and by practically demonstrating how they can be achieved and how they can be monitored.

Conclusion

If this analysis is correct, then the global violence prevention field is poised to achieve greater visibility, and has the potential to achieve greater coherence and power. But this will only happen if all the actors in the field push towards a common goal. From WHO’s side, December 2014 will see the launch of the first Global status report on violence prevention. The findings of the report are relevant to national, regional and global violence prevention efforts. Across all these levels, they offer an unprecedented opportunity for violence prevention stakeholders to come together and step up their activities and investments to a level commensurate with the burden and severity of the problem. Launch of the report thus represents another opportunity for the global violence prevention field to grow, and it will hopefully inspire complementary initiatives from other sectors.
Linking Developmental Science and Prevention Research to Intervene More Effectively in Child Development

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Abstract

Despite important strides forward in global efforts to improve opportunities to promote early childhood development (ECD) and initiatives to prevent violence against children (VAC) these two fields have largely operated in isolation of one another. In reality VAC is a risk factor for ECD and poor family conditions and parenting give rise to greater risk for violence against children. Preventing VAC and promoting ECD share many common elements, including important risk and protective factors and programmatic and policy responses. A greater awareness is needed of the overlap between poor ECD and risk of VAC with attention to opportunities for shared understanding in approaches and efforts to reduce violence and promote ECD. Important links between these conditions and outcomes will be presented along with preliminary efforts on the development of a family-based preventive intervention to promote healthy parenting, reduce conflict and promote ECD among families facing multiple adversities in Rwanda. A family home visiting model, originally developed and evaluated for families affected by HIV/AIDS is now being adapted to focus on families in extreme poverty raising children ages 0-3 which with support from the World Bank and the Rwandan government is being integrated into the Social Protection System. Such integrated programs hold tremendous promise for advancing a joint agenda for prevention of VAC and the promotion of ECD. The presentation will conclude with recommendations for research, policy and practice.

Summary

This talk orients itself to the conference topic of How to Reduce Violence by 50% in the next 30 Years by focusing heavily on prevention and working with at-risk families in low and middle income countries (LMICS) early on. It is directed at the situation of violence against children but nested within a larger ecological framing of understanding violence prevention wherein we recognize that external stressors such as poverty and social isolation have cascading effects on family violence and also on violence against children. Some basic background on the scope of the problem of poor child development and mental health outcomes in children facing adversity will be presented as well as some information on causes and risk factors that link both ECD and VAC. In particular, this talk will focus on family based prevention and the need for multi-level and integrated responses the work across sectors. Violence prevention must start early. The promotion of child development and the prevention of violence...
have shared risk and protective factors. Recognizing these synergies can help us to maximize resources and work across sectors and in a manner that focuses on prevention. Core recommendations to policy makers include: 1) the prevention of violence against children must start early. 2) Both ECD promotion and violence prevention must work with the entire family system as well as the larger social ecology of other families, communities as well as cultural and societal attitudes about violence. 3) An understanding of the social determinants of health and a basic human security approaches to understanding violence prevention must also be advanced. We cannot understand the roots of violence without understanding whether caregivers and children have their basic security needs met including efforts to reduce poverty and increase access to basic services. 4) Violence prevention must work intergenerationally. The mechanisms by which the march of violence moves from one generation to the next are increasingly becoming articulated. We must capitalize on this evidence-base in order to inform intervention development. 5) Policy makers and donors have a tremendous role to play in advancing the evidence-base and applied research on the integration of ECD promotion and VAC prevention. This means that greater policy and donor attention needs to be paid to rigorous research on these topics. 6) Finally, conjoint efforts to promote ECD and prevent VAC must anticipate and attend to implementation challenges and in order to ensure good scale up of evidence based approaches globally, similar research attention must be directed at implementation science on these critical topics. To illuminate some of the issues that arise, the presentation will share experiences from the piloting of a family-based preventive intervention for families facing compound adversity in Rwanda. An ongoing initiative supported by the World Bank and Rwanda’s flagship Social Protection initiative, the Vision Umerenge (VUP) will integrate this ECD and family strengthening intervention into targeting and ongoing services delivered via the social protection system. Lessons learned to date and the potential of such integrated interventions will be discussed along with the key policy recommendations presented above.

Key Recommendations

1) The prevention of violence against children must start early and work with the entire family system as well as the larger social ecology of other families, communities as well as cultural and societal attitudes about violence.

2) Efforts to promote ECD and prevent violence against children must be linked and integrated to maximize benefits.

3) An understanding of the social determinants of health and a basic human security approaches to understanding violence prevention must also be advanced. We cannot understand the roots of violence without understanding whether caregivers and children have their basic security needs met including efforts to reduce poverty and increase access to basic health services.

4) Violence prevention must work intergenerationally. The mechanisms by which violence moves from one generation to the next are increasingly becoming articulated. We must capitalize on this evidence-base in order to inform intervention development and focus on issues such as mental health and parental self-regulation in our integrated ECD-VAC interventions.

5) Policy makers and donors have a tremendous role to play in advancing the evidence-base and applied research on the integration of ECD promotion and VAC prevention. This means that greater policy and donor attention needs to be paid to rigorous evaluation research on these topics and implementation science to ensure successful scale up and sustainment of evidence based practices to reduce violence globally.
Adolescence: A Critical Period in Reducing Abuse and Exploitation in Low- and Middle-Income Countries

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ABSTRACT

There are 1.2 billion people aged 10-19 years in the world and the majority of them live in low- and middle-income countries. Adolescence is a critical developmental stage where notable changes are occurring in the brain together with the biological changes of puberty making the adolescent acutely sensitive to the environment where they live, work and grow. It is also the time when accumulated risks from childhood and/or adolescent-onset risky behaviors shape adult well-being and ultimately the next generation. This period is marked by vulnerability to both victimization and offending. Prevalence studies of the burden of abuse in the adolescent period show high rates of sexual, physical and emotional abuse. Adolescents are also an increasing target for exploitation and trafficking. There are similarities and differences in the risk and protective factors between low- and middle-income countries and high-income countries. There have been few studies on the effective primary prevention programs on reducing adolescent experience of abuse in LAMIC countries and these have evaluated structural interventions such as conditional cash transfers, access to education and employment. Majority of the research on primary prevention have been in high income countries. Much still need to be learned with regards implementation research. Recommendations for post-2015 MDGs are universal secondary education for boys and girl and for universal access to mental health. It is further recommended that reorganization of services is necessary to increase integration and collaboration of sectors that target common outcomes. Prevention and implementation research capacity of low- and middle-income countries need to be developed.

SUMMARY

Introduction

There are 1.8 billion people aged 10-24 years in the world and nearly 90% live in low-income and middle-income countries where they constitute the majority of the population (Sawyer, Afifi, et al 2012). Around 1 in 6 persons in the world is an adolescent: that is 1.2 billion people aged 10 to 19 years. Adolescence is a critical developmental stage where notable transformations are occurring in the brain and together with the other biological changes of puberty interact with cultural, economic, and psychosocial forces to shape how the adolescent think, feel and behave (Spear, 2013). Adolescence is the time of increased risk-taking, sensation seeking and where reward has more salience than punishment. It is during these years when risks for injury and mental
disorders are highest. Depression is the top cause of illness and disability among adolescents and suicide is the third cause of death. According to WHO (2014) violence is a leading cause of death of this age group. An estimated 180 adolescents die every day as a result of interpersonal violence. Around 1 of every 3 deaths among adolescent males in the low-and middle-income countries in the WHO Americas Region is due to violence. Globally, some 30% of girls aged 15 to 19 experience violence by a partner.

Effects of abuse and violence that may have occurred during childhood or during the adolescent period can manifest as health risk behaviors such as early initiation of sex, multiple sex partners, smoking and substance misuse, teen pregnancy (Ramiro, et al 2010). It could also lead to mental, emotional and behavioral problems such as depression, anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, conduct disorder and school drop-out. Unhealthy patterns established in adolescence as well as effects of the maltreatment in childhood can disrupt the physiologic functions of the brain leading to chronic diseases affecting the different body systems such as the cardiovascular, immune and endocrine systems in adulthood (Shonkoff, et.al. 2009). Furthermore, Currie and Widom’s research (2010) indicate that adults who were abused as children have lower levels of education, employment, earnings and assets.

Interventions during adolescence can decrease or reverse the impact of violence and abuse that occurred during childhood or adolescent-onset and prevent them from impacting the adult years and ultimately the future generation. The maturing adolescent brain is still undergoing a lot of pruning and rewiring and new evidence point to possible opportunities for epigenetic change that could shed new light on Freud’s view that adolescence provides a “second chance” (Uhlhaas, Singer, 2011); adding a neuroscience perspective on WHO’s “A Second Chance in the Second Decade” (WHO, 2014).

**Burden of Abuse of Children & Adolescents in LAMIC**

A multi-country Violence Against Children Survey initiative supported by UNICEF, CDC and country partners seeks to provide for the first time comparable national population-based estimates of the magnitude of the problem faced by young people in low-income and middle-income countries. Results from countries in Africa such as Tanzania, Kenya and Zimbabwe show high prevalence rates of abuse for both males and females: 30% of females, 9%-18% of males experienced sexual violence before the age of 18 years; Physical abuse rates range from 48%-73% for both males and females. Majority of the sexual violence perpetrators were boyfriends or peers. Age of the first incident of sexual violence was clustered around 14-17 years old, again both for females and males. Majority of the sexual abuse was repeated and the teens experienced more than one type of abuse. Results of the VAC Survey done in Cambodia and Indonesia have yet to be published. There are many LAMIC countries who are in the process of starting their VAC survey.

A review of the research done in the East Asia and the Pacific Region on the prevalence of child maltreatment (UNICEF, 2012) show a wide range of prevalence for the different forms of abuse depending on country, definitions of abuse and sampling method. For example for physical abuse the prevalence rates ranged from 10% in China to 30.3% in Thailand; sexual abuse, in studies with probability samples, prevalence rates ranged from 1.7% in Hong Kong to 11.6% in the Pacific Islands. A meta-analysis of 27 studies of child sexual abuse in China (Finkelhor, Dunne, Ji, 2013) showed estimates that were lower than international estimates, CSA for females in the pooled estimate was 15.3% (95% Cl=12.6-18.0) but not significantly. For penetrative CSA for females, the pooled estimate was 1% (95% Cl= 0.7-1.3) significantly lower than the international estimate of 15.1%. Chinese men reported significantly less penetrative CSA but significantly more total CSA than international estimates.

LAMIC countries are also very vulnerable to human trafficking both for labor and commercial sexual exploitation, pornography and now cybersex. The 2012 UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons show a rising increase in child victims form 20% in 2003-2006 to 27% between 2007 and 2010. Trafficking of girls, mostly adolescents, accounts for 15-20% of the total victims and represents the second largest category of detected trafficking victims globally after adult women. Sexual exploitation is the most frequent form. Trafficking originating from East Asia remains the most conspicuous globally with victims found in 64 countries in all regions and often detected in large numbers (Fedotov, 2012). Child labor continues to have a high prevalence in LAMIC countries. UNICEF estimates that around 150 million children aged 5-14 in developing countries, about 16 per cent of all children in this age group, are involved in child labour (UNICEF 2011 State of the World’s Children). ILO estimates that throughout the world, around 215 million children under 18 work, many full-time. In Sub Saharan African 1 in 4 children aged 5-17 work, compared to 1 in 8 in Asia Pacific and 1 in 10 in Latin America (ILO 2010 Facts on Child Labour).

**Risk and Protective Factors**

These can be categorized into structural and individual risk and protective factors. The most accepted framework is the socio- ecological approach.
which originated from Bronfenbrenner (1979). This theory explains child development based on multiple levels of embedded systems. These levels range from the proximal child environment e.g. family, peers, neighborhood to more distal social structures such as as laws, policies and culture. In the present world, war and natural disasters are the “new normal” for many of the children and adolescents in LAMIC. Many of the risk and protective factors affect different outcomes of health, social welfare, education and not just child protection. No single risk or protective factor can determine outcome. It is the cumulative risks and their interplay with protective factors that determine outcome. In most LAMIC, poverty and income inequality are overarching risks. Following Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, there is a threshold for survival needs to be met before meaningful participation as a citizen can happen. Good governance is a structural protective factor while corruption is a risk factor. Other structural protective factors that have been shown to affect adolescent well-being are access to education and employment for young people.

Adolescents around the world are similar in terms of their developmental needs. For example studies on the neuroscience of the brain and the effects of incarceration on the development of young adolescents has led to the passage of the Comprehensive Juvenile Justice Law in the Philippines which increased the age of criminal responsibility from 9 years to 15 years. However, the age of statutory rape in the Philippines is still below 12 years. In explaining the lower rates of sexual abuse in China, Finkelhor, Ji, Mikton and Dunne (2013) postulated that Confucian family values, definitions of masculinity and a collectivist culture may be protective. The UN Multi-country cross-sectional study on men and violence in Asia & the Pacific (Fulu, Jewkes, Roselli, Garcia-Moreno, 2013) showed that factors related to the perpetration of IPV were related to gender and relationship practices followed by experiences of childhood trauma (abuse & neglect), alcohol misuse and depression, low education, poverty, and involvement in gangs and fights with weapons. Additional factors in non-partner rape included masculinities emphasizing heterosexual performance, dominance over women and low empathy. A review of 12,000 cases in the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Management Information System database on the factors leading to both abuse and risk for re-abuse in the last 14 years consistently came up with 4 factors: poverty, disability, poor parenting, drugs and alcohol. Mental health problems affect 10-20% of children and adolescents worldwide. The range of the reported prevalence in LAMIC, however, is very wide from 161% to 39 4% (Kieling, Baker-Henningham et. al., 2011). The lack of mental health services including rehabilitation for substance and alcohol misuse in LAMIC has serious consequences for prevention and intervention programs.

**Primary Prevention of Victimization and Offending**

The few primary prevention studies with adolescents in LAMIC that have been evaluated have used structural factors in implementing prevention programs. McQueston, Silverman and Glassman (2012) in their review on what works with teen pregnancy found that interventions that encouraged school attendance proved more effective in reducing overall adolescent fertility. They recommend that policy makers should expand educational opportunities for girls and create incentives for school continuation, such as conditional cash transfer payments or the expectation of a worthwhile job after graduation. The World Bank-funded Zomba Cash Transfer Program in southern Malawi (Ashburn & Warner, 2010) used cash transfers to increase school attendance, to be less sexually active and may also have led to a reduction in transactional sex. The use of cash transfers in humanitarian emergencies has also been shown to promote psychosocial well-being of both mothers and children (Thompson, 2014).

Majority of the studies on primary prevention programs that targeted proximal factors have been done in High Income countries. Prevention science is highly developed and Nation et. al.(2003) has identified nine principles of prevention that were strongly associated with positive effects: 1. Comprehensive; 2. Appropriately timed; 3. Utilized varied teaching methods; 4. Had sufficient dosage; 5. Were administered by well-trained staff; 6. Provided opportunities for positive relationships; 7. Were socio-culturally relevant; 8. Were theory-driven, and 9. Included outcome evaluation. Promising and effective programs include efforts to improve social, emotional, behavioral competencies; efforts to improve family functioning and parenting practices and school programs to address gender norms and attitudes. While so much has been learned about prevention, an area of research that has not been widely applied is that of Implementation Science: what actions are necessary to ensure that practices can be implemented with fidelity in real-world settings and in cultures that may be different from where it was intended. This applies to both complex programs and evidence-based “kernels” or “fundamental units of behavior influence” that are the basis for a number of evidence-based programs (Embry & Biglan, 2008). Other strategies that have been successfully used in health such as task shifting and building non-specialist capacity need evaluation when used in the delivery of prevention programs. Preventive and translational research capacities for prevention of child and adolescent abuse in LAMIC is still in its early stages.
Recommendations

Much has already been said about the world post-2015. MDG 1 (eradicate poverty), MDG 2 (Universal primary education), MDG 3 (Gender equality & empower women), MDG 4 (reduce child mortality) and MDG 5 (improve maternal health) and MDG 6 (combat HIV-AIDS) all share common risk factors for child and adolescent abuse and neglect. The inclusions of the reduction of violence against children and adolescents as a goal post-2015 is a natural fit. To achieve that I propose the following:

1. Universal secondary education for boys and girls. Completion of high school has already been shown to protect against early marriage, early sexual initiation, decrease infant, adolescent and maternal mortality.

2. Universal access to mental health. Mental health problems are both an outcome and risk factor for victimization, perpetration of violence, poor physical health, and unemployment among others.

3. Reorganization of services to increase integration and collaboration of services where common outcomes are targeted by different sectors. This may mean having “child protection services” within each agency with a broad definition of “child protection that spans from prevention to intervention.

4. Collaborations to increase capacity in prevention and implementation research. These can be North-South collaborations or South-South collaborations.
Dilemmas in International Strategies to Reduce Violence Against Children

David Finkelhor
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ABSTRACT

In this session, I will discuss dilemmas raised by various efforts to mobilize international action around child abuse and neglect (CAN). I start by proposing a typology of international mobilization strategies, noting that initiatives to promote CAN programming in new settings have tended to emphasize one of three vectors: governments, professionals or international NGOs. There are pros and cons to each emphasis. I also review the debates around some of the following dilemmas: Should Low-Income countries (LICs) be a top priority for CAN mobilization? Are there cultural and institutional capacities that need to be present in a country in order for CAN programs to work or be ethical? Are some CAN programs more likely to be internationally transferable than others and why so? Has the field adequately considered whether non-CAN programming (like family planning) might actually be more effective at preventing maltreatment than CAN programming? Does the field give adequate acknowledgement that policies and practices emanating from high resourced and Western countries may not always be the best to disseminate? Are we relying too much on a model of program trans-plantation over a model of local cultivation? Should we aim for modest rather than ambitious accomplishments in international mobilization? How much emphasis should be put on the priority dissemination of evidence-based programming? I will make suggestions for more a more evidence-based approach to these questions, though the study of successes and failures in this and other international mobilization efforts.

SUMMARY

Initiatives to promote CAN programming in new settings have tended to emphasize one of three vectors: governments, professionals or international NGOs. There are pros and cons to each emphasis.

The Government Vector

The targeting of governments is an obvious policy strategy and reflects particularly the strategies of UNICEF and the Together for Girls initiative as well as the work of the UN Commission on the Rights of Children and the World Health Organization. The logic to such efforts is that if a government makes CAN a policy priority, it will likely commit resources to set up programs, change laws, train professionals and affect conditions for young people across a wide expanse of the population. Governments in many countries have public health bureaucracies that have broad jurisdictions, are part of international collaborations and could be potentially mobilized to take on child maltreatment in addition to other health problems. One component in this strategic approach is to make arguments that might be particularly persuasive to governments, like studies showing high population prevalence, potential cost savings and broader economic and social benefits. Another component to this strategy is to oblige governments to take action through involvement in international conventions, such as the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Despite such apparent successes, the strategy has pitfalls. Governments can be difficult to influence and slow to move. Some do not want sensitive issues exposed. Their commitments can be fickle, so that support for a policy at one point can
disappear quickly. Political regimes may change, and new politicians may resent and suspect the programs of their predecessor. Governmental policies often carry a lot of political baggage, for example, interest groups that need to be placated or bureaucrats who are arbitrarily favored or alienated. When governments mobilize, they often prioritize political considerations over the evidence base.

The Professional Vector

The targeting of professionals as the agents of mobilization has been the long-term strategy of organizations like ISPCAN, and other international professional groups such as the International Pediatrics Association. Those targets include professionals in fields like pediatrics, social work, psychology and law enforcement. One goal of this strategy has been to recruit and train professionals who will go back to their countries to disseminate information about CAN, implement programs and in turn recruit and train more colleagues. There appear to have been some notable successes to this strategy in generating child maltreatment programs in countries like Malaysia, Estonia, and Saudi Arabia.

A key element in this logic model is to utilize professional ambitions and ideals. Modern professional training puts a premium on adoption of the most modern practice, and promotes staying current as important to professional competence. Professionals are often motivated to be seen as leaders in their profession by bringing home this new knowledge.

The strategy has some obvious strengths. Given a growing pool of professionals in many countries, there is often at least one person who can be interested in this topic. Knowledge transfer is relatively easy because it is done among colleagues who share common values, training, vocabulary and assumptions. The transfers tend to have longevity because the professionals have extended careers in a fixed locale and often rise to positions of prominence over time. This means that much can be done, even in relatively passive political environments. The capacity that is established can last a long time.

There are problems with this strategy as well. Working with isolated professionals, change may be very slow and fragmented. Moreover, child protection is not a self-contained discipline like medicine or education, but is an interdisciplinary field. The knowledge transfer can stay confined within one discipline like social work and not percolate into other fields (like pediatrics) where it is also needed.

The NGO Vector

The third strategy is organized around the fact that large numbers of NGOs operate worldwide to promote a variety of health, economic and social programs and run programs related to them. These organizations frequently have agendas that meld to some degree with the goals of CAN prevention, because they concern related topics such as child health or education or women’s empowerment or AIDS.

There are many virtues to the NGO vector strategy. For one, many NGOs have a great deal of experience in various countries. They often have good reputations, strong networks of in-country collaborators and time-tested methods and programs. The CAN initiatives can benefit from not having to recreate networks. The collaborations may foster important synergies that CAN work would not have on its own, for example helping to reduce unwanted childbearing at the same time as improving parenting practices. The collaborations also forestall competition and rivalries that can develop when new social programs arrive in communities that already have established activists, and the newcomers compete for attention of local officials.

Nonetheless, there are downsides to the NGO strategy as well. One is that in a collaborative effort the CAN programming may not have the same priority or salience. Professionals implementing programs may feel uncomfortable crossing over into fields outside their core expertise. Workers or participants may receive diluted training or may suffer from content overload because too much is being covered. In the end, there may not be enough people in a locality or country with a primary commitment to the CAN goals or practices.

In summary, although multiple mobilization vectors may be an optimal approach, in the real world with limited resources of time, individuals and organizations often have to give priority to one vector over another, but not necessarily based on their likelihood of success. Frequently the choice is based on the skill sets or levers of influence an organization or an individual happens to possess. But large international strategy planners should think through these strategic options in a more systematic way.

First, it may be useful to convene some forums, through meetings and journals, where some of these issues can be more specifically discussed and the issues more carefully conceptualized.

Second, more case studies are needed about the process of mobilization and adoption of CAN practices in various countries. Also more studies of the cultivation of homegrown programs in
unexpected places. Moreover, it is important to have examples of failures as well as successes.

Third, it would be useful to have studies of the dissemination and prevalence of various CAN policies and practices in countries around the world.

Fourth, efforts need to be made to draw on the experience of other health and social problem mobilizations with longer histories.

Fifth, more evaluations are needed of CAN practice in different cultural environments, and evaluations of policies as well as programs.

Sixth, attention might be paid to looking at how countries cluster in terms of cultural and institutional patterns relevant to CAN practice. The distinction between low-income and high-income may not be the most relevant dimension. For example, Gardner et al. found that dimensions related to traditional values about child rearing were more relevant to the success of parenting programs (positively) than economic variables. There may be clusters of countries with particular risk factors or particular commonalities that would suggest particular programming or particular transfer affinities.

Seventh, more attention may need to be placed on the conceptualization, evaluation and development of capacities, including research capacities, that may be required for effective CAN mobilization.
Global Strategies to Reduce Violence Against Women

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ABSTRACT

There are four central tasks in effecting successful global strategies for violence prevention, and underpinning all of these is a need for us to work consistently to reduce fragmentation within the field. These are not essentially new, but we need to change gear and broaden the vision if we are to achieve an ambitious goal of a 50% reduction in violence over 30 years. We need to build our knowledge as a platform for prevention, and recognise the overlaps in drivers of different forms of violence and ensure that learning across areas of violence prevention. We need for inter-disciplinary research that we can build on the strengths and overcome the limitations of each disciplinary perspective. We must build an understanding of how to use evidence to develop stronger interventions, how to use evidence for this, and of the importance of systematically developed, theoretically driven interventions. We need to evaluate interventions and systematically approach intervention development. There are enormous weaknesses in the architecture of violence prevention research and innovation development. We have much to learn here from other fields. We need centres of excellence, coordination of testing and trials so that evaluations are comparable, and development of human resources for this work. A secure funding base is essential. In order to enable uptake and knowledge use, we need first to build an awareness among policy makers, donors and service providers of the poorly understood relationship between primary prevention and responses to violence. We need to build understanding of what does work in primary prevention, as well as what has never been shown to work, and to develop knowledge and build understanding of how to combine interventions to have impact at a population level, and the required institutional delivery mechanisms. This process requires knowledge so we can fluently discuss costs.

SUMMARY

Introduction

Primary prevention is the central challenge for global gender-based violence reduction strategies. To date the predominant focus of action and investment, of both response and car-marked prevention spend, has been in building mechanisms of response to violence against women. Such services and response mechanisms after violence are incredibly important, but these areas of investment are not the avenues through which a 50% global reduction in violence against women will be secured. Globally the violence against women field needs to address the challenge of primary prevention.

In approaching prevention of violence against women it is important to conceptualise the problem. Globally intimate partner violence (IPV) and sexual violence by male non-partners are most highly prevalent. The most recent global systematic reviews show that 30% of women aged 15 and over have ever experienced physical and/or sexual IPV, and 7% of women have ever experienced non-partner sexual violence. Non-partner rape perpetration research has reported lifetime population prevalences among adult men of between 4% (urban Bangladesh) to 41% (Bougainville, Papua New Guinea). There is a strong overlap between these forms of violence both from the perspective of victims and perpetrators, as there is with other forms of violence against women. The latter is mostly sexual slavery/trafficking for sex and a group of harmful traditional practices, some of which are highly prevalent in some parts of the world, including FGM, child marriage and practices such as ukuthwala (Xhosa wife abduction) and Swara (a Pashtun girl-child fine/compensation practice).
Building a knowledge platform

The field of violence against women prevention has been greatly advanced by research from a number of different disciplinary perspectives, but going forward it’s time to change the way we think about knowledge production in violence prevention. One of the central tasks here is to reduce fragmentation. For example, there are specific differences between these different violent practices and other forms of interpersonal violence, but we can gain much by recognising that there are common underlying drivers. Different disciplines have over the years brought different strengths and insights to the field, but most disciplinary perspectives have important limitations. We need much more inter-disciplinary research so we can build on the strengths and avoid becoming conceptually stunted by boundaries of thought within particular fields. For example, standard epidemiological approaches to research have often served to accentuate differences through the reduction of behaviour into measurable units for surveys, and a reluctance to pursue avenues of analysis which deepen understanding of latent (unmeasurable) constructs such as constructions of masculinity and femininity. Regression modelling has often resulted in shopping lists of risk factors, which unless carefully interpreted, can hinder understanding of problems rather than assisting. One of the most important advances in understanding violence causation has been at the nexus of sociology and epidemiology, through the application of gender theory, particularly around masculinities, and the recognition of patterns of risk factors stemming from underlying groups of behaviours which map on to constructions of masculinity. The patterning of these across types of violence enables the opening of new pathways for violence prevention.

Strengthening understanding of how to use evidence in developing interventions

There is an increasing recognition in some quarters of the benefits of systematically developed, theoretically driven interventions, and considerable evidence that when theory is carefully applied, for example in the development by Alice Wellbourn of Stepping Stones, Jackson Katz’s Mentors in Violence Prevention, or Emma Lundqvist and colleagues of the Swedish intervention Machofabriek, the interventions are very much better. Sadly these types of interventions are the exception in the field. It is more commonly characterised by interventions which are cobbled together in a fairly ad hoc way, often not recorded, or also interventions are funded for use, not on merit, but because they have the backing of a powerful funder. Intervention development is both a science and an art, and this is not well recognised. Much of the science can be taught but this needs to be done systematically and there needs to be much wider recognition of the need for a robust theory of change to underpin interventions.

We further need to extend understanding of what it means to use theory in intervention development, beyond identifying risk factors. Good use of theory also encompasses theory of the problem to be tackled, for example understanding in a broad theoretical sense how gender inequity operates, or for social norm change interventions, understanding how culture operates to through complex systems of communication in order to create a ‘norm’ in behaviour or attitude. We also need to understand better what methods are most appropriate for engaging different people in processes of behaviour change in different environments, and to balance the desire for replicability with acknowledging complexity and difference between contexts in which we try to intervene. At the heart here lies the question: does one size fit all? One assumes the answer is ‘no’, but the types of difference that may need to be accommodated in programming is incompletely understood. We may readily acknowledge that interventions in deeply traditional Islamic societies need to involve the clergy and not engage with alcohol and dating violence, however we struggle more to understand how interventions to prevent violence against women in gang ridden areas may contrast with those of less violent and more settled communities.

Generation of knowledge of ‘what works?’ : time for an intervention pipeline

Comparison of the field of violence prevention intervention development with that of, for example, drug discovery, highlights enormous weaknesses in the global architecture of the violence prevention field. The funding and organisation of violence prevention intervention development has been such that the field is hugely fragmented. There is no recognisable product pipeline, only a small handful of organisations globally have ever produced (or adapted) more than one theoretically grounded intervention. Proper intervention development is expensive, research evaluating interventions is highly complex, relatively costly and complex to manage. Replication in different settings is essential as nature of the product and effectiveness will vary between settings, and careful interpretation is needed to understand whether intervention failure in one setting is a product of the setting or reflects structural weaknesses in the intervention. Lack of funds has resulted in the field inherently being set up to produce sub-optimally. The problems this generates
are well recognised in other areas of research. For example, those developing and evaluating interventions cannot afford to fail, because their further funding depends on the publications of results from previous evaluations. Because the intervention field is small and fundraising is essential interventions are often promoted as 'successful' (or good practice) well before they are evaluated and then it is almost impossible to acknowledge weakness when evaluation results are published. The shortage of funds is resulting in under-powered studies and resultant claims that interventions would have worked if only evaluations had been larger. These problems can best be addressed by providing large and long term funding for centres of excellence in intervention development, which develop and improve multiple interventions, with some coordination of testing and trials so that evaluations are comparable, and a focus on development of appropriate human resources.

Knowledge dissemination and scale up

The first really systematic attempt to build prevention of violence against women and girls through research on a large scale is the DFID-funded ‘What Works to Prevent Violence’ programme. A key element of this involves disseminating knowledge generated and packaged through the programme. The first step here involves building awareness among policy makers, donors and service providers of what primary prevention is, as this is very poorly understood in many quarters, and in particular the relationship between primary prevention and responses to violence is poorly understood. There is a need to encourage funding, use and scale up of interventions that do have an evidence-base to demonstrate effectiveness, and also for there to be better knowledge of what has never been shown to work, so that these are not continuously funded. There is also a need to know how to combine interventions to have impact at a population level and what institutional delivery mechanisms need to be in place for this. Concerted violence prevention requires a large number of NGOs and Government departments and agencies to work together in different roles. This is essential as the task is far too great for any one agency or organisation to shoulder. How to optimise this at a national level is a challenge, and one which itself requires research so that countries, like Australia who are leading the field can share positive and negative experiences with others. The challenge in low and middle income countries is that the same gender norms that feed the problem of violence against women and girls pervade policymaking arenas and in turn provide powerful obstacles to addressing violence prevention. A requirement that countries reported in their violence against women prevention spend (and response) could be very powerful. Violence prevention advocates also need to know the costs of the work that is promoted and to be able to engage in a coherent discussion of both costs and benefits.

Conclusions

A central requirement for effective work to reduce violence against women by 50% is that we reduce fragmentation within the field: across different forms of interpersonal violence, academic disciplines, linking theorists and practitioners, practitioners and evaluators, and all of the above to policy makers. We need to build a broad understanding of the value of scientific and theoretically based interventions, and we must enter a new era with large and sustainable funding streams so that we can build expertise and knowledge, and approach its translation into practice, in a much more coherent way.

References


Reducing Homicide by 50% in 30 Years: Universal Mechanisms and Evidence-Based Public Policy

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ABSTRACT

Homicide is probably the only type of violence where the quality of indicators is good enough to define targets and to monitor progress at a global, national and regional level. Evidence from many places in the world suggests that reductions by about 2.5% per year – needed for a 50% drop in 30 years - are feasible and realistic. A public policy framework for achieving such a goal needs to overcome the traditional cleavage between the more micro-level evidence typically produced by randomized trials and the macro-level evidence of what drives population-level differences. I will suggest three universal mechanisms that have been involved in any major homicide decline and that can guide policies aimed at reducing homicide: Better governance and the rule of law; the promotion of self-control and discipline; and cultural change towards higher civility. These stipulated universal mechanisms must be translated into actual prevention strategies.

SUMMARY

The question of my talk is: What public policy strategies can help to halve worldwide homicide rates from the current level of about 6.4 per 100,000 to about 3.2 per 100,000 in 2040? The focus on homicide has several reasons: First, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (2000) show that defining global development goals such as halving extreme poverty can mobilize government action, release innovative ideas, and free important resources. Such goals need a benchmark to measure failure or success in regions, countries and cities. And the only indicator good enough to serve this purpose in the field of violence reduction are probably homicide data.

Second, the question of the conference requires knowledge about policies that can prompt population-level change. For almost all forms of violence this knowledge hardly exists, since most evidence comes from small-scale randomized trials. And whether the short-term effects typically found in such studies generalize to population level change is largely unknown. For homicide, in contrast, several research traditions have examined mechanisms associated with macro-level change in many places and different periods in time; this includes cross-national comparative work, comparative historical studies, or case studies of cities or countries. Its findings provide one of the foundations for understanding the policy mechanisms likely to be associated with major drops in serious violence.

Third, a conceptual focus on homicide does not mean that other aspects of violence are left unconsidered. Strategies that help to reduce homicide tend to be broad and general, and will likely also lead to reductions in other types of violence. This
especially holds for violence in public space including robbery. But success in reducing homicide is often also accompanied by declines in assault, child maltreatment, and domestic violence.

What Would a 50% Decline Mean?

A worldwide decline by 50% over 30 years equals an average reduction of 2.3% per year. However, any reduction will have to occur primarily in the countries where present levels are highest. Current homicide rates vary by a factor of about 1 to 100 at the level of nation states. 36% of the world population lives in countries with a homicide rate below 2 per 100,000. These countries account for only 5.7% of all homicides, meaning that further reductions will only have marginal effects on the world total. In contrast, almost half (45%) of all homicides word-wide are committed in the 23 countries with homicide rates of 20 per 100,000 where only 10% of the world population lives. All are in low and middle income countries in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts must concentrate on these countries and achieve over-proportional reductions there.

Whether homicide rates will be cut by 50% over 30 years is impossible to know. But there is no doubt that it can be achieved: In fact, almost half (45%) of the present world population already lives in societies where the murder rate is below the 2040 target of 3.1 per 100,000. If we understand how these societies got there we can harness this knowledge to inform others. Also, there are many examples in all parts of the world where sustained declines in homicide over several decades have been achieved, often with reductions far larger than 50% within shorter periods of time (see table 1). In fact, in most regions other than Latin America declining trends have predominated over the past 15-20 years. Research by historians, economists, criminologists and public policy experts is beginning to unravel the causes of this drop and why it happens in some places, but not in others. We definitely need more and better knowledge about whether macro-level public policy trends, improved policing, change in cultural beliefs, successes in the control of environmental pathogens such as lead or other factors have contributed to this trend. But undoubtedly homicide rates can be brought down rather quickly, and once underway they tend to continue to decline over longer periods of time.

What Drives Population-level Declines in Homicide?

Where will answers to the question of ‘How to cut levels of violence by half’ come from? Part of the answer will likely result from more and better evaluations of programmes, their implementation in low and middle-income countries, and the aggregation of knowledge through meta-analyses and systematic reviews. But it is unclear whether this will suffice to generate long-term and macro-level dynamics. We also need knowledge derived from research about the mechanisms involved in societal-level variation in homicide, relate them to proximal mechanisms involved in the causation of violence, and encourage public policies that reflect this knowledge.

Across the world the characteristics of homicide in high violence societies differ from those in more pacified societies: In high violence societies the majority of homicides occurs in public space between males. In these contexts many young males are armed and gather in coalitionary groups, sometimes called gangs. In all high-violence societies, also, a large proportion of violence is instrumental: It serves to protect profits from the trading of illegal goods and services, it helps to defend and maintain territories where protection rents are being extracted, and it serves to punish those who don’t comply.

High violence contexts also reliably have a number of characteristics: The state is absent or weak, state representatives are corrupt and serve particularistic needs of their group, the police and the judiciary are ineffective and fail in enforcing the rule of law, and the population lacks trust in the state. Where the state fails to maintain a legitimate and stable order citizens will use violence as self-help and engage in retaliation and vigilante attacks; and gangs will engage in violent conflict over control of lucrative markets in drugs, weapons, prostitution, and illegal immigrants. The general mechanisms of why failing states produce more violence are well understood: Enlightenment philosophers, game theory models, and neuro-cognitive science arrive at the same conclusion: Humans have an tendency to cooperate and care for each other, but whether this tendency prevails depends on the existence of a legal, moral and social order that supports these tendencies.

At the cultural level high violence contexts are characterized by an emphasis on male honor, admiration for physical strength and ruthlessness, the veneration of outlaws and rebels as heroes, the primacy of family, tribal or ethnic allegiances and a deep distrust of state institutions. Pacified societies across the world, in contrast, are characterized by the cultivation of what western thinking has called civil virtues: They include self-control, thrift, conscientiousness, sobriety, integrity, and trustworthiness – any they are usually supported by a dense network of civil society institutions. In psychological research these virtues have sometimes been subsumed under the notion of self-control, a
tendency to control impulses, to resist temptations, to act conscientiously and to plan ahead.

What is Needed to Pacify Societies?

If it happens, a global reduction of homicide rates by 50% over the coming three decades will partly result from dynamics outside the scope of specific policy interventions: This includes an aging population in most high violence societies, progress in medical technology and emergency services, and general trends in global development such as further reductions in absolute poverty, better control over environmental pathogens, and wider availability of social and medical services. However, there are several domains where public policy strategies are likely to make a significant difference. My own reading of the comparative evidence on homicide declines in many societies and different historical periods suggests three broad mechanisms that often play a crucial role: a) increasing confidence that the legal and judicial institutions are fair and will redress wrongs and protect lives and property; b) the promotion of civility through a mix of strategies aimed at increasing social control and inner self-control; and c) coordinated and sustained efforts to raise the moral barriers against violence and cruelty.

Create fair and legitimate institutions that serve citizens and that individuals wish to comply with

Stable states based on good governance are an essential precondition for any reduction in violence. Good governance means accountability, transparency, sustainability and the rule of law in decision-making processes. This includes an authority that enforces rules; a belief that the rules are fair and acceptable; and accepted mechanisms for resolving conflicts. In Nigeria 65% of people believe that the police is corrupt and in Uruguay 70% of adolescents think that the police cannot be trusted. Such conditions of distrust in authorities operate as powerful incentives for violence.

Good governance means good schools for children, the availability of medical services to all, and a functioning infrastructure. But ensuring an effective monopoly of power of the state, based on the endorsement of human rights, promoting the rule of law, and respecting the equal rights of citizens is probably the single most important requirement for an effective reduction in violence, especially in societies with endemic and organized violence. Without the rule of law notions such as children’s rights or women’s rights have no meaning. And any national action plans to reduce violence, whether in schools, social services, or the medical field must be backed by a functioning state. Knowledge about how this can be achieved is still very limited. We need more research about how to combat organized crime, reduce corruption in the justice system as well as in the private sector, improve victim’s access to justice as well as to wider support systems, and make the police more effective. These areas are essential and need to be better integrated with public health approaches to violence such as early childhood interventions, parenting programmes or victim support schemes founded in a coherent action plan. Improving the state's capacity to enforce the rule of law and to make its institutions more legitimate comprises many things. This includes, for example, building trust with communities, better police training, enhancing patrol police’s sense of accountability to the population, increased responsiveness to victims, faster processing of cases in the criminal justice system, and a better use of resources to fight crime. An example is low police clearance rates. The 2013 UNODC has, for the first time, collected comparative data on the likelihood that the perpetrator of a homicide is arrested and subsequently convicted. The findings show considerable disparities. In Western Europe almost all homicides lead to the identification of the perpetrator. In contrast, the police clearance rate in Mexico is just 25%. In Brazil only 5-8% of all homicide cases are recorded as ‘solved’. Such differences are an important problem because they undermine the rule of law and effectively act as an incentive for committing more murders. The state is not the only institution that matters when it comes to providing a fair and legitimate social order. For example, in the modern world schools are the first and most influential institution where children learn about social order, compliance with rules, mechanisms for dealing with conflicts, and the roots of cooperation. Thus, many of the best evidence-based school-based prevention programmes emphasize the importance of supporting positive behaviors consistently, promoting adherence to universal rules based on shared values, and reacting to behavior problems promptly and in ways that support individual development.

Promote self-control and discipline

Many declines of homicide seem to have been accompanied by the diffusion of packages of social control that focused on the promotion of more civilized, disciplined, self-directed and respectful behaviors. Such waves in the diffusion of technologies of social control are not primarily focused on homicide or even serious crime. They are often aimed at eradicating disorderly conduct on the streets, controlling and reducing alcohol consumption, promoting respect and good manners, advancing hard work and respectability, and encouraging cooperation and help. One might call them disciplining revolutions. In Singapore, for
example, the 10-fold decline in homicide since independence (1965) has been linked to the systematic efforts to promote a well-trained and disciplined workforce, active policies to foster community integration, the well-known steps to control anti-social behavior in public space, and active policies to raise standards of civility in public life. At the individual level there exists an established link between lack of self-control and violence. Moreover, the lack of self-control has been associated with a range of long-term negative effects on later life outcomes including poor adult physical health, substance dependence, personal finances and criminal offending outcomes. Also, a range of experimental studies both with universal and high-risk samples suggest that preventive interventions that focus on promoting self-control have a good chance of being successful.

A broad focus on a bundle of strategies that promote abilities of emotional, moral, and cognitive self-regulation at the individual level and strengthen social control mechanisms through norms, laws, and technologies is supported both by individual level observational research, experimental evidence, and macro-level findings. They likely not only reduce violence, but promote a range of positive outcomes. However, more knowledge is needed about how early developmental prevention, parenting support schemes, school-based programmes and targeted interventions can be made more effective and embedded into a coherent public policy strategy.

Change Beliefs about the Rightfulness of Violence

Changing population-level norms and beliefs about all manifestations of violence is an important component of civilizing processes. In Europe, for example, the decline in violence was accompanied by sometimes quite systematic moralizing campaigns that attempted to change the way people thought about violent and antagonizing behavior. In the contemporary world, many forms of violence such as domestic violence against women, corporal punishment, honor killings, female genital mutilation, or sectarian violence are supported by beliefs and norms that justify violence. In Jordan, almost 50% of adolescents believe that killing a woman who has dishonored the family is morally right, and in many regions of the world large proportions of men believe that beating a disobedient wife is justified.

Changing beliefs about violence therefore plays an important part of violence reduction strategies. However, our current understanding of how such changes can be brought about is limited. In a review for the Cochrane Collaboration on media campaigns to reduce the consumption of illicit drugs found no effects whatsoever. The problem probably is that sustained culture change requires more than a series of media campaigns: Their success is dependent on credible, widespread, and active support by pressure groups, including political, religious, and cultural elites. Furthermore, important factors for the success of campaigns for change in violence-related beliefs are the concurrent availability of required services and products, availability of community-based programmes, and policies that support behaviour change. This findings mirrors results from the historical literature: Most of the major violence declines in the past seem to have been accompanied by major moralizing mobilizations, whether directed at fighting the culture of blood revenge, reducing domestic abuse in the late 19th century, stigmatizing alcohol-related violence, or campaigning against corporal punishment. However, to the extent that they had an impact they were accompanied by campaigns by powerful sections the elites who not only produced media output, put also tried to change legislation, provide better services, and produce specific manuals and guidebooks etc.

Conclusion

An endorsement of a measureable target for violence reduction in the post 2015 United Nations Development agenda would be highly desirable. In conjunction with the World Health Assembly resolution and activities by other international organizations this could energize stake-holders at international, national and local levels. The macro-level comparative analysis of societal variation in homicide rates cannot replace the accumulation of evidence from randomized trials, longitudinal studies, and systematic reviews that we urgently need. However, understanding what mechanisms enhanced the ability of societies to control violence is likely as important for answering the question of how we can significantly reduce homicide at the population level as developmental research in psychology is as a basis for designing interventions that target individual behavior. It can serve to outline the general principles that can support broader public policy.
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<th>Country</th>
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<td>3.5 (1955)</td>
<td>0.9 (1990)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>- 3.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.0 (2000)</td>
<td>1.0 (2010)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 6.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2.5 (1985)</td>
<td>0.3 (2012)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>- 7.3%</td>
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<td><strong>Americas</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.0 (1976)</td>
<td>1.5 (2012)</td>
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<td>- 1.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>25.0 (1920)</td>
<td>5.0 (1960)</td>
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<td>- 3.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>83.0 (1991)</td>
<td>35.2 (2009)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>- 4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>30.0 (1955)</td>
<td>4.0 (2011)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>- 3.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9.8 (1991)</td>
<td>5.0 (2009)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>- 3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>80.6 (1991)</td>
<td>24.0 (2009)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>- 6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>60.0 (1995)</td>
<td>31.2 (2011)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>- 4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.9 (1990)</td>
<td>1.1 (2010)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>- 2.7%</td>
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Sources: various sources, references not yet processed.
Principles of Evidence-Based Practice for Youth Violence Prevention: Lessons from Around the World

Nancy Guerra
University of Delaware, Director of the Institute for Global Studies

ABSTRACT

Although there has been a surge in the popularity of evidence-based programs delivered via "blueprints" or guides that must be followed rigorously, in real-world settings this approach has several limitations. First, evidence-based programs that have been implemented in a few settings may not be applicable in different cultures and under different conditions, particularly in low resource countries and settings. Second, evidence-based programs often are quite costly to purchase and implement. Third, they typically require adherence to specific procedures that may not be feasible, particularly when programs are taken to scale. Fourth, there are many regular activities that youth engage in that have potential benefits for violence prevention and reduction, even though they may not have been evaluated as prevention programs per se. This is not to say that model programs are not useful. They are. Rather, as presented in this talk, it also is important to consider evidence-based principles that can guide program development and that can be used to improve quality of a range of programs with potential for youth violence prevention. Examples across different contexts and from different countries are discussed to illustrate the utility of focusing on evidence-based principles.

SUMMARY

Introduction

This presentation focuses on violence in childhood and adolescence. As such, it focuses on types of violence most commonly associated with this developmental period, including school violence (bullying, fighting, aggression against and by teachers), serious gang and group-based violence (e.g., terrorist groups), and self-directed violence. These are among the most common forms of violence for this age group, and of concern worldwide. These have been targeted in global reports. For instance, the WHO report on violence and health (2002) reports high rates of both homicide and suicide during adolescence and into early adulthood (although suicide rates continue to increase with age). Rates in low and middle-income countries, on average, are more than twice as high as in high-income countries, suggesting an important need to understand what works in these settings. Eliminating violence in childhood and adolescence also has been framed as a human rights obligation, as noted in the 2006 UN Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children. Yet, as noted in the 5-year follow up to the UN report (2011), violence in childhood and adolescence continues at staggering rates—in some countries, including the US and the UK, children are 2-3 times more likely to be victims of violence than adults, 78 countries still authorize corporal punishment by teachers, and over 90 million girls in Africa have undergone FGM.

Violence of this scope cannot be reduced or eliminated by a single set of programs, most of which have been implemented and evaluated in the United States, Europe, and western countries. Further, in
related problem behaviors. Development and for prevention of aggression and important these types of activities can be prevention intervention, yet findings illustrate how lower aggression perpetration, particularly in boys to increased self-regulation and cognitive skills revealed that participating in the youth orchestra led children studied at two waves one year apart. Results 6 out relation to promoting positive developmental resources, often are easily implemented, and can be beneficial to children in multiple ways.

A Review of the Evidence

What this suggests is that it is important to consider risk and protective factors within specific country, cultural, and local contexts, and recommend prevention strategies that are sensitive to risk within these contexts.

More recently, there has been considerable interest in understanding what children need to succeed, with evidence suggesting that children who do well are less likely to be involved in violence as perpetrators and victims. This is quite relevant for prevention programming worldwide, as many different programs for children emphasize positive development. These programs may be particularly critical for children with limited access to family and community resources, often are easily implemented, and can be beneficial to children in multiple ways.

As an example, findings from a recent IADB-sponsored evaluation of the El Sistema National Youth Orchestra of Venezuela are presented in relation to promoting positive developmental outcomes and preventing aggression in children ages 6-14. This study was an RCT involving over 3,000 children studied at two waves one year apart. Results revealed that participating in the youth orchestra led to increased self-regulation and cognitive skills and lower aggression perpetration, particularly in boys growing up in the most distressed environments. Clearly, this program is not designated as a violence prevention intervention, yet findings illustrate how important these types of activities can be to children's development and for prevention of aggression and related problem behaviors.

As noted above, the scope of the problem of violence in childhood (both perpetration and victimization) is daunting and unacceptable. There is a relatively robust evidence base, as reviewed in various empirical articles, reviews, and global reports, listing risk factors across contexts, including individuals, schools, families, communities, cultures, and societies. Although relatively few multi-country studies of risk and protective factors have been done in non-western countries, it is plausible that some risk factors are less culture bound and more amenable to intervention worldwide.

For instance, high levels of impulsivity and poor impulse control have been robustly linked to children's aggression and violence. Because impulse control allows children to inhibit automatic, impulsive responding and reflect on their behavior, it is likely that this skill would predict lower levels of aggression cross-culturally. On the other hand, there is a robust literature linking authoritarian parenting with children's aggression, with the caveat that under certain conditions associated with more extreme environments (e.g., high violence), more authoritative parenting might be adaptive.

Other examples of programs for children and youth with potential preventive benefits are reviewed. These include organized recess, play time, sports activities, cooperative learning programs, service learning for youth, mentoring, and civic engagement. The assumption is that many regular activities can have preventive benefits, and that these activities can be intentionally enhanced to align with key processes linked to reducing risk and building resilience. Of course, for children with more extreme risk for violence and/or victimization, targeted interventions may be warranted. As will be discussed in this presentation, most recent evidence supports the importance of building in trauma recovery/adjustment and cognitive-behavioral skills into these programs. This is particularly important for recent victims of extreme trauma, such as children living in war zones or post-conflict societies.

The presentation concludes with a checklist of evidence-based principles to guide prevention programming drawn from the prevention, risk and resilience literature and across key developmental contexts. This checklist emphasizes key constructs that should be targeted across different levels of prevention—programs that target individual development, schools, families, peers, communities, and cultural norms. An important consideration is to highlight strategies that are relatively low cost and scalable in different countries. For example, programs that try to impact social norms around violence can operate at multiple levels in schools, community settings, and at the country level. Recent norm-changing interventions using soap operas in Africa and India are presented. Similarly, practices that target families should provide skills training for
effective parent-child interaction/behavior management and mobilize and help parents access support services. This can be accomplished by training parents as coaches to help other parents, building supportive groups of parents that meet regularly with some guidance, etc. Although there are model programs that can provide guidance for how best to do this, locally-developed programs also can be successful if they follow core principles. In conclusion, a program that has demonstrated success with immigrant Latina Mothers in the U.S., Madres a Madres, that was developed to respond to local conditions, is briefly reviewed.
Reducing Youth Violence: Tackling the Challenges in High Violence Societies

Maria Fernanda Tourinho Peres
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ABSTRACT

Since year 2000 homicide death fell 63% in São Paulo Municipality. What can explain such a huge drop in a small time frame? I will try to address this topic having in mind the challenging questions posed by Eisner and Nivette (2012) in a recent paper named “How to reduce the global homicide rate to 2 per 100,000 by 2060”. Our focus will be on homicide and specifically youth homicide, having Brazil and São Paulo Municipality, with interest in some specific very violent areas of the city, as examples to discuss the challenges for homicide death reduction in highly violent areas. Violence reduction in high violent areas, which suffer “a syndrome of characteristics” (Eisner and Nivette, 2012), should necessarily go beyond fragmented and focused violence prevention programs (all very necessary) to include actions aiming to reduce police violence and gross human rights violations, promote a positive presence of state institutions, broaden the opportunity for the young population to access formal and legal networks, strengthening social cohesion and trust and reduce the power and presence of criminal organization. Broad and comprehensive programs, including both state and civil society are an important step to achieve an effective violence reduction.

SUMMARY

In the nineties São Paulo Municipality had the second higher homicide mortality rate (HMR) among all Brazilian State Capitals. In 1999 HMR was 60.6 for the whole population. A decade later São Paulo presented the lowest HMR among state capitals in Brazil, values being 20.4 per 100,000 inhabitants. The reduction was on the order of 63%. What can explain such a huge drop in such a small time frame? In my speech I will try to address this topic having in mind the challenging questions posed by Eisner and Nivette (2012) in a recent paper named “How to reduce the global homicide rate to 2 per 100,000 by 2060”: 1) Is it possible to reduce homicide death globally to reach levels of pacified societies? 2) If it is possible, by what means?

When asking this two questions the authors wanted to know if it is possible to “effectively reduce homicide across the world” and what the role we (as academics and policymakers from different fields of knowledge) can have to help reach these aims. Taking the example of São Paulo I propose to discuss the importance of looking beyond outcome indicators (homicide drop) and try to understand the process by which homicide fell as part of what can be understood as an effective reduction in homicide death: high in magnitude, consistent and sustainable in time and reached by means that do not violate rule of law.

Our focus will be on homicide, broadly speaking, and specifically youth homicide, having Brazil and São Paulo Municipality, with interest in some specific very violent areas of the city, as examples to discuss the challenges for homicide death reduction in highly violent areas.

In 2012, according to UNODC, 437,000 people died because of intentional homicide across the world. The global average homicide rate was 6.2 per 100,000. Higher rates were found in Southern Africa and Central America, followed by South America, Middle Africa and Caribbean. Still according to UNODC “The 15-29 and 30-44 age groups account for the vast majority of homicides
globally, with almost half of all homicide victims aged 15-29 and slightly less than a third aged 30-44.” This is not a new evidence. In the World report on violence and health, published in 2002 by the WHO, the scenario was quite the same: a substantial difference in HMR among the countries, higher rates in poorer areas and a predominant young profile of the victims.

In Brazil we still face very high homicide mortality rates. In 2012 HMR in Brazil was 29.04 per 100,000 inhabitants, almost five times the global rate. For the young population values were 59.17, 50.70 and 32.36 for the 15 to 24, 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 year-old groups respectively. From 2000 to 2012, we had 649,187 homicide death, of them 537,214 were young victims between 15-44 years-old, what means 83% of all homicide death. In 2012 only we had in the country a total of 56.337 homicide death, of which 20.611 in the 15-24, 16,948 in the 25-34 and 8,853 in the 35-44 age-group, what means that more than 80% of our homicide are still among the young population.

Considering the 96 administrative districts of the city of São Paulo, in year 2000 HMR ranged from 5,85 to 110.47 per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2010, extreme values were 2,32 and 44,42 per 100,000. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that higher HMR are found in areas with concentrated social disadvantage, police violence, lynching, and execution. Even considering the drop we are facing in the last years, the inequity in the distribution of homicide risk persists. Higher rates are found in more deprived areas of the city.

Looking at homicide trends in São Paulo in the last decade we could think, initially, we are facing a successful example of violence reduction in a very high violent area. HMR fell drastically from 2000 on, mostly in the young population and among homicide committed with firearms. Global drop was on the order of 63% from 2000 (60.6 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 2010 (20.4 per 100,000 inhabitants). Even though the reduction occurred in 89 of the 96 administrative districts of the city, a stronger reduction is observed in peripheral areas with traditional higher HMR and social exclusion. Global trajectories models identified four distinct groups of districts, among which the main difference is the magnitude of the drop. Our data also suggest that groups with higher drops presented, in the beginning of the series, concentrated social disadvantage, worse living condition, lower formal employment, lower offer of social equipment and more family disruption.

Lot’s of hypothesis were raised to explain Homicide reduction in São Paulo. Time series analysis shows that the municipal annual percent variation in HMR is correlated with reduction in the proportion of youth in population, unemployment, state investment in health and sanitation, state and municipal investment in public security, incarceration rate and apprehension of firearms. In multivariate models the crude association between HMR and incarceration rate looses its significance after adjustment for unemployment rate and the percent of youth in the population.

Qualitative studies carried on in São Paulo shows that homicide reduction, even though perceived by those who live in peripheries as a reality, does not mean a pacification of social life or a reduction in violence itself. People continue to fall unsafe, and expressive parts of the young population are still living in the border of legality, with informal inclusion in labor market mostly through the participation in illegal drug market. The state is perceived as a violent and ineffective institution, mostly because of police violence, stigmatization, corruption and insufficient social programs. According to those that live in such traditionally violent areas, the fall in homicide can be explained by the presence of strong criminal organization, that are acting as a social control mechanism through “crime tribunals” and regulation of the right to kill. The reconstruction of life stories of young homicide victims in São Paulo, in the early 2000, will be used to show this mechanism in operation.

According to the ecological model proposed as a framework to understand violence, systematized in the World Report on Violence and Health (WHO, 2002), its determinants or risk factors are framed across the relationships between multi-level characteristics of individuals, their networks and relationships, the proximal communities where they live and the broad society. The ecological model should also be a guide for violence prevention interventions, once “each level in the model represents a level of risk and each level can also be thought of as a key point for intervention” (p.16). Therefore, all the levels should be involved to reach a comprehensive knowledge about violence and its determinants and an effective global violence reduction.

Such a complex model is hard to approach empirically and so most part of the knowledge we have today is limited to single levels, mostly the individual level of risk. At the same way most part of the violence prevention initiatives focus on single-level, well delimited risk factors. By now we have good evidence about the positive results of many of the initiatives that are being implemented all over the world, but most part of the evidence come from the US, as can be seen in the violence prevention evidence base data source: from the 345 existing abstracts about published studies evaluating the effectiveness of Youth Violence prevention initiatives, 262 are from the American region (of which 247 from the US, 3 from Jamaica, 1 from...
Colombia and 11 from Canada), 2 from African region, 60 from European region, 3 from South-east Asia and 18 from the Western Pacific region. In a recent review on youth violence impact assessment Moestue, Moestue and Muggah (2013) found 18 studies in Latin America and Caribbean, of which 11 were complete and published, being 8 in English and 5 in peer-reviewed academic journals. Countries where the evaluations were made were Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Jamaica. Even though we have good evidence about violence prevention and specifically youth violence prevention, little of them are from LMIC which traditionally have higher violence or homicide rates.

High risky or violent areas usually put additional challenges to violence prevention, mostly related to the concentration of social disadvantage and fragmentation of social relationships, lack of trust in one another, in the politicians and state institutions. Lack of opportunities, unemployment, state corruption, police violence, strong criminal organizations, easy access to firearms and drugs, allied with gross human rights violations, are among the factors that contribute to a fragile rule of law and to a socializing process of children and youth that tends to reinforce the adoption of risky and violent behavior.

Violence reduction in high violent areas, which suffer “a syndrome of characteristics” as stated by Eisner and Nivete (2012), should necessarily go beyond fragmented and focused violence prevention programs (all very necessary) to include actions aiming to reduce police violence and gross human rights violations such as lynching and executions, promote a positive presence of state institutions, broaden the opportunity for the young population to access formal and legal networks, strengthening social cohesion and trust and reduce the power and presence of criminal organization. Broad and comprehensive programs, including both state and civil society are an important step to achieve an effective violence reduction in the following years.
Preventing Civil Conflict: Effective Leadership and Good Governance

Robert Rotberg
Harvard University, Founding Director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict, President Emeritus of the World Peace Foundation, Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center

ABSTRACT

Anywhere an African polity does not fulfill the functions of a modern nation-state and discriminates against some of its own people; anywhere African leaders look after themselves, their lineages, and their kin rather than their entire citizenry; anywhere leaders appear to steal from their people; anywhere in Africa that is consumed by flamboyant corruption and criminality; anywhere in Africa dominated by greed without a social conscience; and anywhere lacking strong separation of powers and rule of law, plus a military subordinate to civilians, is at risk of a countervailing popular reaction and cataclysmic civil conflict. That is precisely what has happened so many times already in sub-Saharan Africa (as well as in 2011 and 2012 in North Africa and the Middle East).

Human agency brought Africa to its current state of disarray. Human agency must, equally, provide the wisdom and energy to meet Africa’s critical challenges and to chart a successful path forward. Those are the striking conclusions of an analysis of the determining role of leadership in all developing societies, as well as of a broad understanding of Africa’s history since 1960. Leaders clearly make a difference; the smaller and the more fragile the state, the more leadership actions are substantial and critical. Hence, the failed states of Africa never failed by themselves or on their own. They were driven to failure and thus to internal warring by purposeful leadership actions.

Intrastate conflict occurs in Africa and elsewhere not primarily because of colonial legacies or poorly drawn borders, not because of ancient hatreds between peoples, not exclusively because of competition for scarce resources, and not completely because of innate avarice. Instead, it is the failure of the modern nation-state in Africa and elsewhere to perform adequately – to deliver the essential political goods that are fundamental to the existence of a nation-state and that satisfy the expectations of its citizens – that causes ruptures of trust, the breaking of the implicit social contract between the state and its citizens, and outbreaks of reactive war.

SUMMARY

Africa has endured decades of war. From Western Sahara and Mauritania on its northwestern flank to the Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia on its northeastern periphery, and south through the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, and South Africa (mostly before independence in 1994), only some of the peoples of Africa have tasted the sweet fruits of sustainable peace and harmony within their own countries and across neighboring borders. Even Madagascar and the Comoros, off-shore, have known intermittent civil war, as have many of the countries in 2014 that are now free from fratricide. The legacy of this intrastate mayhem still hampers the development and curtails the prosperity and enhanced standards of living of countries as disparate and at one or more points “failed” as Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and the Sudan. Then there is the “collapsed” geographical entity of Somalia (but not Somaliland nor Punt) – in a class of its own, with civil war, potent non-state actors, and piracy.
In mid-2014, hot unresolved conflicts of great danger persist south of the Sahara: in the eastern Congo, in Darfur and in two other southern provinces of the Sudan, in South Sudan, in the Central African Republic, in Kenya, in Mali, in Mauritania, in Nigeria (and Chad and Cameroon), and in southern Somalia.

The transformation of sub-Saharan Africa from a region where hostilities between ethnic, geographical, linguistic, or religious groups are always raw and contentious into a region where everyone feels an integral part of and a valued contributor to the nation-state project is still ongoing. Distrust (political more than ethnic) across communities is rampant and widespread. Grievances are legion. Resource avarice abounds. So do zero-sum approaches to wealth and political advantage. The inability of many of the nation-states of Africa to keep their citizens safe and secure or to provide them with reasonably adequate quantities and qualities of essential political goods means that minorities often feel oppressed and ethnicity or some other separate identity often trumps national solidarity. Peoples feel threatened, especially when they believe that they and peoples similar to them are being preyed upon rather than protected by a central government — or by a ruling cabal that constitutes a regime in power. Likewise, if wealth opportunities are shared unequally or are channeled to a preferred group, anger intensifies and fuels antagonism. Leadership and governance, in other words, are key ingredients both of conflict creation and conflict resolution.

Anywhere an African state does not fulfill the functions of a modern nation-state and discriminates against some of its own people; anywhere African leaders look after themselves, their lineages, and their kin rather than their entire citizenry; anywhere leaders appear to steal from their people; anywhere in Africa that is consumed by flamboyant corruption and criminality; anywhere in Africa dominated by greed without a social conscience; and anywhere lacking strong separation of powers and rule of law, plus a military subordinate to civilians, is at risk of a countervailing popular reaction and catalyzicm civil conflict. That is precisely what has happened so many times already in sub-Saharan Africa (as well as in 2011 and 2012 in North Africa and the Middle East and today in Syria and Iraq). Those are among the realities that hold Africa back. Without the new approach to peace making that Africa’s emergent middle class now demands, even China’s warming economic embrace of Africa will be unable to create proper foundations for a new progressive African order unless leaders can be incentivized to lead more responsibly and to focus on good governance rather than plunder.

Human agency brought Africa to its current state of disarray. Human agency must, equally, provide the wisdom and energy to meet Africa’s critical challenges and to chart a successful path forward. Those are the striking conclusions of an analysis of the determining role of leadership in all developing societies, as well as of a broad understanding of Africa’s history since 1960. Leaders clearly make a difference; the smaller and the more fragile the state, the more leadership actions are substantial and critical. Hence, the failed and internally conflicted states of Africa never failed by themselves or on their own. They were driven to failure and thus to internal warring by purposeful leadership actions. Equally, those few African states that have never known civil conflict, those few states that have long been democratic, those few states with high incomes and high social returns per capita, and those polities today seeking to emulate Botswana and Mauritius, are all well-led, with strong political cultures and well-established political institutions.

Intrastate conflict occurs in Africa and elsewhere not because of colonial legacies or poorly drawn borders, not because of ancient hatreds between peoples, not exclusively because of competition for scarce resources, and not completely because of innate avarice. Instead, it is the failure of the modern nation-state in Africa and elsewhere to perform adequately — to deliver the essential political goods that are fundamental to the existence of a nation-state and that satisfy the expectations of its citizens (governance) — that causes ruptures of trust, the breaking of the implicit social contract between the state and its citizens, and outbreaks of reactive war. Conflict also is protective. Minorities (sometimes majorities) strike back against authority when they fear for their lives and their rights, or anticipate perpetuated assaults by the state. Conflict, in Africa and elsewhere, is rarely anomic, offensive, or without real or perceived state-delivered discrimination, deprivation, and oppression.

**Governance**

Nation-states exist to supply adequate quantities and acceptable qualities of essential political goods for their citizens. From the Westphalian epoch to the present, as monarchs were succeeded by early and then more mature forms of the modern nation-state, the role of the state was to exchange the provision of security and safety, rule of law, forms of participation, incipient and later more robust civil liberties and civil rights, opportunities for persons to prosper economically, roads and other arteries of commerce, human development (nowadays access to educational and improved health chances), and a sense of belonging to a noble and fulfilling larger enterprise for the wherewithal (taxes) to fund first the monarchs and then states, their executives, their legislators, their bureaucrats, and their diplomatic and martial adventures at home and abroad. These provisions, the political goods citizens
or inhabitants expect of their own political entities – their nation-states – collectively constitute the test of good governance. If governments of any kind of jurisdiction (nation-states, provinces, states, or municipalities) show that they are unable or unwilling to supply several or many of the requisite political goods, or if they supply hardly any of some of the more critical political goods, they could fail both objectively (according to determinations of comparatively low gross domestic product per capita or high crime rates, etc.) and subjectively (according to the polled sentiments of their citizens).

The many nation-states in Africa that have in recent decades endured massive bouts of intrastate conflict have all been collapsed, failed, or nearly failed polities. Conflict indeed has followed the breakdown of the nation-state in every case, from the Siaka Stevens era in Sierra Leone to the vicissitudes of today’s Sudan and Congo (Kinshasa). Thus it is the strengthening of the state – improving governance – and the building of the state (creating a robust democratic political culture) that prevents and will prevent the sliding of African states from weakness (or strength) toward failure, and hence into internal war and the denial of higher standards of living and advances in the human welfare of citizens. Think how Cote d’Ivoire in this century moved from an envious position of strength as compared to its neighbors into a decade of nasty civil war, forfeiting the benefits that its citizens had long enjoyed as a result of decades of comparatively good governance and adequate supplies of political goods – security, safety, and the rest. Note also how a rigged election in Kenya in 2007 led to outbreaks of rural and urban ethnic violence and to a perilous slide toward civil war and state failure. Kenya has since struggled to recover from its near plunge into failure and all-out intrastate conflict.

Failed states are those states that fall below a threshold of political goods supply; always, they fail to satisfy the safety and security minimums. That is, when a state’s citizens are preyed upon by state-controlled operatives or by outsiders crossing its borders, when the state loses its monopoly of violence within its borders and non-state actors (warlords) gain primacy within disaffected regions, then the state is insecure and failed. A state’s prime function is to eliminate attacks on the national order or social structure and “to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.” Likewise, even if a state is otherwise secure, if high levels of crime make its citizens unsafe it can become weak and unstable. High levels of crime, especially murders, rapes, and carjackings, indicate that the state is unable to perform appropriately for its peoples. Weakness ensues and breakdown can follow.

Without security and safety citizens cannot easily go about their daily pursuits, whether schooling, urban work, or farming without fear. Productivity naturally suffers, as does the pursuit of human happiness. Moreover, only where there is adequate security, perceived or real, is the delivery of other desirable political goods possible. That is, for the modern nation-state in Africa to deliver reasonable accumulations of political goods it must be both secure and safe. When the African state cannot perform in this manner, civil war often is a consequence, followed in some circumstances by outside intervention and the introduction of international security substitutes.

Once a nation-state is safe and secure it can – if capable – provide a predictable, systematized method of adjudicating disputes between individuals or groups, or between individuals and groups and the state. This constitutes an enforceable rule of law and also implies an effective and independent judicial system. Whether the legal framework is common law or Napoleonic is less significant than the extent to which the mechanism of law giving and law maintenance is separated from a nation’s executive. Once citizens observe that they can obtain justice from the courts without ruling party or presidential interference, citizens smooth their differences or reduce their antagonisms without resort to arms. Within Nigeria, in part because the rule of law is viewed as partial, and subject to flows of money, competition between ethnic groups for land, for employment, for residence (in Bauchi or Jos, say, or even in distant Zamfara), for schooling, for medical attention, and so on is settled with weapons rather than reason or adjudication. If the state is seen as weak or incapable, citizens default to their ethnic solidarities and defend themselves against others perceived as threatening their livelihoods or their opportunities.

A third essential political good permits, indeed in the more advanced polities, encourages free and open participation in a national political arena. This is “voice” – the ability of individuals and all peoples to express their views and their grievances freely, to participate in the ongoing affairs of the state without hindrance, to compete for public office without barriers, and to vote for their own preferred candidates without undue interference. Integral to this political good is respect on the part of the state

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3 For an excellent summary of exactly what went wrong, and how, see Daniel Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair* (New Haven, 2011), 269-284.
4 Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States,” 3
for essential human rights and liberties and the basic freedoms – of assembly, of expression, of religion, of language, and of community. Where the citizens of African nation-states enjoy this political good to the full, when they consider themselves free to be critical of their rulers and to campaign against perceived wrongs, there is a welcome absence of strife. Moreover, there may even be a strong sense of belonging to a state that is fulfilling its social contract. If so, and if the nation-state (like modern Ghana) has the leadership or means to perform well, then Ghanaians for example can maximize their individual educational and economic opportunities and, conceivably, begin to enjoy improved social attainments of the kind that are impossible when a state is mired in conflict.

Nation-states enable individuals to prosper through individual initiative or group effort. If their supplying of this fourth political good is energetic, GDPs per capita will grow, inflation rates will stabilize, macroeconomic indices will be robust, a central banking system will be sound, the local currency will be fairly valued, relative equality across groups and classes (as reflected by GINI coefficient scores) will prevail, and the regulatory environment will enable individuals to transact commerce without undue interference or delay. Nation-states which score well according to this category of political good have invested in extensive and well-maintained modern arteries of commerce (paved roads, railways, harbors, airports) and have embraced and extended their Internet and mobile telephone networks. Nation-states in conflict invariably have neglected the provision of modern infrastructures or have destroyed (as in Congo) inherited road networks. By plunging into conflict, too, they often undermine their macroeconomies and, inevitably, reduce GDPs per capita.

Thus the failure to satisfy any of these categories of governance tends to plunge nations previously regarded as “strong” into the throes of conflict. That happened to Cote d’Ivoire and is now driving Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa’s most populous entity, into all out internal conflict. Indeed, because Nigeria has long suffered from poor governance and insufficient national (rather than regional or parochial) leadership, the Boko Haram insurgency is more an example of how even seemingly solid, but poorly governed and poorly led entities can fall apart and prove very hard to put back together.
Promoting Justice and Making the Police More Effective

Lawrence Sherman
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ABSTRACT

Across the globe, high rates of violence appear to be correlated with low levels of police legitimacy. The explanation of this correlation may be elusive, but its implications are clear. If police and their societies can improve police legitimacy, they may be far more capable of reducing violence. Exactly how societies with high violence can achieve more police legitimacy is thus a central question for reducing global violence. One answer may be a global social movement that increases the self-legitimacy of police officers by shaping their practices on the basis of violence prevention research. Since its founding at Cambridge in 2010, the Society of Evidence-Based Policing has grown to almost 2,000 members worldwide, with police officers from countries as diverse as Argentina and Australia registered as members. The aims of the Society are scientific and professional, but their inspiration is highly moral: a quest for self-legitimation of the police based on their effectiveness in preventing harm to fellow citizens. Seen this way, evidence-based policing is thus both an end in itself, and a means to the self-legitimation of the police institution—a step that may be essential to increasing police legitimacy in high-violence societies. The best way governments can support this social movement is to make policing a middle-class profession, with higher salaries, higher educational requirements, and a global sharing of knowledge, all modelled on the medical profession.

SUMMARY

1. Introduction

No plan for reducing global violence can ignore the role of the police. At the very least, violence by the police (and state violence more generally) is an important part of the problem. In some Caribbean countries, homicides by police can range up to 20% of all homicides. Yet in such societies, overall violence rates are high as well. Whether the police are just failing to prevent violence, or helping to cause high violence, they must be considered as a potential part of the solution. But how?

A rational-instrumental answer to that question would focus on the growing body of knowledge about “what works” in policing (Sherman, 1997), now commonly described as evidence-based policing. As US police leaders travel the globe advising governments in high violence nations, they spread the message that violence reduction is a matter of tactical—or even strategic—competence. We know how to do this, their message suggests; you just have to do it “right.” But the “we” suggesting a technical solution includes a thick context of emotional and expressive support for the police that has never been created in many high violence countries. Unless police can gain the willing consent of the governed, the best technical procedures in the G-8 world may fail to reduce high levels of violence.

A symbolic-expressive strategy for police to prevent violence is sometimes offered as an alternative to a rational-instrumental one. In its extreme form, it suggests that police should stop doing things that create conflict, such as stop and search, and concentrate instead on cultivating personal
relationships with community leaders and residents. Yet the either-or premise of that claim fails to grasp the importance of police effectiveness at protecting citizens in the sustainability of police legitimacy (Sherman, 1998). At the time that murders were rising to their highest levels in the history of New York, police were carefully cultivating relationships with the law-abiding residents of local neighbourhoods. Meanwhile, many others complained that police were failing to protect innocent bystanders—even babies—from death by stray bullets.

This paper suggests that the best chance for policing to help reduce violence would be a combination of these two strategies: the instrumental and affective strategies. That combination may appear a lot easier than it would actually turn out to be, in practice. Yet if both are undertaken on the basis of the best research evidence, the combination may have some chance of success. The critical element would be a transformation of the police institution world-wide into a well-educated, middle-class profession, one that values research and its application—much of which has already happened in the UK and can happen elsewhere. That is not unlike the historical experience of medicine (Bliss, 1999). But like medicine, police transformation on this scale will require a lot of support from other institutions. Of special importance will be elected officials, civil servants and universities.

With adequate pay and social prestige across the police profession—at the levels currently found just for the top leadership in “officer corps” police systems such as continental Europe and the former British Empire—the police can improve their own moral sense of their legitimacy. Much theory, and some evidence (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012) suggests that “self-legitimacy” is a vital (and perhaps necessary) condition for establishing “external” or “public” legitimacy. And because police, like doctors, often judge themselves by short-term results of complex interventions, the key to building self-legitimacy may well be the application and creation of more reliable knowledge about effective police practices in local contexts. This means that police must not only apply research from the north Atlantic world in the developing nations; they must also conduct rigorous research to learn what works best in their own communities.

Getting to that point is exactly what a conference like this one can consider. What can the WHO recommend? What can the development banks do to help implement the recommendations? What can international collaborations of police agencies and universities do to help promote a plan? All of the questions of what is to be done must be answered, lest this essay remain an exercise in idle speculation. But the most important knowledge for answering them is not about policing. It is not about violence. It is, rather, about social movements.

The kinds of changes needed to transform police legitimacy in high-violence nations are so massive that they cannot possibly happen without the support of a substantial social movement. That is what succeeded in the abolition of slavery. That is why the abolition of the caste system in India has failed, despite legislation. That is what was required to ban smoking in public places, drinking-and-driving, and driving without seat belts (the latter of which has still failed to take hold in many high-violence nations). Ultimately, we must see the modernization of medicine as the result of a social movement as well. Hence the paper must introduce the evidence on social movements to suggest some strategies for the organizations already engaged in this work.

Central among them is the Society of Evidence-Based Policing, a British-based, civil society group that is not even yet incorporated. Most of its members appear to be employees of UK police agencies, although they have attracted colleagues and academics in many other countries as well. Exactly how the Society might, in the age of the internet and social media, mobilize resources to raise police self-legitimacy can be a central part of any plan for the police role in global violence reduction.

2. Theories of Police Legitimacy and Violence

This part of the paper will develop a Weberian perspective on compliance with law, complemented by the social psychology of procedural justice, the sociology of reintegrative shaming and defiance, and the sociobiology of group conflict. It will then summarize the theories of self-legitimacy in relation to external legitimacy.

Violence tends to be more prevalent in societies with low state legitimacy, at least across 65 societies (Nivette and Eisner, 2013). Whether that claim applies specifically to police legitimacy is more anecdotal than systematic, but it is a useful starting point for thinking about the role of police in violence prevention. In New York City in 1996, lower police legitimacy predicted higher violence in disadvantaged areas but not economically comfortable areas (Kane, 2005). The same may be true more generally across nation-states. Yet even if it is, that correlation does not imply cause and effect. If the rise of commerce or a middle class were primary factors driving down the use of violence to settle disputes, then the police may have simply reaped a “legitimacy dividend” from a pacifying society.

The frequently-observed correlations between inequality and violence do not settle the issue of
causality, since violence may help provoke those police required to protect the wealthy and powerful. The mere fact of their doing their job may reduce legitimacy of police, but the major cause of violence may be the broader legitimacy of the polity and economy. The key question for a 30-year plan is what we know from experimental evidence, broadly conceived, about whether attempts to increase police legitimacy have been able to reduce violent crime—including “natural experiments” in reducing offensive police conduct.

3. Evidence on Police Legitimacy and Violence

This section reviews what evidence we have about the potential causality of less violence by more legitimacy of the police. One historical reading of the evidence on cultural changes in violence (Eisner, 2003; Pinker, 2011), for example, is that today’s prosperous nations developed legitimate policing with a rule of law, violence declined in society.

4. Evidence on Police Effectiveness Against Violence

This section summarizes what we know about the results of testing police practices for their effects on violence reduction. It will be a min-version of policing violence for prevention: what works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising. This may be the longest part of the paper, just to demonstrate how much we already know—and the failure of G-8 nations to incorporate it into their own police practices to date, albeit with strong movement in that direction in the UK and elsewhere.

5. Middle-Class Cops: Raising Police Legitimacy

This section reviews the contentious issues of where police are located in the social class structure of societies. It develops a broad concept of class, especially on both sides of the middle-class boundaries—skilled workers below and elite managers or professionals above. It shows how certain values, such as gender, class and ethnic equality, come to dominate a middle-class police culture. It also develops an argument for why this matters for legitimacy, how it has succeeded so dramatically in the UK and to a lesser extent in the US, and why it can be almost self-defeating at the point of excess (as in occasional cases of refusal to take risks against health and safety rules, leaving citizens in harm’s way instead of police). Finally, it tackles the multi-faceted question of intelligence, in terms of what kinds and combinations of intelligence are needed for police to reduce violence.

6. Relevant Principles of Social Movements

This section will summarize the evidence on social movements in general, with several case studies of successful and unsuccessful efforts to transform both the police and other professions. It will focus heavily on the potential for the Society of Evidence-Based Policing to raise police self-legitimacy, as well as societal legitimation of police institutions.

7. What is to be done?

This section will offer a specific plan for action, organized by institutional sector: G-8 police, police in high-violence nations, WHO/UN/international development banks, G-8 governments, governments of high-violence nations, universities in both kinds of nations, other civil society organizations including Amnesty International, Transparency International, major religions, public health, education ministries and the military.
Treating Violent Offenders More Effectively: Alternatives to Punishment

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ABSTRACT

Most concepts for violence prevention are in the fields of primary and secondary prevention. However, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders is also important for a decrease of violence in societies. After some skepticism due to the ‘nothing works’ doctrine in the 1970s such approaches are now based on numerous evaluation studies and systematic reviews. This ‘what works’ evidence shows that correctional treatment is more effective than the traditional focus of criminal justice on pure punishment and deterrence (in which treatment is embedded for legal reasons). According to various meta-analyses the recidivism rates of appropriately treated violent offenders are 5-30% lower than the rates in control groups. Results on the most effective types of interventions and on more complex approaches such as the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model are briefly outlined. Of course, as in other areas of violence prevention, there are still practical and methodological problems (e.g. with regard to the treatment of sexual, young, personality disordered and domestic violence offenders). A model for a view beyond the mere content of programs will be presented. This leads to various recommendations for a further improvement of the treatment of violent offenders: Development of evidence-bases in the many countries with serious deficits in this field, widen the perspective to broader interventions systems, more attention to implementation science, more well-controlled outcome evaluations, more individualized program elements, more links to neurobiology and desistance research, more direct comparisons between community and custodial measures, and more integration of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention approaches.

SUMMARY

Introduction

Contrary to public opinion the prevalence of violent crime is currently not at a peak in many countries. Historical analyses suggest that there is a decrease of serious violence over centuries. Although such analyses had to cope with methodological problems, they indicate a long-term trend of civilization in modern history. A positive development is also visible in recent data since 2000. A number of countries, including the United States, observe a ‘crime drop’ not only in official police statistics but also in victim surveys. This development is insofar encouraging as it suggests that a further substantial reduction of violence – as stated in the ambitious title of the conference - may be possible if efforts in policy, practice and research are increased.

Achieving such an aim requires solid knowledge about the causes of (reduced) violence and adequate interventions. Although there is a wealth of theories of violence, the recent decrease in various countries is difficult to explain. Many hypotheses have been recommended, for example: the aging society, less abuse and corporal punishment in childrearing, reduced lead in fuel, reduced birth rates among high-risk minorities, better education, more effective policing and situational prevention, more and better developmental prevention, economic conditions and so forth. None of these explanations is fully convincing and can be generalized across countries because there are different trends in otherwise similar societies. As in the field of individual risk and
protective factors many influences can play a role. Therefore, efforts in different policy areas with a range of effective programs are necessary to achieve a sustainable impact on the society level. The respective policies should not rely primarily on correlational data, but must be based on sound evidence from well-controlled program evaluations.

The potential role of correctional treatment

Within the framework of policies to reduce violence the criminal justice system (CJS) plays an important role. However, when measures in this field are discussed in the general public, policy arena and media, the focus is often on tough punishment or selective incapacitation, i.e. long-term incarceration of high-risk cases. It is assumed that tough punishment will deter offenders from future crime and/or they will ‘outgrow’ their criminal propensity over time. However, there is no clear evidence for deterrence with regard to serious offending and some research even suggests criminogenic effects of incarceration and other forms of pure punishment. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to more constructive, future-oriented approaches of the CJS such as correctional treatment and offender rehabilitation. At first glance, such measures may not be seen as ‘prevention’ in the narrow sense because they are implemented after people have offended. They also have to be balanced with the various other aims of criminal law such as compensation of guilt or general deterrence. Depending on what aims are emphasized, there is still some controversy about the role of correctional treatment, but the ‘nothing works’ doctrine of the 1970-80s has been replaced by the current ‘what works’ movement.

Against this background my presentation will analyze the potential of offender treatment as an approach to reducing criminal violence. Although rehabilitation is on the level of tertiary prevention, it is highly relevant because many correctional treatment programs address the core group of persistent, serious and violent offenders. According to international research this small group is responsible for approximately half of traditional crime and also for a large part of different kinds of violent offences. Therefore, effective programs to reduce re-offending in this group would make a significant contribution to an overall reduction of violence.

Based on these assumptions the planned contribution will provide a brief overview on the recent ‘what works’ literature (including own evaluations of programs for sexual, young, drug addicted and domestic violence offenders). The focus is not on single studies but more on systematic reviews and meta-analyses because decisions in policy and practice require replicated evidence. I will summarize the evidence for a range of intervention types and also address relevant factors that go beyond the content of programs and take organizational factors and community framing conditions into account.

The evidence on ‘what works’

Hundreds of more or less well-controlled evaluations and a number of systematic reviews and meta-analyses have been carried out on the treatment of serious and violent offenders. Often, the respective target groups are heterogeneous (e.g. rapists, child molesters with or without paraphilia) and many offenders are versatile with regard to kinds of offending. In addition, treatment contexts, implementation quality and other features vary so that there are always some inconsistencies between the findings of different studies on the same or similar programs. These problems are not specific for offender treatment but very similar in other areas of violence prevention (e.g. in developmental prevention, my second field of interest). In spite of such problems some general trends in offender treatment can be summarized:

Well- replicated positive effects: For example, cognitive-behavioral treatment (CBT) with anger management, interpersonal problem solving and social skills training as most important elements; structured therapeutic communities (TCs); milieu and social therapy; Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Functional Family Therapy (FFT) for young violent offenders.

Positive effects: For example, basic education; vocational training programs (if useful in life); offender-victim mediation (not for all groups); drug courts (with treatment elements); psychopharmacological and substitution drug treatment (for some groups).

Promising effects, but more sound studies needed: For example, prison work and non-custodial employment programs, electronic monitoring (but technical problems and violation of orders), pharmacological treatment (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors; SSRIs) and anti-androgenic medication for subgroups of sexual offenders; counselling programs; sports and adventure/challenge programs

No effects: For example, pure sanctions and deterrence (e.g. longer vs. shorter imprisonment, scared straight, shock incarceration), intensive supervision without education/treatment elements, first generation boot camps

General conclusions with regard to effect sizes (ESs) are difficult because the base rates and types of reoffending in the control groups play a role. Often mean effects are in the range of 5% to 15% less
reoffending in the treated groups, however, there are also a number of reviews with stronger ESs. In our most recent meta-analysis on the treatment of sexual offenders there was an average reduction of sexual reoffending of 27%. Such effects are not only relevant with regard to prevention of further victimization, but also pay off in financial terms. Relatively sound effects have particularly been observed when programs were based on the Risk-Need-Responsivity Model. This means they precisely target the offenders’ risk level, criminogenic needs, and learning styles. Programs that adhered to all three principles showed up to 30% reduction of recidivism, whereas programs that did not adhere to any of the three principles even had slightly negative outcomes. This was the case for general, sexual and young offenders and indicates that good intentions in violence prevention are not enough.

Based on such findings, many countries increased the treatment of violent offenders in the 21st century. In various CJSs comprehensive criteria of appropriate programs have been developed for program accreditation/quality assurance. I will briefly address the work of the Correctional Services Advisory and Accreditation Panel in England and Wales, in which I have long experience. Although the number of well-controlled evaluations in the UK is still too low, there are various positive results. For example, a recent study of 36,000 offenders showed a reduction of ca. 13% in reoffending of CBT-treated offenders in comparison to a nationwide matched cohort. In particular, the respective effects on violence are promising. Recent data also showed a decrease of the prevalence and (even stronger) of the frequency of reoffending after custodial and community sanctions since 2000.

However, in the UK, as well as internationally, most treatment evaluations are not randomized controlled trials. Although RCTs should be carried out when possible, they are not always feasible in the field of serious violent offenders. For various reasons, there are only few RCTs or sound quasi-experiments on sexual offenders, personality disordered offenders and domestic violence perpetrators. A further limitation is that most evaluations of programs for violent offenders stem from North America and the English-speaking world. In a recent EC funded project on transnational approaches to reducing reoffending we found nearly no controlled evaluations in the majority of European countries. The situation is even worse in Africa, Asia and South America where practice can rarely make use of any local evidence. It is also important to widen the view from isolated treatment programs to patterns of interventions that can make a stronger impact. This includes relations between the 'what works' and desistance research and the role of natural protective factors in reducing violent reoffending. A model will be presented that integrates a number of factors that are important for the effectiveness in routine practice (e.g. program content and implementation, staff and organizational factors, characteristics of the target groups, and methodological factors of the respective research).

Conclusions/Recommendations

Over the last decades the ‘what works’ approach has made clear progress and established basic knowledge on how to reduce recidivism in serious and violent offenders and thus protect potential victims. Now we need more differentiated scientific knowledge and practical experience on what works for whom, when and under what conditions. This is particularly necessary for target groups such as sexual offenders, young offenders, personality disordered offenders, and domestic violence perpetrators. The following strategies are recommended in these and other fields:

1. Establishing evidence-based approaches to violent offender treatment in countries with clear deficits in research and practice in this field.
2. Strategies that are guided by implementation science and contain sound process analyses and outcome studies not only on isolated programs, but systems of interventions.
3. Strategies that keep the strengths of structured programs but include more individualized elements (e.g. take into account the differences between sexual offenders with and without a paraphilia).
4. More programs that include findings of neurobiological research and desistance studies (in relation to no. 3).
5. More systematic investigation of community vs. custodial interventions (where legally possible) and related analyses of effectiveness and cost-benefit.
6. More integration between selective and indicated prevention and offender treatment (because the key features of successful programs are very similar in both areas).
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